



제4회 한류국제학술대회

The 4th World Congress for Hallyu

옥스포드 대학교 오리엘 칼리지

2016년 9월 26 ~ 28일

Oriel College, Oxford University

September 26 ~ 28, 2016

주최 / Host

한류기획단 Hallyu Strategy Council

주관 / Organizer

세계한류학회 World Association for Hallyu Studies

한국문화산업교류재단 Korea Foundation for International Culture Exchange

한류융복합연구소 Institute of Hallyu Convergence Research

제 4회 한류국제학술대회 후원기관

Sponsoring Organizations for the 4th World Congress for Hallyy



문화체육관광부



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Congress Summary

Opening Speech

The 4th WAHS Essay/Article Contest, 1st Hallyu Video Contest
Award Ceremony

The 4th World Congress for Hallyu

WAHS Directors

The Organizing Committee

Facts and Data

Opening Speech



Dear ladies and gentlemen, our distinguished guests, WAHS regional presidents and Hallyu inspired students from all over the world,

Welcome to the 4th World Congress for Hallyu.

As the phenomenon known as Hallyu continues to grow and diversify, the question of its constitution begs further exploration and explication. It is for this reason that our goal for this year's Congress is to define what the "'Han' in 'Hallyu'" and the "'K' in 'K-pop'" is.

It has been almost two decades since the term "hallyu" was coined with reference to Chinese reception and perceptions of the rapid spread of Korean TV dramas and popular music, and is a term that has later come to refer to not just Korean cinema and television productions, but to all and any products of Korean popular culture. At the beginning of the much lauded wave, it made sense to group together cultural products that originated from in Korea into a single category based on their shared common point of origin. However, as this vast array of products has become more varied and multi-faceted, while also having traveled in multiple directions and flowed across borders, the singular point of commonality has become much more difficult to define.

Today, the "K" in K-hiphop relative to award-winning Korean films premiering at the Cannes film festival, or Korean food now being successfully marketed to North Americans by large culture industry giants such as the CJ group? Indeed, the point of commonality has become far more complex than a mere common point of origin.

The range of interests have broadened in the struggle to bolster the growth of Korean cultural products seen and consumed outside Korea, modes of propagation have differentiated, as have the types of media that now carry so many myriad messages that it has become more difficult to describe them as being part of a single phenomenon.

This is why we, as scholars and thinkers on the subject of Korea's putative wave, have taken it upon ourselves to think more deeply about what continues to drive many levels of this wave and how to understand each type of these varied cultural texts on their own varied terms.

I thank Prof. Chris Rowley for allowing us to use this splendid place as our home for the 4th World Congress for Hallyu. I also thank all those who devoted their time and energy to the promotion and completion of the preparation of this congress. I thank all of you for sharing your new research results in the field of Hallyu Studies. I particularly express my gratitude to those who graciously provided us with the funds necessary to organize this event. The ministry of culture, sports, and tourism, the ministry of foreign affairs, and the Korea Foundation of International Culture Exchange, Samsung, PNS Networks, SM Entertainment, Korea Telecom, KP Communications, and TNS Korea.

I wish you would all have a great time here in Oriel College and look forward to the two days of wonderful knowledge exchanges. Thank you very much.

Gil-Sung Park
Chair & President
World Association for Hallyu Studies

The 4th WAHS Essay/Article Contest Award Ceremony

The 1st Hallyu Video Contest Award Ceremony

Board of Examiners

Chair of Board of Examiners	Gil-Sung Park (Korea University)
Board of Examiners	Ingyu Oh (Korea University)
	Ricardo Regatieri (Korea University)

Award Winners

Article Division

- Grand prize -
 - Title: Finding Home in the “K” of K-Pop: Perceived Space and Affective Home Building of Expat K-Pop Fans in South Korea
 - Name: Cody Black
 - Affiliation: Duke University
- Grand prize -
 - Title: How Does Korean Musical Theatre Perform the Nation and Its History on Global Stages in the Time of Korean Wave?
 - Name: Kyungjin Jo
 - Affiliation: Graduate Center of the City College of New York
- 1st Prize -
 - Title: Hallyu Helps Bridge the Culural Divide - Mending Fences on the 38th Parallel
 - Name: Jonathan Reade Corrado
 - Affiliation: George Washington University
- 2nd Prize -
 - Title: When the Islamic world meets Korean culture: A study of Hallyu in Tunisia
 - Name: Eunbyul Lee
 - Affiliation: Korea University

Essay

- 1st Prize -
 - No one selected
- 2nd Prize -
 - Title: Han In Hallyu
 - Name: Malcom Kritseh Kumar
 - Country: Fiji
- 3rd Prize -
 - Title: What is the K in K-Pop?
 - Name: Brittany Khedun-Burgoine
 - Country: United Kingdom

Hallyu Video Contest

- 1st Prize -
 - Title: K-POP in my eyes
 - Name: Ji Young Lee
 - Country: South Korea
- 2nd Prize -
 - Title: Korea through my eyes
 - Name: Shauna Granger
 - Country: USA

Sponsoring Organization
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

The 4th World Congress for Hallyu

The 4th World Congress for Hallyu, which is to be held in Oxford, England, invites individual paper abstracts and panel proposals on “What is the ‘K’ in K-Pop or What defines the ‘Han’ in Hallyu?” Several studies in the past argued that K-pop or K-dramas were not really Korean, inviting conjectures that K-pop or K-dramas were either hybrid cultural forms (thus, no creativity) or Western cultural forms created by Koreans (thus, new forms of creativity). However, we want to develop the debate further. We need to think of Hallyu as not merely Korean cultural products that come from South Korean cultural industries, but as things that are in some way Korean in substance as well as form. This is a time in which Korean Studies scholars should critically engage the question of how to think about Korean popular culture in terms outside of merely describing their recent and sudden upsurge in popularity, outside of the excitement imbued by the newness and fascination with the idea that the world is finally interested in Korea and its cultural environs. We need to think about the core of the matter, the *Han* in Hallyu, or what defines Korean cultural products as Korean at all, as Hallyu enters maturity, beyond the time when intellectual concern with the phenomenon can be merely concerned with describing its popularity.

Papers and panel proposals are invited that deal with theoretical and empirical debates on Korean cultural flows, including:

1. How to define the constituent parts of the Korean wave itself.
2. But as we look at other fields as well, one can continue to ask the question of what is particularly Korean about “K-fashion,” off or on the runway? Like K-pop, or a Kia car production line, does the Koreanness lie in the product itself, or in the processes that informed its production?
3. Also, how might we actively define or describe Korean cultural products outside of a negative definition such as “Hallyu 3.0” (which is everything/anything that 1.0 and 2.0 is not). Where might one look to see other aspects of the “wave” — or rather, to understand it as a constant cultural flow?
4. What are some Hallyu forms that we either haven’t seen yet or perhaps might not have been defined within the boundaries of the concept? How might we redefine the concept to include other, aspects of popular culture?

As usual, divisional and special sessions are prepared as follows:

1. Divisional Sessions: Korean Language and Culture, K-Medical, Hallyu Policies and Management, K-sports, Entertainment Industries, Tourism and Migration, Fashion and Beauty, K-food, K-game, Soft Power and Cultural Exchange
2. Special Sessions: What is ‘K’ in K-pop? What is ‘K’ in K-dramas? What is ‘Han’ in Hallyu?

WAHS Directors

Chair and President

Gil-Sung Park (Dept. of Sociology, Korea University)

Vice Presidents

Choun-Ki Joo (School of Medicine, The Catholic University of Korea)

Won-Ho Jang (Dept. of Urban Sociology, University of Seoul)

Secretary General & Director of General Affairs

Ingyu Oh (Research Institute of Korean Studies, Korea University)

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Japan	Seong-Bin Hwang (Dept. of Communication and Media Studies, Rikkyo University, Tokyo)
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China	Mary Jane Ainslie (Head of Film and Television, University of Nottingham Malaysia Campus)
Philippine	Sarah Domingo Lipura (Ateneo de Manila University)
Indonesia	Desideria Leksmono (Universitas Pelita Harapan)
USA East	Hearin Shin (Dept. of English, Vanderbilt University, TN)
USA Central	Hun Shik Kim (University of Colorado)
USA West	Russell Ahn (Martial Arts Program, UC Berkeley)
Canada	Millie Creighton (Dept. of Anthropology, University of British Columbia, Vancouver)
Argentina	Maria del Valle Guerra (College of East Asian Studies, Alcala University, Buenos Aires)
Brazil	Yun Jung Im Park (University of São Paulo)
Austria	Sang Yeon Sung (Dept. of East Asian Studies, University of Vienna, Austria)
Germany	Ute Fendler (University of Bayreuth, German)
UK South	Keith Howard (SOAS, University of London)
UK North	Haekyung Um (School of Music, University of Liverpool)
UK Midland	Chris Rowley (Cass Business School, City University London)
France Central	Frederic Martell (The French Institute for International and Strategic Affairs)
France South	Peter Von Staden (Kedge Business School, Marseille)
France East	Jane Carda (K-POP Life Magazinem, CEO)
Australia	Chris Baumann / Sarah Keith (Macquarie University, Australia)
New Zealand Wellington	Stephen Epstein (School of Languages and Cultures, Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand)
New Zealand Auckland	Margaret Kitchen (School of Curriculum and Pedagogy, University of Auckland, New Zealand)
Israel	Nissim Otmazgin (Dept. of East Asian Studies, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel)

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Wonho Jang (Dept. of Urban Sociology, University of Seoul)

Directors of Strategic Planning

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Dong Hwan Shin (KP Communication CEO)

Director of International Affairs

Emanuel Pastreich (College of International Studies, Kyung Hee University)

Director of Editorial Affairs

Soo Wan Kim (Hankuk University of Foreign Studies)

Director of Finance

Sung Hyun Park (YoungSan University Affiliate Professor)

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Se Han Lee (CEO, GT&T)

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Jung Sook Kim (Dept. of Korean Language and Literature, Korea University)

Haiyoung Lee (Dept. of Korean Studies, Ewha Women's University)

Ho Yeong Jung (TNS Korea)

Gwan Su Choi (Kim & Chang law firm)

Changyong Choi (KDI School of Public Policy and Management)

Auditors

Gyeong Yeong Jung (KIM & JANG Accounting Office)

Sang Bong Kim (Gangnam LLP)

Branch Directors

Gangwon Branch Seungho Ryu (Dept. of Visual Culture, Gangwon National University, Chuncheon)

Western Branch Jungkyu Sun (College of Chinese Studies, Korea University, Sejong)

Daegu Branch Junghyo Kim (College of Music & Performing Arts, Keimyung University, Daegu)

Busan Branch Sangwoo Yoon (Dept. of Sociology, Donga University, Busan)

The Organizing Committee

Chair

Gil-Sung Park (WAHS President)

Executive Committee

Ingyu Oh (WAHS Secretary General)

Chris Rowley (UK Midland President)

Organizing Committee Members

Hye Seon Hwang (Executive Secretary)

Ricardo Regartieri (Korea University, Research Professor)

Andrea Rowley (Oxford Coordinator)

Sou Hwan Kang (Korea University, PhD Student)

Jong Ho Kwon (Korea University, Department of International Studies)

World Association for Hallyu Studies Official Homepage

· [HTTP://WWW.IWAHS.ORG](http://WWW.IWAHS.ORG)

The 4th World Congress for Hallyu Studies Official Homepage

· [HTTP://KOREANWAVECONGRESS.ORG](http://KOREANWAVECONGRESS.ORG)

Facts & Data

Number of Panel Participants: 66

Koreans: 35

Other Nationalities: 31

Number of Panels: 18

Korean Panel: 1

English Panels: 15

Spanish Panel: 1

Indonesian Panel: 1

Countries of Participants: 14

Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, France, Germany, Indonesia, Japan, Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, United Kingdom, USA

Congress Information

Congress Venue

Registration


Congress Dinner

Congress Venue

From Airport to Venue

Oriel College, Oxford University

Oxford OX1 4EW, United Kingdom



Oriel College

Tel. +44 (0)1865 276555


Email. lodge@oriel.ox.ac.uk

From Airport to Oriel College

Public Transportation (Bus&Metro)


Heathrow Airport -> Go to London Heathrow Airport Central Bus Station -> Take 'The Airline OXF (Oxford City Centre)' -> After 7 Stops, Get off At Queens Lane (Stop J1) -> 2min Walk to Oriel College

- Bus Fare: £23.00 (One Way)
- Time Taken: 1Hour and 2 Mins
- Taxi Fare: £162.83 (UK Taxifarefinder.com)



Oriel College

Oriel Square, Oxford OX1 4EW
Tel: 01865 276555



- Congress Registration: Main Entrance
- Oriel B&B Accommodations: Lodge
- Oriel B&B Breakfast: Oriel College Hall
- Congress Dinner: Oriel College Hall
- Reception Dinner: Champneys

Registration

Please register at the registration desks, and pick up the conference program, name tag, and other related materials when you register. The registration desk will be operated at Main Entrance

* All participants should carry the name tag during the conference period. Those without the name tag may not be admitted to conference sessions and other occasions like Congress Dinners.

Registration Locations

Oriel College Main Entrance

On Site Registration Fees

	Classification		On-site registration fee
Presenters	WAHS Members	Professionals	\$65 (£50)
		Students	Free
	WAHS Non-Members	Professionals	\$130 (£100)
		Students	\$65 (£50)
Audience	Professionals		\$65 (£50)
	Students		Free

Congress Dinner

Registered participants are invited to the Congress Dinner (September 27th). The time and venue for the dinner are as follows. Participants must present meal coupons on the name tag to enter Congress Dinner.

	9/27 (Tue)
Congress Dinner	<Oriol College Hall> 18:00-20:00

Congress Program

Overview

Panel Details

Overview

Sep. 26 (Monday)

	Main Hall	Harris Lecture Theatre
14:00-18:00		
18:00-20:00	Reception Dinner for Regional Presidents and Invited Guests	

Sep. 27 (Tuesday)

	Main Hall	Harris Lecture Theatre
08:00-09:00		
09:00-10:00		Opening Ceremony Opening Speech (Prof. Gil-Sung Park) Welcoming Speech (Prof. Chris Rowley) Award Ceremony Photo Session
10:00-10:30		
10:30-12:00		<2016-1> K-Literature Round Table: Translating Korean Literature · Chair: Hae-Rin Shin · Featured: Deborah Smith, Mingyu Park, Jin-Kyung Lee, Kyung-Hyun Kim
12:00-14:00		
14:00-15:30		<2016-4> Theme Session: What is the "K" in K-Pop or What defines the "Han" in Hallyu? · Chair: Wonho Jang · Featured: Maria Luisa T. Reyes, Minhyong Kim, Sana Ho, Jung Eun Song, Cody Black
15:30-16:00		
16:00-17:30		<2016-7> Student Round Table: K-pop in the UK · Chair: Keith Howard · Featured: Olivia Emma Beteta, Cody Black, Jonathan Reade Corrado, Kyungjin Jo, Scott Jowett, Hollie Caroline Johnson, Paola Laforgia, Shuanise Ayopelu Efunwale Odunaiya, Dhyana Rao-Middleton, Anna Yates-Lu
18:00-20:00	Congress Dinner Plenary Speech · Prof. Kyung-Hyun Kim	

Sep. 28 (Wednesday)

	Main Hall	Harris Lecture Theatre
09:00-10:00		
10:00-12:00		<2016-10> Session: Korean Entertainment Industry · Chair: Jaibeom Kim · Panelists: Yoo-Soo Hong, Hui-Wen Chen, Deho Kim, Phillip Park, Rachel Joo
12:00-14:00		
14:00-15:30		<2016-13> Session: Student Video Contest · Chair: Millie Creighton · Panelists: Jiyoung Lee, Eun Ji Lee, Hana Park, Shauna Granger
15:30-16:00		
16:00-17:30		<2016-16> Session: Multivalent Han (Koreanness): Reading Korean Culture and Literature through Critical Theory · Chair: Julie Choi · Panelists: Duk-Ae Chung, Sooyoung Chon, Haerin Shin

Harris Seminar Room	Sanders Room
Registration	

Harris Seminar Room	Sanders Room
Registration	

Coffee Break	
<2016-2> Session: Hallyu in Asia · Chair: Millie Creighton · Panelists: Mihye Jeong, Arnel Joven	<2016-3> Session: Hallyu Theory (in Korean) · Chair: Kee-Hyung Kim · Panelists: Gyeong-Mook Kim, Sung-Hyun Park, Seol Ri Ryu · Discussant: Sang-hyun Nam
Lunch Break	
<2016-5> Session: Student Paper Contest · Chair: Millie Creighton · Panelists: Cody Black, Jonathan Reade Corrado, Kyungjin Jo, Eunbyul Lee	<2016-6> Session: Hallyu & Overseas Koreans · Chair: In-Jin Yoon · Panelists: Yun Jung Im, Jung-Sun Park, Joan Yoon
Coffee Break	

<2016-8> Session: Hallyu & Soft Power · Chair: Peter von Staden · Panelists: Virginie Vial, Ingyu Oh, Hun Shik Kim, Andrew Eungi Kim	<2016-9> Session: Visual Hallyu: Return to Text · Chair: Ute Fendler · Panelists: Kyung Hyun Kim, Ji Hyeon Kim, Sarah Domingo Lipura

Harris Seminar Room	Sanders Room
Registration	
<2016-11> Session: Cultural Contagion and Hallyu · Chair: Gil-Sung Park · Panelists: Minhyoung Kim, Janghyuk Lee, Sou Hwan Kang, Hyun Jee Kim	<2016-12> Session: Hallyu in Latin America · Chair: Yun Jung Im · Panelists: Ricardo Regatieri, Paula Fernandes, Constanza Jorquera
Lunch Break	
<2016-14> Session: Hallyu in Indonesia · Chair: Desideria Leksmono · Panelists: Sigit Pamungkas, Eric Gunawan	<2016-15> Session: WAHS Directors Meeting (Invited Directors Only)
Coffee Break	
<2016-17> Session: Fandom Studies · Chair: Desideria Leksmono · Panelists: Sarah Keith, Jung Eun Song	<2016-18> Round Table: Food & National Identity · Chair: Ayumi Takenaka · Panelists: Ingyu Oh, Peter von Staden

Panel Details

<2016-1>

Sep. 27 - Tuesday

10:30 ~ 12:00

Harris Lecture Theatre

K-Literature: Translating Korean Literature

<2016-2>

Sep. 27 - Tuesday

10:30 ~ 12:00

Harris Seminar Room

Hallyu in Asia

<2016-3>

Sep. 27 - Tuesday

10:30 ~ 12:00

Sanders Room

Hallyu Theory (in Korean)

Chair

- Hae-Rin Shin (Vanderbilt University)

Participants

- Deborah Smith
- Mingyu Park
- Jin-Kyung Lee (University of California, San Diego)
“The Historicities and Particularities of ‘Universalism’ in The Vegetarian and Re-inventing the ‘National’ in the Globalized World”
- Kyung-Hyun Kim (University of California, Irvine)

Chair

- Millie Creighton (University of British Columbia)
“Masking the Korean Wave at a UNESCO Event in Shanghai, China :
Exploring Hallyu’s Merging of Modern Performance Forms and Korean
Traditional Dance via Globalizing Organizations.”

Participants

- Mihye Jeong (Freelancer)
“Heart and Beauty inside Hallyu”
- Arnel Estrada Joven (University of Asia and the Pacific)
“Asserting Korean Identity, Hallyu Internationalisation, and Strategic
Localisation: Case Studies of Early K-Pop Immersion in Japan”

Chair

- Kee-Hyung Kim (Korea University)
“K-pop의 개념과 범주”

Participants

- Gyeong-Mook Kim (Duksung Women’s University)
“A Strategy for Crossing the Chasm: Learning from Cookin’s Success”
- Sung-Hyun Park (Yongsan University)
“新한류콘텐츠, 융복합 한류! 기업의 브랜드 콘텐츠, 융복합 한류!”
- Seol Ri Ryu (KOFICE)
“한류에 대한 해외 연구 경향 분석: 메타분석과 텍스트 네트워크 분석을 중심으로”

Discussant

- Sang-hyun Nam (KOFICE)

<2016-4>

Sep. 27 - Tuesday

14:00 ~ 16:00

Harris Lecture Theatre

Theme Session**What is the "K" in K-Pop or What defines the "Han" in Hallyu?**

<2016-5>

Sep. 27 - Tuesday

14:00 ~ 15:30

Harris Seminar Room

Session 3**Student Paper Contest**

<2016-6>

Sep. 27 - Tuesday

14:00 ~ 15:30

Sanders Room

Session 4**Hallyu and Overseas Koreans****Chair**

- Wonho Jang (University of Seoul)
"Hallyu as a Glocal Culture"

Participants

- Maria Luisa T. Reyes & Sarah Domingo Lipura (Ateneo de Manila University)
"The Han in Hallyu -- Made in Korea, from Korea, and therefore, 'K'?"
- Minhyoung Kim (Hankuk University of Foreign Studies)
"Taste of Hallyu in a Liquid Modern World"
- Sana Ho (Soochow University)
"What is 'Han' in Hallyu? : 'Han' as 'Jeong' and 'Han' in food related K-drama"
- Jung Eun Song (University of Seoul)
"Interpreting the meaning of 'K' and the roles of the Korean Wave to build the brand images of Korea"
- Cody Black (Duke University)
"Finding Home in the 'K' of K-Pop: Perceived Space and Affective Home Building of Expat K-Pop Fans in South Korea"

Chair

- Millie Creighton (University of British Columbia)

Participants

- Cody Black (Duke University)
"Finding Home in the 'K' of K-Pop: Perceived Space and Affective Home Building of Expat K-Pop Fans in South Korea"
- Kyungjin Jo (City College of New York)
"How Does Korean Musical Theatre Perform the Nation and Its History on Global Stages in the Time of Korean Wave?"
- Jonathan Reade Corrado (Georgetown University)
"Hallyu Helps Bridge the Cultural Divide - Mending Fences on the 38th Parallel"
- Eunbyul Lee (Korea University)
"When the Islamic World Meets Korean Culture: a Study of Hallyu in Tunisia"

Chair

- In-Jin Yoon (Korea University)

Participants

- Yun Jung Im (University of São Paulo)
"The impact of Hallyu over the Korean Community in Brazil"
- Jung-Sun Park (California State University, Dominguez Hills)
"Hallyu and American youths: Cultural Consumption, Identity and Power"
- In-Jin Yoon (Korea University) & Joan Yoon (Korea University)
"The Effects of Korean Wave on the Younger Generation of Overseas Koreans"

<2016-7>

Sep. 27 - Tuesday

16:00 ~ 17:30

Harris Lecture Theatre

Student Round Table

**K-pop in the
United Kingdom**

Chair

- Keith Howard (SOAS, University of London)

Participants

- Olivia Emma Beteta (SOAS, University of London)
- Cody Black (Duke University)
- Jonathan Reade Corrado (Georgetown University)
- Kyungjin Jo (Graduate Center of the City University of New York)
- Scott Jowett (SOAS, University of London)
- Hollie Caroline Johnson (SOAS, University of London)
- Paola Laforgia (SOAS, University of London)
- Shuanise Ayopelu Efunwale Odunaiya (SOAS, University of London)
- Dhyana Rao-Middleton (SOAS, University of London)
- Anna Yates-Lu (SOAS, University of London)

<2016-8>

Sep. 27 - Tuesday

16:00 ~ 17:30

Harris Seminar Room

Session 5

Hallyu and Soft Power

Chair

- Peter von Staden (Kedge Business School)

Participants

- Virginie Vial (Kedge Business School) & Elenora Lollo (Institut d'Asie Orientale, Lyon, France)
"South Korean Soft Power in Indonesia: Geopolitical and Economic Regionalisation in The Digital Age"
- "The epidemics of a Cultural Wave : The Geographical and Socio-Economic Spread of Hallyu in Indonesia"
- Ingyu Oh (Korea University) & Peter von Staden (Kedge Business School)
"To What Extent Does the Soft Power of Hallyu Change Fan Consumption Choices?"
- Hun Shik Kim (University of Colorado, Boulder)
"Two Decades of Korean Wave as Soft Power Public Diplomacy"
- Andrew Eungi Kim (Korea University)
"The Success of the Korean Wave and Competitions for Soft Power in East Asia"

<2016-9>

Sep. 27 - Tuesday

16:00 ~ 17:30

Sanders Room

Session 6

**Visual Hallyu:
Return to Text**

Chair

- Ute Fendler (University of Bayreuth)
"Routes and Roots: K-Hiphop or Hiphop from Korea"

Participants

- Kyung Hyun Kim (University of California, Irvine)
"INFINITE VARIETY: On-screen Captions, Korean Traditional Aesthetics, and Shifting Remake Politics in Korean Variety Shows"
- Ji Hyeon Kim (Goldsmiths, University of London)
"Amateur Webtoons as the new driving force of the K-comics wave: a case study of amateur competitions on global Webtoon platforms"
- Sarah Domingo Lipura (Ateneo de Manila University)

<2016-10>

Sep. 28 - Wednesday

10:00 ~ 12:00

Harris Lecture Theatre

Korean Entertainment Industry**Chair**

- Jaibeom Kim (Sungkyunkwan University)

Panelists

- Yoo-Soo Hong (Institute for Creative and Innovative Development-World) & Hui-Wen Chen (Wenza Ursuline University of Languages)
“From an Innovation Economy to a Creative Economy? : Implications of Hallyu to China and Taiwan”
- Deho Kim (Art Life Publishing), Jaibeom Kim (Sungkyunkwan University) & Phillip Park (Kyunghee University)
“K-Pop의 해외시장 진출 전략: 제도적 거리(institutional distance)의 관점에서”
- Phillip Park (Kyunghee University)
- Rachel Miyung Joo (Middlebury College)
“Sports in the Korean Wave : Connecting Hallyu and Sports through Mega Sporting Events”

<2016-11>

Sep. 28 - Wednesday

10:00 ~ 12:00

Harris Seminar Room

Session 7**Cultural Contagion and Hallyu****Chair**

- Gil-Sung Park (Korea University)

Participants

- Minhyoung Kim (Hankuk University of Foreign Studies)
“Understanding Hallyu Fandom from a Perspective of Cultural Contagion”
- Janghyuk Lee (Korea University)
“Assessing the Impact of Country of Origin Perception on Purchase: A Case of K-pop”
- Sou Hwan Kang (Korea University)
‘Han’ in Hallyu as a ‘Stimuli of Invention’ in the American Food Culture: The Reconstitution of Categories through Institutional Entrepreneurship”
- Hyun Jee Kim (Korea University)
“Political Economy of Korean Film Industry : Focus on the decline of film exports to the European Market”

Chair

- Yun Jung Im (University of São Paulo)

Participants

- Ricardo Pagliuso Regatier (Korea University)
“Korean modernity as pop culture: Hallyu in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Peru”
- Paula Fernandez (Quilmes National University)
“When Hallyu meets Argentina’s open TV: The Korean image as seen through Telefe’s social media”
- Constanza Jorquera (University of Santiago)
“The Korean Dream and K-Lyfe: Hallyu as an instrument of change and social mobilization in developing countries in Asia and Latin America.”

<2016-12>

Sep. 28 - Wednesday

10:00 ~ 12:00

Sanders Room

Session 8**Hallyu in Latin America**

<2016-13>

Sep. 28 - Wednesday

14:00 ~ 15:30

Harris Lecture Theatre

Student Video Contest

Chair

- Millie Creighton (University of British Columbia)

Participants

- Jiyoung Lee (IIBI Korea) & Eun Ji Lee & Hana Park(IIBI Korea)
“K-POP in My Eyes”
- Shauna Granger (University of North Texas)

<2016-14>

Sep. 28 - Wednesday

14:00 ~ 15:30

Harris Seminar Room

Session 9

**Hallyu in
Indonesia**

Chair

- Desideria Leksmono (Universitas Pelita Harapan)
“The Future of K-comic and K-animation as The Product of Popular Culture”

Participants

- Sigit Pamungkas (Universitas Pelita Harapan)
“The Future of K-comic and K-animation as The Product of Popular Culture”
- Eric Gunawan (Universitas Pelita Harapan)
“Korean Cinema in The Eyes of Indonesian Moviegoers: Hallyu Revisited and Redefining”

<2016-15>

Sep. 28 - Wednesday

14:00 ~ 15:30

Sanders Room

**WAHS Directors
Meeting**

Invited Directors Only

<2016-16>

Sep. 28 - Wednesday
16:00 ~ 17:30
Harris Lecture Theatre

Session 10

**Multivalent
Han (Koreanness):
Reading Korean
Culture and Literature
through Critical Theory**

Chair

- Julie Choi (Ewha Womans University)
“The Mass Ornament, Flanerie, and Fashion, Gangnam Style”

Participants

- Duk-Ae Chung (Ewha Womans University)
“The Anamorphosis of Oppa: Male Subjectivity in the Novels of Kim Youngha, Kim Sojin, and Park Minkyu”
- Sooyoung Chon (Ewha Womans University)
“Reading the Korean T.V. Drama Series <A Deep Rooted Tree> as an Ecoian Archival Detective Fiction”
- Haerin Shin (Vanderbilt University)
“Fraying the Fringes of Bare Life : Vegetal Agency in Han Kang’s The Vegetarian”

<2016-17>

Sep. 28 - Wednesday
16:00 ~ 17:30
Harris Seminar Room

Session 11**Fandom Studies****Chair**

- Desideria Leksmono (Universitas Pelita Harapan)
“Audience Involvement Between Audience and Media Personae of Korean Fashion as Process of Identity Development Among Indonesian Youth”

Participants

- Sarah Keith (Macquarie University)
“K-pop and ‘Asia Capability’ in Australia”
- Jung Eun Song (University of Seoul)
“The Influences of K-pop fandom on Substantiality of K-pop: The case study of Philippine K-pop Convention, Inc.”

<2016-18>

Sep. 28 - Wednesday
16:00 ~ 17:30
Sanders Room

Round Table 2

**Food and
National Identity**

Chair

- Ayumi Takenaka (Aston University)
“Food and National Identity in Comparative Perspective”

Participants

- Ingyu Oh (Korea University)
- Peter von Staden (Kedge Business School)

Abstracts

SESSION 2016-1

*K-Literature Round Table:
Translating Korean Literature*

The Historicities and Particularities of “Universalism” in The Vegetarian and Re-inventing the “National” in the Globalized World

Jin-kyung Lee / University of California, San Diego

Contextualizing my discussion of Han Kang’s novel, *The Vegetarian*, this presentation will first address the changing meaning of “national” literature in relation to the ongoing cultural globalization at large as well as in relation to the transition that South Korean literature has been undergoing since the mid-1990s when the Student Movement began to dissolve itself. The presentation will explore the ways in which various factors contribute to the intertwining of the “global” and “national” literature. In particular I am interested how cultural globalization and the “(re-)branding” of the “national” literature deploy new strategies of “universalization” and “allegorization” among others. Some of the questions, related to the larger issues mentioned above, I would like to pose are as follows: what happens to “historicity” and cultural specificity and locality in the late capitalist globalized world, where ideas, things, and cultures not only get hybridized but also homogenized?; how does “globality” relate to the notion of “universality”?; what has the notion and practice of “Orientalism” changed in relation to “globality”?

SESSION 2016-2

Hallyu in Asia

**Masking the Korean Wave at a UNESCO Event in Shanghai, China:
Exploring Hallyu's Merging of Modern Performance Forms and
Korean Traditional Dance via Globalizing Organizations.**

Millie Creighton / University of British Columbia

Though it is tempting to pair popular Korean variety shows such as Infinite Challenge and Running Man with postmodernism because of their reliance on 'reality television' genre and technique of self-reflexivity, this talk argues that their themes, aesthetic forms, and use of on-screen captions embrace aesthetic and moral conventions that depart from those of the West. This talk probes on what might be the underlining reasons behind the Korean variety shows' success in Asia—particularly in China. Without necessarily affirming or debunking the widespread notion that these are shows based on, what Henry Jenkins calls, "transmedia storytelling," I attempt to locate the dominant pulses of these variety shows in the East Asian traditions of p'ansori, Confucianism, and even an aversion toward phonocentrism that is rooted in the Western modernity. After exploring the themes and the performative techniques of the shows as ones deeply rooted in the Asian tradition, I intend to problematize the prevailing remake theories that still insist on the bifurcated system of 'original vs. copy.' Through the rumination of the cultural flow between Japanese, Korean, and Chinese variety shows, this study will attempt to shift the meaning behind cultural authority that shape up remake debates.

Heart and Beauty inside Hallyu

Mihye Jeong / Freelancer

Korean wave, led by K-Pop, has several impacts, such as industrial, social, cultural, verbal (lingual), beauty related, ethical and other impacts on Japan, and other regions. Mostly referred to phenomenon around K-pop and Hallyu in Japan, I shall focus on mental impacts and mental influence side of Hallyu here. Such mental impacts are beyond entertainment and consumption. Any other pop culture may never have had such deep impact mentally on fans, then, which somewhat have changed fans' mindset. I shall sort out these unique and exclusive features of Hallyu and K-pop into eight parts, briefly explained, to focus on mental side of K-pop and Hallyu impacts. And, I shall conclude these impacts turned into the discovery of heart and beauty inside Hallyu.

Asserting Korean Identity, Hallyu Internationalisation, and Strategic Localisation: Case Studies of Early K-Pop Immersion in Japan

Arnel E. Joven / University of Asia and the Pacific

In the first decade of the twenty-first century, SM Entertainment ventured into what became second-generation K-Pop. In less than two years, SM Entertainment managed to promote their Korean artists in Japan with a Japanese label. This paper begins by looking at the strategies in which Korean entertainment companies tied up with Japanese company Avex Trax, and promote famous K-Pop Artists such as BoA and DBSK or TVXQ among the Japanese as “Japanese,” without specifically stating so. While BoA launched her career in Japan as early as the 2001, DBSK was launched with a Japanese identity, “Tohoshinki” in 2006, replete with the five artists singing in Japanese, conversing in fluent Japanese, and appearing in the media as consumers of Japanese culture. After BoA and Tohoshinki’s success in Japan, many other artists followed suit, as the trend still continues today.

This paper engages the problematique of Hallyu’s localised presence in Japan. While there seems to be a diplomatic quagmire in the political relations between Korea and Japan, hallyu serves as a form of cultural diplomacy. Among the Japanese public, there has been a dramatic, more positive view towards Koreans and Korean culture among mainstream Japanese due in large part to Hallyu through K-Pop. This paper thus engages these developments in analysing the Japanisation of K-Pop Artists as a strategic method for the Korean entertainment industry to successfully and overwhelmingly penetrate the conservative Japanese market. In using case studies of SM Entertainment’s BoA and TVXQ, this paper looks at K-Pop’s version of the “Winter Sonata Phenomenon” in Japan. The Japanese are well aware that K-Pop artists are obviously Koreans, yet they “consume” them in popular culture as localised Japanese. This research on cultural anthropology, looks at the phenomenological assertion of Korean cultural identity – repackaged as Japanese.

SESSION 2016-3

Hallyu Theory
(Korean Panel)

K-pop의 개념과 범주

Kee-hyung Kim / Korea University

한류 3.0의 시대가 도래했다고 하지만, 여전히 한류 문화를 이끌고 있는 주된 영역은 1.0 시대의 K-drama와 2.0 시대의 K-pop이다. 특히 K-pop은 유튜브와 같은 인터넷 매체를 통해 시간적·공간적 경계를 넘어 향유되고 있으며, 문화적으로 드라마보다 더 큰 영향력을 발휘하고 있다.

이 발표는 K-pop의 개념과 범주를 점검하는 데 목적이 있다. K-pop은 기본적으로 타자의 시선으로부터 개념화 된 용어라 할 수 있다. 1990년대 후반 일본에서 J-pop의 상대 개념으로 명명된 이후 두루 사용되기 시작했다는 점에서 그러하다. K-pop은 오늘날 ‘한류’의 대표적인 문화 현상으로 인식되고 있으며, 거의 보편화된 용어로 폭넓게 자리 잡고 있다. 그러나 정작 K-pop이 가리키는 대상은 무엇이고 그 범주는 어떠한지 등에 대한 학술적 검토는 충분히 이루어지지 않고 있는 듯하다. K-pop에서의 ‘K’, 즉 Koreaness는 K-pop의 존립 기반임에도 불구하고 K-pop에 대한 정의가 제대로 이루어지지 않고 있는 상황인 것이다.

선행 연구에서 보이는 K-pop의 개념 규정이 다양하다는 사실이 그 점을 잘 보여주고 있다.

몇몇 대표적인 사례를 정리해 보면 다음과 같다.

- 한국 대중음악 전반을 가리키기보다는 해외에서 관심을 끌고 있는 한국 주류 대중음악의 최신 경향, 더 구체적으로는 아이돌 그룹의 팝을 지칭(김창남)
- 한국의 음악 산업을 통해 생산되고 일본을 비롯한 (동)아시아 권역에서 소비되는 대중음악 및 그와 연관된 문화를 포괄적으로 지칭하는 국제적 고유명사(신현준)
- 한국에서 생산되어 세계로 발신하는 한국의 대중음악(박애경)
- 글로벌 시장에서 대중적 인기가 있는 한국의 댄스음악(한국민족문화대백과사전)
- 한국음악을 총체적으로 지칭하는 것이 아니라 주로 아이돌 가수, 그룹이 부르는 한국의 댄스음악(서민수 외)
- 1990년대 이후의 한국 대중음악 중 아이돌이 주축이 되어 생산된 서구 음악 장르, 특히 힙합, R&B, 록, 일렉트로닉 음악이 가미된 댄스음악(이수완)
- 1990년대 후반 이후 댄스음악 중심의 주류 장르(이상욱)

위의 내용을 보면, K-pop에 대한 개념 규정이 크게 세 가지 측면에서 다루어지고 있음을 알 수 있다. ‘한국’이라는 생산지역, ‘해외’라는 소비지역 그리고 ‘1990년대 이후’라는 시간적 범위가 그것이다. 물론, ‘대중성’이 강조되는 경우도 있지만, K-pop에서 ‘K’의 실체가 무엇인가에 대한 깊이 있는 탐구는 보이지 않는다. 생산지로서의 ‘K’, 서구음악 장르에 의해 형성된 ‘K’에 주목하고 있을 뿐이다.

한국→해외로의 방향성과 1990년대 이후라는 시간적 범위에 주목하여 대중음악으로서의 K-pop의 개념 문제를 논하는 시각이 지닌 일정한 유효함을 부정할 수는 없다. 그렇지만 이러한 시각으로만 접근할 경우, 자칫 K는 정말 생산지에 머물 수밖에 없으며 지속적으로 제기되는 ‘무국적성’과 관련된 비판에서도 자유로울 수 없다. 이는 곧 K의 실체는 없다는 주장으로 연결되고 나아가 한류의 정체성을 부정하는 결과로 이어질 가능성도 있다.

이 발표에서는 기존 연구에서 보이는 접근 시각의 장점을 포괄하되 나아가 K-pop에 내재된 장르적 속성 혹은 특질과 개념의 통시적 변모과정에 주목하여 논의해 보고자 한다.

A Strategy for Crossing the Chasm: Learning from Cookin's Success

Gyeong Mook Kim / Duksung Women's University

This study provides a qualitative in-depth analysis of an entertainment company, PMC Production Corporation. Interviews with top management team and performance professionals, reviews of company's archives, and personal observation highlight basic principles for crossing the chasm. Based on these investigations, the study presents the principles for crossing the chasm; establishing customer-defined value, focusing on competency, building a culture to support excellence and relentless improvement, utilizing differentiated marketing, promoting lateral thinking, emphasizing simplicity, utilizing outside networks, emphasizing learning organization, operating primarily through a global mind-set.

新한류콘텐츠, 융복합 한류! 기업의 브랜드 콘텐츠, 융복합 한류!


Sung Hyun Park / Youngsan University

한류가 대세다. 한국대중문화로 시작된 한류는 이제 관광한류, 전통한류, 음식한류, 패션 한류, 미용한류, 의료한류, 스포츠한류, 건설한류 등 해외시장에서 선전하는 모든 제품과 서비스는 한류라는 명칭으로 사용되고 있다. 그만큼 한국대중문화의 세계적 인기를 동경하는 한국 내 분위기를 반영하고 있는 현상일 것이다.

한국대중문화의 세계적 인기, 즉 '한류'에 대해 우리는 왜 열광하는가? 이는 해외로부터 대중문화를 수용해 오던 상황에서 역으로 한국의 대중문화를 세계로 확산시키며 자국민들에게 민족적 자부심을 고취시키고 있다. 즉, 과거 일제 식민지 경험과 한국전쟁의 아픈 경험을 딛고 일어선 한국의 경제적 위상을 높인 일에 더하여, 문화라고 하는 감성적 영역에서 서의 위상을 제고시키고 이와 더불어 내부적으로는 국민들의 자부심을 높이고 외부로는 한 국의 국가적 위상을 높이고 있는 것이다.

한국대중문화의 인기는 콘텐츠 산업의 직접적 수익 뿐 아니라 관련 산업의 동반성장, 그리고 국가이미지 향상으로 나타나고 있다.

먼저 콘텐츠 분야의 매출액은 5년간 평균 4.6%씩 증가하여 2015년 약 99조 6천억원에 이르고 있으며 수출액은 5년간 평균 7.5% 성장하여 2015년 약 57억 달러를 달성하였다.



〈그림 1〉 2011-2015 콘텐츠 매출액



〈그림 2〉 2011-2015 콘텐츠 수출액

* 출처 : 강경석(2016), 한국콘텐츠진흥원 K컬처 정책포럼 세미나 자료집

한류를 시대적 흐름에 따라 살펴보면 크게 드라마가 주도했던 '한류 1.0', K-pop이 주 도한 '한류 2.0', 그리고 드라마, 영화, K-Pop으로 인해 한국의 패션, 미용, 한식, 관광 등 한국생활문화로 그 선호가 이어지는 현 시대를 '한류 3.0'으로 규정하고 있다(한류백서, 2013).

2013년 중국에서 폭발적인 인기를 모았던 SBS 드라마 〈별에서 온 그대〉는 문화한류가 생활한류로 확장되는 전형적인 사례를 보여주고 있다. 드라마에 등장한 치킨과 맥주, 라면, 의류('천송이 코트'), 립스틱 등 드라마 관련 상품들도 날개 돋친 듯

팔려나갔으며 드라마 주요 촬영지를 방문하기 위해 중국관광객들이 몰려왔다. 2014년 한국을 찾은 중국관광객 비율이 약 40% 상승한 571만명을 기록(한국관광공사, 2015)한 것은 바로 드라마의 인기에 기인한다고 볼 수 있다.

최근에는 <태양의 후예>가 중국 동시 방영으로 큰 인기를 모았고 역시 이 드라마에서 주 인공 송중기가 먹었던 홍삼 제품은 지난해 같은 기간보다 2배 가까이 매출이 늘었고 송혜교가 사용한 립스틱 역시 판매 사흘 만에 품절되었다는 소식이다. 뿐만 아니라 현대차가 험 찬한 투싼은 전달 대비 평균 계약율이 18% 가까이 상승했고 극중 자율주행 기능을 선보인 제네시스도 예약 문의가 쇄도하는 것으로 알려졌다¹⁾.

한류콘텐츠의 인기가 실생활문화 선호로 이어지면서 타 산업분야에 미치는 경제적 효과를 추산하는 여러 연구들이 발표되고 있다.

하지만 이와 같은 한류에 대해 우려스러운 목소리가 들리고 있다.

첫째로, 상승하는 콘텐츠 인기와 그에 따른 파급효과에 비해 콘텐츠 업계 자체의 수익은 미미한 수준이라는 것이다. 일례로 '별그대' 열풍의 직간접적 경제효과가 5,300억원에 이르는 것으로 추정²⁾되지만 정작 드라마 제작사 수익은 5억 원에 불과하여 한류 콘텐츠 인기는 '대박', 콘텐츠 업계 수익은 '족박'이란 현실을 보여준다.

매년 국가경제성장률보다 높은 수치로 성장해가는 콘텐츠 산업이지만 2014년을 기준으로 한국 전체 산업 수출 중 문화콘텐츠 수출이 차지하는 비율은 약 0.9%에 불과하다. 그리고 0.9% 중 K-Pop과 방송 수출이 차지하는 비율은 각각 약 6% 내에 머물고 있어 한류의 인기 에 비해 초라한 수익 구조를 보여준다.

둘째 콘텐츠의 획일성에 대한 문제이다. 한류콘텐츠에 대한 문제점들을 지적할 때 항상 제기되는 문제점은 바로 비슷한 드라마 전개와 비슷한 음악의 유형, 그리고 한정된 콘텐츠 장르였다(한국문화산업교류재단, 2015). 다양한 한류 상품을 만들지 못한다면 한류의 지속성 장을 담보할 수 없을 것이다.

최근 문화산업이나 한류의 관심사는 '융합(convergence)'이다. 영화와 뮤지컬의 융합으로 무비컬이라는 장르가 관심을 받고, 인터넷과 드라마의 융합으로 웹드라마 시장이 급속히 성장하고 있다. 한류의 핵심요인이 드라마와 음악인 점을 고려할 때, OST 시장의 전망은 밝다. 대중음악도 단순히 음원이나 뮤직비디오만으로 급변하는 미디어 환경에서 살아남기 어려운 시대가 되었다. 음악으로 시작해서 코스타에 상장하는 등 기업화, 대형화 된 엔터테인먼트사들은 적극적인 부가사업진출을 시작했다. YG는 패션, 화장품 그리고 외식사업 등을 적극적으로 추진하기 시작했고, SM는 여행, 공연, 외식, 노래방사업 등에 이어 첨단 공연 특허까지 출원하고 지구 반대편에서 실시간 가상공연을 펼치기 시작했다. 한국의 강점인 IT기술이 ICT기술로 성장하고 있는 것이다. 그리고 음악장르의 다양화와 새로운 창작기반지원을 위해 인디레이블 설립, 인수도 시작했다(하재근, 2016). 또한 글로벌 소비재 기업들은 한류콘텐츠의 인기로 수익이 상승하자 콘텐츠와 융복합된 서비스나 상품들을 사업에 적용하고 있다.

결국, 콘텐츠 산업 분야에서 융복합 콘텐츠의 발굴과 개발에 박차를 가하는 것은 새로운 시장을 선점하고 발전시키려는 블루오션 전략이라 할 수 있다.

현재 한국의 대기업과 제조업 중심의 산업구조로는 창업 활성화, 중소기업 육성, 일자리 창출에 한계가 있는 만큼 서비스 산업과 함께 콘텐츠 산업을 기업의 성장 동력으로 활용하는 방안에도 적극적인 필요가 있는 것이다. 융복합 한류의 경제적 가치는 타산업분야로 재 생산되고 분배되는 선순환적 산업 공유지 생태계를 조성할 수 있을 것이다. 한국경제의 새로운 동력이자 공공재로서의 한류 만들기를 위해 기업과 콘텐츠 업계 간 협업 모델을 개발하는 노력이 필요할 때이다.

1) 연합뉴스(2016. 04. 09.), '태양의 후예' 경제적 효과는?...별그대 3조 넘어설 듯

2) 한국일보(2016. 06. 19.). "단발성 한류 마케팅, 디즈니를 배워라"

한류에 대한 해외 연구 경향 분석: 메타분석과 텍스트 네트워크 분석을 중심으로

Seol Ri Ryu / Korea Foundation for International Culture Exchange

본 연구는 해외에서 진행된 한류 연구를 대상으로 한류 발전 단계에 따라 한류 2.0' 과 '한류 3.0' 시기로 구분하여, 메타분석과 텍스트 네트워크 분석 방법을 통해 종합적으로 검토하였다. 그 결과, 최근 12년 간 총 46편의 연구가 진행된 것으로 나타났다. 시기별로 보면 한류 2.0시기(15편)에 비해 3.0시기(31편)에 약 2배 가량의 연구가 진행되었으며, 연구 대상 또한 3.0시기에 기존에 중심으로 연구되었던 아시아 지역을 넘어 전 세계를 대상으로 확산되었음을 확인 하였다. 특징적으로 한류 2.0시기에는 '문화적 동질성' 을 한류의 원인으로 보았으나, 3.0시기에는 '문화적 혼종성' 과 '세계화' 의 결과로 해석한 것으로 나타났다. 한편 수요자 측면에서 2.0시기에는 한류 콘텐츠를 수동적으로 시청하는 '시청자' 로서 역할이 강조됐지만, 3.0시기는 'k-pop'을 능동적으로 소비하고 체험하는 '이용자' 로서 역할 변화가 관찰됐다. 또한 2.0시기에는 미디어를 통해 한류 콘텐츠를 접하면서 영향 받게 되는 '성별' 의 경계 및 역할에 대한 담론이 주를 이뤘으나, 3.0시기에는 보다 '산업' 적인 차원에서 한류 콘텐츠를 바라보게 되었다.

SESSION 2016-4

Theme Session:

*What is the “K” in K-Pop or What
defines the “Han” in Hallyu?*

Hallyu as a Glocal Culture

Wonho Jang / University of Seoul

This paper deals with the characteristics of Hallyu in terms of the ‘glocal culture.’ Glocal culture can be defined as a culture created through the influence of globalization but contains a mixture of global and local contexts, and is in turn consumed transnationally. Regarding Hallyu as an exemplary glocal culture, the paper describes global impacts to Hallyu, hybridity of Hallyu as a mixture of globalization and Korean socio-cultural Characteristics, and transnational consumption of Hallyu. In explaining the role of the Korean socio-cultural characteristics, the paper emphasizes hyper-competition and cosmopolitan striving in the Korean society.

In addition, the paper suggests that the local countries consuming Hallyu are now creating other glocal cultures through local re-interpretations of Hallyu. The glocalizing dynamics of Hallyu can be seen in the process of consumption in foreign countries and in the creation of new pop culture in the countries that consume Hallyu. It is an important factor for the creation of transnational cultural communities where people of different countries share cultural identities and tastes, and develop mutual understanding and cooperation. The paper finally lists the activists of the fan clubs of the K-POP groups as evidence of cultural communities based on Hallyu.

The Han in Hallyu -- Made in Korea, from Korea, and therefore, “K”?

Maria Luisa T. Reyes, Sarah Domingo Lipura / Ateneo de Manila University

Cultural forms, institutions and practices like books, magazines, television, cinema, and advertising – referred to as “mediascapes by Arjun Appadurai -- have the power to imagine and produce images restructuring personal and collective identities. In particular, popular forms like K-drama, K-pop and Hallyu are social practices that embody the social imaginary of lived relations. Following Appadurai, a well-known anthropologist, in his widely cited and anthologized article, “Disjuncture and difference in the global cultural economy” (1990; 1996), they are sites of global processes in which the image they embody thus propelled by the imagination plays a major role in constituting agency in a global cultural flow of today’s new global order. But as “mediascapes,” they not only disseminate information but also produce images of subjectivities and the world that are fractured and contradictory, transforming the “K” and the “Han” into complex fields of the Korean culture industry in the global cultural economy.

This panel looks into the complex images embodied by mediascapes in order to describe how they imagine the “K” in K-pop, K-drama and the “Han” in Hallyu, interrogating the contradictory ways in which identity is perceived and agency is possible in today’s globalization.

Taste of Hallyu in a Liquid Modern World

Minhyoung Kim / Hankuk University of Foreign Studies

In many ways, the global popularity of Hallyu and its hybrid quality would be exemplary of today's world of "liquid modernity," as which Zygmunt Bauman describes what others have designated to be "late modernity" or "post-modernity," with the growing conviction that change is the only permanence, and uncertainty the only certainty (2013). Based on a state of fluids, while solids have clear spatial dimensions, he claims to consider "liquidity" as a key concept when we wish to grasp the nature of the present in the modernity discourse. Following Bauman's primary statement that modernity has been a process of "liquefaction" or "melting the solids" from the start, this study aims to examine the "liquid" nature of Hallyu, which feeds on the fluidity of space and time, and thus exemplifies a new global power. Represented by the huge success of "Gangnam Style" and the influence of Psy's works, the taste of Hallyu is satisfied in the porosity of the local, the global, and other locals, with less need for contextual meaning or linguistic clarity. Such a liquefaction of "Koreanness" in Hallyu within the complex networks of the old/new and locals/globals ranges from fusion historical dramas to heart-wrenching soap operas and consumer kitsch. In conclusion, this study intends to extend the discussion of "Korean modernity" through keenly appreciating a variety of tastes of Hallyu.

What is 'Han' in Hallyu? : 'Han' as 'Jeong' and 'Han' in food related K-drama

Sana Ho / Soochow University

What is 'Han' in Hallyu? I argue that 'Han'(한) is the key concept to understand the unique Koreanness presented in Korean drama. 'Han' means something Korean as well as one community/collectivity. It is a unique concept of Korean mentality which combines both 'Jeong'(情,affection) and 'Han' (恨,resentment). This paper attempts to examine 'Jeong' and 'Han,' the dual aspects of Korean culture which represent Korean 'Han' mentality, by examining the discourses and contents within food-related Korean melodrama.

'Han' (한) is related to collectivism and group mentality in Korean society. 'Han' means one, as for the close relationship to others. 'Han' (恨) and 'Jeong' (情) are two biggest themes that lay behind Korean mentality, which can be considered as two sides of 'Han.' Jeong (情) means love, affection, sympathy, feeling, heart and even human nature. It's an emotion that one feels outside of oneself, in relation to other people or a group. The second 'Han' (恨) means hatred, dislike, animosity, bitterness, rancor, or resentment. It denotes a collective feeling of oppression and isolation in the face of insurmountable odds. It connotes aspects of lament and unavenged injustice.

Both 'Jeong'(情) and 'Han' (恨) are the key concepts to present Koreanness in K-drama. Food related drama can especially best represent the theme of 'Han' ideology based on 'Jeong'(情) and 'Han' (恨). I will use food related K-drama as major texts to examine how the Koreanness is presented.

Yet, this main theme in Korean cultural products is also shared in other East Asian area, i.e. Sino-sphere. I would argue that it is the spirit and values of collectivity, affection, and resentment that leads to the well acceptance of Hallyu in this area. 'Han' in Hallyu not only represents the unique Koreanness, but also the shared culture in East Asia..

Interpreting the meaning of ‘K’ and the roles of the Korean Wave to build the brand images of Korea

Jung Eun Song / University of Seoul

Korean Wave is constantly growing as a global pop culture trend, and the influences of Korean Wave have also increased. In particular, Korean Wave has contributed to increasing the export of Korean products and to promoting the familiarity and favorability to Korea. The meaning of ‘K’ of Korean Wave would be ranged from Korean pop culture to the image of Korea and its people. This presentation aims to analyze the meaning of ‘K’ and to suggest the ways of improving the brand images of Korea based on the case studies of exploring the relationships between the economic and cultural influences of Korean Wave and the responses of the FGD participants in Asia.

Kahle and Kim support the importance of an organic image based on an individual’s experiences, interactions, and differences, as well as the larger concept of image beyond a representation. Among various definitive meanings of a national image, according to Hall (1986), the image of a nation is the combined result of psychological, social, and historical relationships among nations (cited by Moffitt, 1994, p. 46). National image is considered as a perception and opinion of others (foreigners) about a country based on familiarity and favorability through direct and indirect experiences, as well as a projection of a nation’s internal self-perception of its national identity. I also posit that a nation’s image is a projection of the nation’s perception of its own identity, in particular, of its culture and arts – heritage, landscape, and the arts, which Dinnie (2009) calls the “cultural expressiveness” of a nation (p. 147).

This presentation uses the Focus Group Discussion(FGD) to consider building the brand image of Korea and to understand how the meaning of ‘K’ can be established and developed. As a result, the meaning of ‘K’ can empathize the attractiveness of Korea as national branding identities. However, until now, the cultural Korean Wave narrowly promotes the national branding images of Korea because of its dependence on the several genres and celebrities of cultural Korean Wave. Thus, the nation branding activities through Korean Wave should provide various opportunities for Korean Wave consumers to experiences the diversity of Korean culture and to develop the meaning of ‘K’. The activities will be caused to sustain the development of Korean Wave and to improve the Korea’s positive brand image.

SESSION 2016-6

Hallyu & Overseas Koreans

The Effects of Korean Wave on the Younger Generation of Overseas Koreans

In-Jin Yoon / Korea University

Joan Yoon / Korea University

This paper examines the effects of Korean wave on the younger generation of overseas Koreans. We propose that Korean wave has positive effects on the younger generation (2nd and later generations) of overseas Koreans with regard to interests in Korean culture and Korean ethnic identity and attachment to their homeland. Korean wave is expected to affect the younger generation by following the sequence of exposure, interest, practice, and diffusion. The initial exposure to Korean wave is likely to increase interest in Korean wave and motivate the individual to practice contents of Korean wave (i.e., singing K-pop or rehearse Korean dance), and diffuse Korean wave to nearby friends, co-workers, neighbors, and members of any organizations that the individual belongs to. Because the younger generation has some prior knowledge and preference for Korean culture and networks with Korean mass media, they are one of the people who have early contact with Korean wave and develop some level of liking and ability to enjoy Korean wave. In this sense, they are likely to be the herald or messenger of Korean wave to the general population of the host country. For this reason, Korean wave is likely to spread more quickly and widely where overseas Koreans are numerous and have broad networks with the generation population of the host country.

Previous research on overseas Koreans has not paid enough attention to the effects of Korean wave on the younger generation of overseas Koreans. For this reason, existing literature on the relationship between Korean wave and the younger generation has been very limited. Given the enormous potential of Korean wave on the younger generation, there is big need for more theoretical and empirical research that examines the effects, mechanisms, and consequences of Korean wave on the younger generation. Because it is much easier for the younger generation to get exposure to various forms and genres of Korean wave (e.g., K-pop, Korean movies and dramas, and comedies) than learning Korean language and history and culture, we can use Korean wave as an attractive tool for getting the younger generation into Korean culture and identity. Once the younger generation is exposed and develops interests in Korean wave, they are likely to expand their interest and involvement in much deeper elements of Korean culture like taking Korean language or culture/history courses, making Korean friends who enjoy Korean wave like themselves, visiting South Korea to find their cultural roots, and eventually strengthening their Korean ethnic identity. For this reason, researchers, teachers, and government officials related with Korean language and culture education for the younger generation should pay more attention to Korean wave and incorporate Korean wave as part of their education.

For this research, we will use two sets of empirical surveys of the younger generation of overseas Koreans, respectively in the United States and Japan. These two sets of surveys were conducted in 2014 and 2016, respectively, as parts of research on language use patterns of overseas Koreans in the United States and Japan. Because the dataset include information on the exposure to Korean mass media, enjoyment of Korean wave, and the level of Korean ethnic identity and attachment, we can determine empirically the effects of Korean wave on ethnic identity and attachment of the younger generation of overseas Koreans.

The impact of hallyu over the Korean community in Brazil

Yun Jung Im / University of São Paulo

Brazil was the destiny of the first Korean government's official emigration program in early 60's. More than half a century past since the first group of Koreans disembarked at the Port of Santos in 1963, the Korean community in Brazil, today with over 50 thousand members, is considered a case of success, due to the prominent role it achieved in the Brazilian garment industry as a whole. In 2010, the district of Bom Retiro in São Paulo, with over a thousand shops and small factories run by Koreans, was officially proclaimed by the city Council as the "Diffusion Pole of Korean Traditions."

In fact, the district of Bom Retiro has been functioning as a big magnet capable of gathering and keeping the Koreans together, and, notably, keeping them from being assimilated into a society that is well known for its highly assimilative character. As Truzzi stated, there is an "ideology of assimilation" in the Brazilian society, reason why the Koreans in Brazil have been labeled as a "closed community," a frankly negative image. Not only that, there had been a certain fuss, especially in the eighties, over the rumors according to which Koreans were enslaving illegal Bolivian immigrants.

On the other hand, the image of Korea among Brazilians has been improving, focused in some main issues: i) the Labor's Party that came to power in 2003 pointed Korea as a model to be followed, stressing the Korean educational system; ii) big Korean companies' success in the Brazilian market of electronics, house appliances and cars.

In this scenario, this article will try to investigate, through interviews and bibliographical research, some questions about the impact of hallyu on the Korean community. Some of the questions that I will try to answer are: i) how Koreans in Brazil relate themselves or engage themselves with the phenomenon; ii) if hallyu is an element of reinforcement of the Korean identity, which would go against the process of assimilation; iii) if hallyu is changing the image of the Korean community in Brazil.

Hallyu and American youths: Cultural consumption, identity and power

Jung-Sun Park / California State University, Dominguez Hills

Despite the tendency to view Hallyu as if it has developed in a similar way across borders, it has been a complex phenomenon with multiple trajectories that are closely intertwined with various local contexts as well as regional and global transformations. Through an analysis of American youth's consumption of Korean pop culture and its ramifications, especially its influence on their identity and social relations as well as global cultural power relations, this paper explores the current state of Hallyu in the U.S. context.

This paper will compare two groups, Asian Americans and non-Asian Americans, exploring the similarities and differences of the reasons for and impact of their consumption of Hallyu and what those differences signify. From the beginning, Asian Americans (including Korean Americans) have been central to Hallyu in the US. Indeed, they have been at the core of the consumption of Korean pop culture and have also been gradually involved (although in a limited capacity) in the creation of Hallyu as entertainers, producers, etc. Factors such as their identity (as a racial/ethnic minority), diasporic connections (between their communities and their countries of origin where Hallyu have been influential), and their transnational reference points may partially explain why Asian Americans are drawn to Hallyu. In contrast, non-Asian Americans' consumption of Korean pop culture poses a question about why they are attracted to it, since it is linguistically, culturally, and ethnically quite different from their own and is from a country not known for its politicoeconomic and cultural power. By exploring this underexplored aspect of Hallyu, and comparing it with the case of Asian Americans, this paper will provide a multi-layered analysis of the transnational flows of Hallyu and its implications for changing cultural power relations and identity construction through shared cultural consumption.

SESSION 2016-8

Hallyu & Soft Power

To What Extent Does the Soft Power of Hallyu Change Fan Consumption Choices?

Ingyu Oh / Korea University

Peter von Staden / KEDGE Business School

This paper asks the question of why Indonesia stands out among Islam countries on the one hand and among Southeast countries on the other in terms of their love affair with Hallyu. By analyzing a strong penchant toward Hallyu and related consumption behaviors among young Indonesian Hallyu fans, we revamp the concept of soft power in order to explain the complex process of getting to love a foreign pop culture like Hallyu and actually start consuming Korean products. Based on extensive qualitative data collection from groups of young Indonesian Hallyu fans in Jakarta and Surabaya, we find that the process of soft power developing into actual consumption behavior among pop culture fans involve a long process of either forward or retrospective learning depending on where the fans come from. In the case of Indonesia, fans take a forward learning strategy to learn Korean culture by first exposing themselves to Hallyu.

South Korea Soft Power in Indonesia: Geopolitical and Economic Regionalisation in the Digital Age

Virginie Vial / KEDGE Business School

Eleonora Lollo / Institut d'Asie Orientale, Lyon, France

Nation branding, soft power, and cultural diplomacy are increasingly put forward as a powerful way to promote national interests overseas (Gilboa 2008), and along with public diplomacy, are all expressions of foreign policy (Pamment, 2014). While super-powers use soft power as a complement to hard power to maintain their dominant position, middle-powers use it rather an alternative, serving national interests while sustaining a win-win relationship with other countries in terms of geopolitical position, economic benefits, and support to regional political stability and peace. The interest and relevance of soft power has increased recently for several reasons. First, because of the need for local balance, the increasing geopolitical regionalisation cannot be dealt with using hard power only. Second, the interactions among local and global actors develop faster and the increased complexity of aligned and competitive relations thus produced pushes countries to turn toward more collaborative approaches (McClory 2015). Third, the rise and spread of digital communication allows new forms of power, that is exerted by entities different from economic and military superpowers. Last, the transnational communication and economic flows through which soft power can be exerted has increased dramatically (Kim, 2011). Asian soft power study is interesting because “it is the site of the only contemporary non-Western concentration of power and wealth even remotely comparable to the West, and because it has its own long history of international relations that is quite distinct from that of the West.” (Acharya & Buzan, 2010). In Asia, three countries stand out for their soft power: Japan, China and South Korea. While Japan and China are superpowers – which both hard and soft power over the periphery has been widely studied, South Korea stands out as a middle power with important soft power in Asia. Most studies focus on the exercise of South Korean soft power on both Japan and China, investigating the influence that a middle power can have over superpowers, with the resistance it can trigger from various stakeholders. Studies of South Korean soft power over other middle powers of the region – including Indonesia, Malaysia, Taiwan, Thailand, the Philippines, and Vietnam, are still scarce. The relations between middle powers are particularly interesting because they aim at creating regional alliances which are “based on either technical ‘win win,’ or solidarity ‘South-South’ or by revitalising old histories (‘silk roads’)”, and in Asia, they share a common revisionist view of history that considers the post-war order as ‘inauthentic’ (Pandey & Watson, 2014, p.2). In this movement, South Korea is leader of MIKTA, created in 2013, which is composed of five top middle powers - Mexico, Indonesia, Korea, Turkey, and Australia, and acts as a consultative group in the area of international relations. South Korea position as major middle power allows opening up to alliances that go beyond those with the US and large neighbours such as Russia, China and Japan. The emergence of networked relationships, together with a diffusion of power worldwide allows South Korea to deploy multi-lateral middle power diplomacy (Lee, 2012). Its contributions to world’s governance cover financial stability, development cooperation, green growth, nuclear safety or international security, and these could be enhanced by initiatives such as MIKTA (Ikenberry, John, and Mo, 2013). South Korea and Indonesia classified as two important middle powers in East and Southeast Asia: In a context of regionalisation of geopolitical power, these are two heavy weights, South Korea in economic and technological terms, and Indonesia in terms of population, market and natural resources. The study of South Korean soft power in Indonesia could exemplify how two middle powers can interact, and how regional alliances can be formed using soft power. The study of the place and influence of Korean soft power in Indonesia, from a wide perspective, and including cultural diplomacy as well as international bi-lateral political and economic

relations, is to date very limited, both in terms of numbers and diffusion (Yang, 2004 ; Syaikh, 2012 ; Wahyudiya, 2012 ; Diani, 2016). A few works deal with the influence of South Korean pop culture – or Hallyu (Muhammad, 2013). Existing research focus on Hallyu from the sole cultural perspective and impact (Nugroho, 2004 ; Andari, 2007 ; Nastiti, 2010 ; Amellita, 2010 ; Sari et al., 2011 ; Muhammad, 2013 ; Herawati, 2015). In spite of increasing interest in the topic, the concept of soft power remains however fuzzy and difficult to operationalise from an empirical point of view (Fan, 2008). As a first contribution, we propose a conceptualisation in terms of political, economic and cultural spheres, stakeholders, and their actions within and between spheres, which allows to take into account the multiplicity of channels and directions through which soft power can unfold. We then underline that the common point of all spheres and stakeholders to exert soft power uses communication and media, which has become widespread, and extremely easy and cheap to use. Using the developed theoretical framework as a grid of analysis, we first depict and discuss South Korean soft power in Indonesia using the long-term historical account of South KoreanIndonesian international relations. Second, underlining the current centrality of digital communication as a place where soft power actors and actions become directly observable, we zoom into the recent period to identify soft power related events. We then discuss our results and draw policy implications for both Indonesia and South Korea.

The epidemics of a cultural wave: The geographical and socio-economic spread of Hallyu in Indonesia

Virginie Vial / KEDGE Business School

Eleonora Lollo / Institut d'Asie Orientale, Lyon, France

The study of the place and influence of Hallyu in Indonesia are to date very limited (Muhammad, 2013) both in terms of numbers and diffusion, as is research on general Korean soft power in Indonesia. Existing research focus on Hallyu from the sole cultural perspective and impact (Nugroho, 2004 ; Andari, 2007 ; Nastiti, 2010 ; Amellita, 2010 ; Sari et al., 2011 ; Muhammad, 2013 ; Herawati, 2015). A few works deals with soft power from a wider perspective including cultural diplomacy as well as international bi-lateral political and economic relations (Yang, 2004 ; Syaikh, 2012 ; Wahyudiya, 2012 ; Diani, 2016). To date, research on the spread of Hallyu in Asia has underlined the adoption of this cultural wave predominantly because of historical reasons, cultural closeness, sharing similar traditional values, and adopted mostly by women in search for learning and emancipation. In this article, we lay out the recent geographical and socio-economic spread of Hallyu in Indonesia and use an inductive methodology to identify the factors that have supported such a spread.

Two Decades of Korean Wave as Soft Power Public Diplomacy

Hun Shik Kim / University of Colorado at Boulder, USA

For over two decades, South Korea's cultural entertainment products such as pop music, TV mini-series dramas and films have enjoyed unprecedented popularity in Asia- Pacific rim countries and the rest of the world. This cultural phenomenon called the Korean Wave or "Hallyu" has elevated South Korea's national brands, increased their overseas exports, and promoted human exchanges. Scholars and journalists believe the unprecedented success of Korean Wave was largely based on the private entertainment industry's successful hybridization of Asian values with Western styles, as well as powerful presentation of the entertainment content to global audiences to make them feel significant cultural proximities to Korea. This study finds that the remarkable success of the Korean Wave is due to collaborative efforts by the private cultural entertainment industry and the Korean government by utilizing Korea's pop entertainment products as an effective tool for global public diplomacy. Coined by Edmund Gullion in the mid-1960s, the concept of public diplomacy is beyond traditional government-oriented foreign diplomacy, and aims to promote mutual understanding and interests of concerned parties. Public diplomacy seeks to promote national interest of a country through understanding, informing and influencing foreign audiences using soft power, including pop entertainment and cultural products. This study investigates on how the Korean government viewed the Korean Wave to be a multipurpose tool to boost the volume of overseas exports, to engage with global audiences by encouraging them to consume Korean entertainment products, and to promote foreign audiences' cultural affinity to Korea.

The Success of the Korean Wave and Competitions for Soft Power in East Asia

Andrew Eungi Kim / Korea University

This paper examines how Korea's head start in fostering creative industries and developing soft power has prompted its neighboring countries, especially China and Japan, to broaden and accelerate their own cultural industrial policies to enhance their soft power. China and Japan are indeed paying close attention to the economic and cultural impact of Hallyu and are trying to emulate the latter's success. Thus, the phenomenon of Hallyu is as much a cause to take heed as it is to celebrate. Not only does this upsurge in cultural exports encourage the Korean government towards an even more instrumental use of the Korean Wave, but its ongoing success also shows Korea's competitors how to structure and promote their own cultural industries. What all of this shows is that discussions of the Korean Wave have all too often assumed that the export of Korean cultural products is a one-way flow with beneficial consequences and that it is uncontested and unstoppable, destined to fill cultural spaces in East Asia and the world. The paper argues that Hallyu is not occurring in a vacuum, for it exists in the context of national, economic, and increasingly cultural competition.

SESSION 2016-9

Visual Hallyu: Return to Text

Routes and Roots: K-Hiphop or Hiphop from Korea

Ute Fendler / University of Bayreuth, Germany

Taking the online article „What’s Real in Korean Hip Hop? A Historical Perspective” (02/2015) as a starting point of reflection about the specificity of the hiphop genre in Korea one track leads directly towards the question of authenticity and the question of the origin, of a lived experience that is captured and transmitted in this genre referring to the African American experience in the US. While there is also hiphop in Kenya as well as in Colombia or in Germany or France, the question of authenticity is more central in Korea. Why is authenticity and the question of Koreanness and appropriation so central in Korea.

Besides the wide range of using hiphop as a fashionable genre to gain attention and therewith a larger public outside of Korea (khiphop as part of kpop), there exists also a wide range of underground hiphop that claims authenticity because of the individuality and the subversive tone which gets closer to the African American context.

Between these two poles a large variety of other modes, styles and motivation exists, so that the question of authenticity (roots) might not be pertinent. With my paper, I would like to suggest a shift in the focus of the question from foreign vs Korean towards - the question of roots - towards a focus on storytelling - routes - as a main feature of hiphop and the visual imagery that refers to a certain performativity. This might open different perspectives on the travelling genre hiphop and its performance in Korea.

**INFINITE VARIETY:
On-screen Captions, Korean Traditional Aesthetics,
and Shifting Remake Politics in Korean Variety Shows**

Kyung Hyun Kim / University of California, Irvine

Kyung Hyun Kim is Professor of East Asian Languages and Literatures and Visual Studies at the University of California, Irvine. He is the author of *Virtual Hallyu: Korean Cinema of the Global Era* (2011) and *The Remasculinization of Korean Cinema* (2004), both published by Duke University Press. He also is the author of a Korean-language novel, *In Search of Lost G* (Seoul Selection, 2014).

Though it is tempting to pair popular Korean variety shows such as *Infinite Challenge* and *Running Man* with postmodernism because of their reliance on ‘reality television’ genre and technique of self-reflexivity, this talk argues that their themes, aesthetic forms, and use of on-screen captions embrace aesthetic and moral conventions that depart from those of the West. This talk probes on what might be the underlining reasons behind the Korean variety shows’ success in Asia—particularly in China. Without necessarily affirming or debunking the widespread notion that these are shows based on, what Henry Jenkins calls, “transmedia storytelling,” I attempt to locate the dominant pulses of these variety shows in the East Asian traditions of p’ansori, Confucianism, and even an aversion toward phonocentrism that is rooted in the Western modernity. After exploring the themes and the performative techniques of the shows as ones deeply rooted in the Asian tradition, I intend to problematize the prevailing remake theories that still insist on the bifurcated system of ‘original vs. copy.’ Through the rumination of the cultural flow between Japanese, Korean, and Chinese variety shows, this study will attempt to shift the meaning behind cultural authority that shape up remake debates.

Amateur Webtoons as the new driving force of the K-comics wave: a case study of amateur competitions on global Webtoon platforms

Ji Hyeon Kim / Goldsmiths, University of London

The Webtoon has been the driving force of fast growth in the K-comics industry, thanks to competitive activities among professional and amateur cartoonists. With the rapid penetration of high-speed Internet during the late 1990s, Webtoons gradually became known in South Korea through the personal Websites or blogs of amateur cartoonists. Furthermore, since the advent of Web portals, they have expanded faster there than in most other industrialised countries, due to the ‘infinite cartoon pool’ supplied not only by professionals, but also by the vast number of amateurs who upload their cartoons for free on such portals. To promote more amateur-based productions, major Korean Web portals such as Naver and Daum have established very unique ‘Webtoonist promotion systems’, that set up a longterm upgrade panel in which audiences are invited to participate as members of an evolution group. Anybody can enter these competitions, so long as he or she has the desire to create Webtoons, as well as the basic skills required to use digital image editing devices and digital graphics software. As a result, they have enabled the industry to successfully increase its supply of amateur manpower. Naver has even implemented an effort to set up a similar labour supply system on their global Webtoon platform, aimed at global amateur cartoonists and audiences. There are several possible main reasons why these portals make a serious effort with such initiatives, such as to secure original cartoon works of high quality, and to generate further additional profit from secondary or tertiary sales of such cartoons through sales of intellectual property rights to the film and TV industries, and companies designing products targeted at K-wave fans. In this sense, the process of fostering amateurs into professionals is linked not only to the financial value of the platform, but also innovation and invention in the K-comics wave. Thus, this research focuses not just on the hyper-exploitation of bio-power, but also on innovation and invention in bio-politics regarding the topic. By employing various theories of cognitive capitalism, it will ascertain the cultural and political implications of amateur cultural productions in the Webtoon industry, which have become the new driving force of the K-comics wave, by investigating the structural reality of Webtoonist promotion systems, which are both fluid and complex as a global flow. This will involve conducting a case study of the ‘Webtoon discovery’ interface on the Line Webtoon platform, which fosters new talent and helps amateur creators monetise their work through the platform’s P2P patronage system.

SESSION 2016-10

Korean Entertainment Industry

K-Pop의 해외시장 진출 전략: 제도적 거리(institutional distance)의 관점에서

Deho Kim / Art Life Publishing

Jaibeom Kim / Sungkyunkwan University

Phillip Park / Kyunghee University

본 논문에서는 K-pop의 해외진출을 위하여 제도적 거리의 관점에서 접근하는 것이 의미가 있으며 이를 위하여 제도적 거리를 규정적, 규범적, 인지적 거리의 세 축으로 나누어 볼 필요가 있다는 점을 강조하였다.

제도적 거리의 관점에서 본 연구는 기존 한류지수 산출 시장들을 적어도 부분적으로는 제도적 거리의 관점에서 살펴보고 그 결과들의 타당성을 검토하여 보았다.

전술한 바와 같이 향후 K-pop의 유럽 진출에 있어서는 전술한 제도적 거리를 보다 명시적으로 고려하여 기업의 전략 및 정부의 정책을 수립하는 것이 필요할 것이다.

진출국과 한국과의 규정적, 규범적, 그리고 인지적 거리를 고려한다면, 한류의 전파에 있어 어느 지역에 우선 진출하며, 어느 지역에 보다 집중할 것인지, 그리고 미진출국이나 아직 한류열기가 높지 않은 지역중 어느 지역을 다음 진출 지역으로 고려해야 할 것인지에 대한 의사결정에 도움이 될 수 있을 것이다.

아울러 한류가 먼저 전파된 지역을 플랫폼으로 하여 그 플랫폼으로부터 타 지역으로 한류를 전파시키는 플랫폼 전략(platform strategy)도 향후 논의되어야 할 중요한 주제라고 하겠다.

From an Innovation Economy to a Creative Economy? : Implications of Hallyu to China and Taiwan

Yoo-Soo Hong / Institute for Creative and Innovative Development-World

Hui-Wen Chen / Wenzao Ursuline University of Languages

This paper deals with the role of Hallyu in the process of transition from an innovative to a creative economy in Korea in the context of interactions with neighboring economies. The basic claim of this paper is that the implications of Hallyu can be better understood from the viewpoint of economic system changes. The first Hallyu in the 1990s was not clearly understood in this way so that it was regarded as a sudden emergence or phenomenon. However, the second or new Hallyu is an outcome of Korea's transition towards a creative economy, strategically guided and encouraged by the Korean government.

When Korea was hit by the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the government realized that the industrialization based on manufacturing, technological innovations and large enterprises revealed serious limitations and problems. It became imperative to the government that Korea should find other alternatives to its economic growth engine to not only help overall growth and trade, but to mitigate risks from industrial downturns. The path to changing this policy and mindset first involved the cultural industry and the Ministry of Culture. Then focus was placed on cultural technologies and quality content, which ultimately led into Korea's creative economy and the emergence of Hallyu. The compounding success of Hallyu was in part due to these strategies, and in return, it convinced the government to further expand upon these key strategies.

Countries currently most affected by Hallyu in East Asia are China, Taiwan, and Japan. Although Japan was mildly interested in Korean strategic policy for the creative economy, China and Taiwan were strongly interested in the cause and effects of Hallyu. Particularly, China not only thoroughly studied Korean strategies, but also pursued alternative catch-up strategies to develop its cultural and creative industries. As a significant reality of the creative economy, Hallyu is a challenge for China and Taiwan. It is expected that sooner or later several countries in Asia such as Thailand and Vietnam will follow suit. Despite its phenomenon of success, Hallyu is also a challenge to Korea, because its success has been received with some criticism from concerned East Asian economies. The authors of this paper suggests, the gradual upgrading of Hallyu towards 'Aliu (亞流)' in cooperation among Northeast Asian economies first, then with East Asian economies, and finally with entire Asian economies in the long run as an Asian creative economic FTA

Sports in the Korean Wave : Connecting Hallyu and Sports through Mega Sporting Events

Rachel Miyung Joo / Middlebury College

The 2018 Pyeongchang Winter Olympics will play an important role in combining Korean national athletes and teams with Hallyu industries. In an era of globalization, sports play an important role in shaping national identity and function to define Koreanness for Koreans located throughout the world. As international sports are organized around national distinctions, they are distinct from other Hallyu industries that are increasingly directed toward expanding markets beyond Korean-identified people. Mega sporting events, however, offer an opportunity to connect sports with other Hallyu industries through international media coverage, international visitors, and advertising. Moreover, the interaction of Korean athletes with sports people of other nations goes beyond competition to enable a shared global expression. In this presentation, I discuss how sports and other Hallyu industries will connect for the 2018 Pyeongchang Olympics based on a number of strategies. The Games will project global relevance through the competitive performance of individual Korean athletes. The Games will also operate through Korea's digital media infrastructure connecting users with not only athletes, teams, and sporting performances, but also other hallyu media products. The cross advertising of a K-brand through non-sports related items, such as fashion, cosmetics, automobiles, and electronics will work to place athletes as celebrities more centrally into top Hallyu industries. Going beyond the advertisements featuring Korean athletes for globally-oriented industries, the Olympics will offer an important opportunity to shape a recognition and identification with Korean athletes and the experience of the Games itself. Furthermore, the Korean diaspora will play a significant role as Koreans throughout the world will work toward shaping the identity of the games as fans and spectators demonstrating the global reach of Koreanness beyond media and advertising.

SESSION 2016-11

Cultural Contagion and Hallyu

Understanding Hallyu Fandom from a Perspective of Cultural Contagion

Minhyoung Kim / Hankuk University of Foreign Studies

Major shifts in media technology and production have globally made fan culture a central mode of consumption. Hallyu, which actively includes various cult fans and consumer kitsch objects, is no exception. While a diversity of ideas has emerged to examine different dimensions of such growing phenomenon, this study explores a new way of understanding Hallyu based on the research frame of fandom studies by particularly investigating key paradigms and methodological issues. In conclusion, this study aims to demonstrate media fan culture as one of the emerging fields of cultural contagion.

Assessing the Impact of Country of Origin Perception on Purchase: A Case of K-pop

Janghyuk Lee / Korea University Business School

The aim of this paper is to expand upon previous research into the CO perception effect through use of empirical data by formulating an analysis method which allows measurement of the extent of the CO effect by proxy of an object associated with CO image (ex. Pop musicians) and to propose an alternative framework which provides an explanation as to the discrepancies between empirical data and prior research.

This paper proposes a generalizable analysis method to assess the extent of the CO perception effect and test how strongly a brand is associated with its CO regardless of brand attitude, involvement level, or product type. The level of exposure and interest in musicians associated with their CO was selected as a variable for measuring CO association strength, which was then compared with the purchase data of two automobile brands from the same CO, measured in terms of export and sales, and analyzed empirically.

Study 1 suggests that K-pop musicians' popularity overseas had a high effect on Korean exports in both B2B and B2C industries. A larger extent of the CO effect was found among high GDP per capita countries than in long GDP per capita countries. Study 2 reveals that the impact of CO effect associated with 'PSY' on the auto sales of two Korean brands in U.S. was significant. The extent of the CO effect differed between the two brands of the same industry group and dissipated over time as 'PSY's popularity faded away. An asymmetric pairwise CO effect was found vis-à-vis American and Japanese brands.

In contrast to previous research, this paper investigates the extent of the CO effect associated with popular musicians and directly assesses their effect purchase behavior. Our findings do confirm the existence of the CO perception effect on real purchase behavior and propose possible future research expansion into a two track process of CO effect: long term attitude change and short term memory lift.

‘Han’ in Hallyu as a ‘Stimuli of Invention’ in the American Food Culture: The Reconstitution of Categories through Institutional Entrepreneurship

Sou Hwan Kang / Korea University

The food culture is different according to the characteristics of each society, and also food culture has dynamics because of external influence which make modify, change, and develop. Such principle is specifically manifested in that Hallyu (韓流) affect the culture of other societies. Actually Hallyu is the pouring or diffusion of Korean culture, as it is comprised of ‘Han (韓)’ which means ‘Korean’, and ‘Ryu (流)’ which means ‘flow’ and ‘disseminate.’ Hallyu, as diffusion phenomena, has ‘Han’ which is a novelty in an existing social order as diffuse object, and ‘Ryu’ which is the process in the settlement of newness at society as diffuse way. Therefore, this characteristic of Hallyu admits of looking into the mechanism of cultural diffusion, because it is cultural inpouring from outside to existing society.

By embodying ‘category’ and ‘institutional entrepreneurship’ in institutional approach, this study makes materialize the mechanism of cultural diffusion which is a natural attribute of Hallyu. So finally, this paper aims for looking at the role of Han in Hallyu, and then discussing the meaning of Han. For that, there are two research questions, “What is the process in which Hallyu enter and flow into other countries?” and “What are the results due to the influence of Hallyu?” Through these two questions, this study does not examine and identify the determining factors and the likelihood of the spread. The focus here is the process of settlement and impact on existing social order after dispersion.

For this analysis, it is appropriate to consider ‘Hansik in America’ as research object, because of two points. First, Hansik, Korean food, is not rated for its taste and quality according to the ‘objective sensory.’ We can check evaluation and support of products depending upon the social context, because the value criteria of food are ambiguous and subjective. Second, Hansik is formed via different cultures system unlike America. This allows knowing how to adapt into other social order and transform the original form. This study does not focus on the determinants of success and popularity of Hansik. Content to be analyzed is how to receive social recognition, what their form change during setting down, and its meaning based on that Korean food flows into America.

Political Economy of Korean Film Industry : **Focus on the decline of film exports to the European Market**

Hyun Jee Kim / Korea University

The number of Korean films released each year has been consistently growing, now to a north of 200. Meanwhile, the ROI (return on investment) of Korean films continues to struggle, at -7.2% in 2015, with only 16 out of 232 films breaking even. Exports of Korean films have dropped by 12% from the previous year, and only accounts for a mere 3% of total film industry revenues. In terms of regional distribution of exports, Korean film exports showed apparent growth among Asian markets, as well as consistent growth in North America and decline in Europe.

The decline of film exports to European countries especially stands out, presumably implying the fall of the “Korean New Wave,” a collective of Korean films internationally recognized since the mid-1990s. Now there seems to be a serious lack of representation of Korean films at major film festivals to satisfy the auteurist taste of the European market. Such unsuccessful status of Korean films both domestically and internationally contrasts the popularity of Korean culture gaining traction worldwide, commonly known as “Hallyu”. While the likes of K-Pop, K-Drama, Korean cosmetics and fashion continue to excel in various markets around the globe, Korean films have stayed on the downside.

In order to address such inconsistency, this research intends to analyze the process of manipulation and integration of economic and cultural agendas in relation to the establishment of policies for Korean cinema. Since the 1990s, in the midst of the inflow of Hollywood blockbusters, the Korean film industry has found its leeway to protect the domestic market using Screen Quota Laws or selecting trendy topics that can boost ticket sales, rather than incubating organically well-made Korean films that can appease the domestic audience and even prosper internationally. Therefore, it has become virtually impossible to isolate economic and cultural drivers of the film industry, and the economic aspects have led to backpedaling of cinematic excellence, which eventually leads to poorer economic results and thus a vicious cycle. This research pinpoints the status quo of the Korean film industry based on key statistics, and analyzes its structural and procedural dysfunctions, in order to outline a route to create, solidify, and expand the art of Korean cinema in the age of Hallyu. The papers to be presented will comprise the initial findings of a research project funded by the Academy of the Korean Studies.

SESSION 2016-12

Hallyu in Latin America

Korean modernity as pop culture: Hallyu in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Peru

Ricardo Pagliuso Regatieri / Korea University

The purpose of this paper is providing a panorama of the penetration of Hallyu in Latin America. Between June and July 2016, I applied a survey among fans in five Latin American countries, which had altogether 1,706 respondents: 636 from Brazil, 584 from Argentina, 237 from Mexico, 169 from Chile and 80 from Peru. These countries were selected for case studies, on the one hand, because of their regional relevance, and, on the other, due to the impact Hallyu has had among young fans in these societies. Topics addressed by the survey include gender, age, education and family income levels, first contact with and preferences within Korean pop culture, platforms used to consume K-Pop, its appeals, perceptions about South Korean modernity, and the fans' likeliness or wish to learn Korean, study, work and live in South Korea. Based on the survey results and taking into account the unfolding of processes of social change in the region, I will analyze the diffusion of Korean pop culture in these Latin American countries, arguing that the K-Pop world offers a sort of social and cultural enhancer for young fans who mostly stem from lower-income backgrounds.

“When Hallyu meets Argentina’s open TV: The Korean image as seen through Telefe’s social media”

Paula Fernandez / Universidad Nacional de Quilmes / Tozai Institute

Not so long ago, the Hallyu was able to reach the Argentine public in an opposite way to the one witnessed in Asia. While in Asia, as it is usually accepted, the TV dramas started the Korean Wave and then gave way to K-Pop, in Argentina K-Pop was first a success and then gave way to TV dramas. In 2014, K-Pop had a major promotion in Argentina’s open TV (public channels) when “Bailando por un Sueño” -similar concept as “Dancing with the Stars”-, one of the programs with bigger audience, showcased K-Pop songs and choreographies based on the genre. TV dramas did not have the same fate, since during 2015 only “Secret Garden” was aired but in cable TV. This year, however, three Korean TV dramas (“Stairway to Heaven”, “My Love From The Stars” and “Angel Eyes”) were aired in Argentina’s public TV through Telefe channel, captivating a new audience and generating several comments of viewers at the sight of this new and unusual product. The aim of this paper is to analyze social media of Telefe channel, which were actively used to promote the dramas, in order to know their impact in the Argentine audience and their perception of Koreans and Korea through them.

The Korean Dream and K-Lyfestyle: Hallyu as an instrument of change and social mobilization in developing countries in Asia and Latin America.

Constanza Fernanda Jorquera Mery / University of Santiago, Chile.

This research shows how the evolution and consolidation of Hallyu, as an economic and Foreign policy strategy to promote South Korea as a national brand, has transcended the socio-cultural level to become an instrument of social change and mobilization to the Hallyu consumers in developing countries, particularly in Asia and Latin America. This paper proposes the concepts of “Korean dream” and “K-Lifestyle” and seeks to analyze its configuration in both regions, and how is challenging the responsiveness of the Korean government to the arrival of foreigners mobilized by this new ethos.

The main argument put forward in this paper is that the export of a country’s positive image by the South Korean culture and media, product of a state strategy that involves the ambitions of national power and the visions of decision makers on the market in Asia and Latin America, has created an imaginary ideal type of society and lifestyle to which Hallyu consumers seek to emulate and belong, which is opposed to individual and collective problems in their own countries, evidence of the success of the Korean wave.

However, this phenomenon is consolidating the country as a pole of attraction and Hallyu consumers try to achieve this social mobilization through initiatives such as tourism and migration, challenging the ability of the Korean government to respond to the demands of the fans of Hallyu and generating a triple pressure - political, economic and socio-cultural – at domestic level for implement public policies consistent with this new status.

Keywords: Hallyu, Korean dream, K-lifestyle, Developing countries, social mobilization, Hallyu consumers.

SESSION 2016-14

Hallyu in Indonesia

The Development in Audience Creativity Manifestation Toward K-Pop Artists in New Media

Desideria Lumongga Dwihadiah Leksmono / Universitas Pelita Harapan

Popular Culture's audiences have the power to create new form of art as their manifestation for adoration to the public figures whom they idolize. They are the fans who have the understanding that they are connected to the artists or singers, athletes, politicians as their idols. In the era of new media, the expression of worship or adoration or favoritism to the idols has developed to a variety of type. It can be in a content form as fan art, fan video or even fan fiction, but whatever the form is, it shows that the bond between audiences and idols are indeed very strong. This also happen between K-Pop artists and their audiences. Through new media the fans are not only becoming the producer of the content (prosumer), and this has happened for quite a long time. The question is not only about how long K-Pop will influence Indonesian audiences anymore but more to the question about what audiences of K-Pop will do in the future to express their feelings toward their idols through new media. This paper will try to answer that question by doing in depth interview with the fans of K-Pop in Indonesia who also active in the fan base community and the network society in general.

Keywords: Hallyu, Korean Cinema, Indonesia Moviegoers, Eisenstein.

The Future of K-Comics and K-Animation as the Product of Popular Culture

Sigit Pamungkas / Universitas Pelita Harapan

Comics as one of the products of popular culture is an effective medium for spreading ideology, lifestyle, or culture of a country. One is the Japanese comics (manga). Manga comics have dominated the market in Indonesia for more than two decades. The Popularity of manga stories increase along with the screening of the manga in the format of animated films (anime). Although currently in Indonesia fans of drama and K-Pop music is still on top of the J-Pop fans, but the presence of Korean comics (manhwa) statistically was not able to shift the dominance manga. This research aims to analyze the development of interest in manga and manhwa in Indonesia, along with a comparison of both the comic book to capture the market segment of comic fans. The end result of this study is a proposal on the development strategy of foreign comics, especially manhwa, to be accepted by the market comic fans in Indonesia, and still be able to rival the dominance of Japanese comics.

Keywords : K-Comic, K-Animation, Popular Culture

Korean Cinema in the Eyes of Indonesian Moviegoers: Hallyu Revisited and Redefining

Eric Gunawan / Universitas Pelita Harapan

Since 2002, Hallyu encountered Indonesian audiences in term of the Korean drama series on television. As it gradually gains its popularity, the success of Korean drama series is then followed by the popularity of Korean music, fashion, culinary, tourism, as well as Korean language course. However, the success of drama series was not followed by Korean feature films screened on Indonesian theatres. Only few numbers are available although the DVDs could be easily found in the stores. Hollywood cinema could be one of the reasons as well as the regaining popularity of Indonesian cinemas.

This paper will try to get some advantages from this “unfortunate” condition of Korean cinema in Indonesia. The result is the recommendation of what forms of Hallyu that should be redefined. For achieving this, Korean drama series and cinema period 2002-2016 should be compared as well as Korean cinema among themselves that has been screened on Indonesian theaters. DVDs would not be included in this paper for this paper objective is looking for some characteristics of Hallyu that Indonesian moviegoer fond of. Then, Eisenstein’s theory of film pathos will conduct of findings of indicators and sub-indicators required by the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP), a method used in this paper.

SESSION 2016-16

*Multivalent Han (Koreaness):
Reading Korean Culture and
Literature through Critical Theory*

The Mass Ornament, Flanerie, and Fashion, Gangnam Style

Julie Choi / Ewha Womans University

First uploaded on July 15, 2012, the official video of Gangnam Style is to date (August, 2016) the only video to have over 2 billion hits and heads the list of 26 YouTube videos in the so-called “Billion View Club.” The content, style, and history of the song/video speak to both its utopian credentials as well as its cynicism. It is a call to arms for the urban dispossessed to take back the topography of “Gangnam,” standing in for all the excesses of glamorous consumption and real estate speculation. It is also the ultimate example of what Kracauer describes as the “pleasure barracks” for the modern breed of consumer, the intellectual homeless, who expend more to remove themselves from serious thought than for daily living expenses. The psychedelic spectacle that denominates itself as “Gangnam Style” presents a rich and colorful array of metropolitan experience that starkly distinguishes itself from the monotony of the rational work day. The carnivalesque inversion of traditional zones and times reserved for the moneyed is narrated from the point of view of an exquisitely groomed but tasteless dandy.

In this paper, I attempt to read Psy's Gangnam Style as a piece of literary montage. Carnival, mass ornament, flaneur—these are the tropes taken from modern cultural studies to examine Gangnam Style's different facets of engagement with urban issues. The video is an oeuvre and the artist presents himself too as oeuvre, a flaneur traversing a landscape carved up as private property and a time regulated by productivity and wage labor. If Kracauer found the movement of the Tiller girls to reflect the regulated bodily movements acclimatized to the factory line, the perfectly synchronized routines of K-Pop choreography can be read as the discipline of the consumer as the new laborer. Consuming is the new labor and it must be performed in no less rigorous and scientific a method as the Fordism of yore. In the tradition of the modernist flaneur, the psychotic and psychedelic monologue performed to song and dance in the video is both a celebration of and a call to arms against contemporary commodity culture.

The Anamorphosis of Oppa: Male Subjectivity in the Novels of Kim Youngha, Kim Sojin, and Park Minkyu

Duk-Ae Chung / Ewha Womans University

Oppa is the word for “older brother” in Korean. A new fad of calling one’s boyfriend oppa arose in the 1990s, and the term is now widely used as in Psy’s song “Gangnam Style.” The fad, which first caught on among younger people of college age, is now widely accepted by Korean society. The blurring of kinship boundaries occasioned by the inaccurate new usage of oppa signals a confusion not only in the matter of appellation but also in the traditional familial relationships based on patriarchal authority and male supremacy. The reason why the appellation of oppa is so favored by men who delight in being called by the name of the brother can be traced back to the de-stabilizing influences due to the breaking down of traditional patriarchal family in the process of colonization, war, speedy economic development that characterizes modern Korean history. Why and how does oppa signify the new subjectivity desired by Korean men? Why has the term oppa achieved such success as desirable mode of address in modern Korean society?

Just like the scar that becomes visible only from the slanted viewpoint of the subject’s desire and fear, the oppa phenomenon only becomes legible as a distorted manifestation of a certain structure of fear and desire. We can only glimpse what lies behind the desire of every man to be the young older brother of a desirable younger woman in postmodern Korean society when we approach it as symptom of the Real hidden behind the symbolic signifier of pleasure. The oppa syndrome can be analyzed as what materializes in the void of man’s identity, once the symbolic order of traditional father and mother is destroyed. This paper explores the fissure in a new modern male subjectivity in the wake of the demise of traditional familial relationships between parents and children in the literary works of contemporary young male writers like Kim Youngha, Kim Sojin, and Park Mingyu.

Oppa is Back (2004) by Kim Youngha shows how the traditional idea of oppa becomes overlaid with the newer connotations of the term. The Oppa who returns to the family as the new economic head of household, ending the rule of the incompetent patriarch, is oppa not only to his younger sister who is the narrator of the story, but oppa also to his young live-in girlfriend. The reign of the morally bankrupt and economically useless father is replaced with the return of the Oppa. This Oppa seems to rebuild the family with the help of strong mother who holds on to patriarchal ideology. As Lacan suggest, language is such a dangerous gift in that “it offers itself to our use free of charge, but once we accept it, it colonizes us.” Likewise, Oppa’s patriarchal attempt to re-structure the family becomes an empty gesture, as his new identity is depended solely on women--a girl friend, a sister, and a strong mother. The incompetent father is a figure who is also present in the work of Kim Sojin. His work takes as backdrop the “unbearable slums” inhabited by those at the bottom of the ladder in the increasingly capitalist order. Here too, the father who is economically incompetent is overtaken by the strong mother who replaces him in the power structure of the household. Torn between pity and contempt, the son cannot grow into the role of patriarch, and the trauma of his relationship with his broken parents is manifested in his language with the father’s voice remaining largely silent compared to the say of the mother. The novels of Park Mingyu cover over the lack of the Father with fantasy and thereby reveal more complicated aspects of the oppa syndrome. The protagonists of his works are usually children or youth who continue to live in a world of infantile phantasmagoria. Park’s characters in the stories collected in Castella [Custard] are mostly loners who live in a world alongside figures like Superman, Batman, and Wonder Woman, discoursing with animals and on familiar terms with the supernatural. This realm of make believe is ultimately the realm where traditional parents and their roles have disappeared. Because his works attempt to represent lack through the language of fantasy, Park’s stories cover more successfully the ideological structure underlying the oppa syndrome.

Reading the Korean T.V. Drama Series <A Deep Rooted Tree> as an Ecoian Archival Detective Fiction

Sooyoung Chon / Ewha Womans University

According to Hayden White “the task of the historian was less to remind men of their obligation to the past than to force upon them an awareness of how the past could be used to effect an ethically responsible transition from present to future.” The paper claims that the Korean T.V. drama <A Deep Rooted Tree> can be cited as one such example. The drama portrays and reinterprets the most loved King in Korean history, King Sejong. The king, with his democratic consciousness, love of people, inventiveness, and futuristic vision is presented as prefiguring the economically and culturally thriving Korea of today. At the same time the king with the truly communicative and creative mind envisions yet another transition Korea has to make from the present state of faction fighting democracy and economy built by imitation rather than invention.

The drama employs the story of the King’s invention of the Korean writing system in the trendy global genre of archival detective fiction, made popular by Umberto Eco’s *The Name of the Rose*. The serial murders committed by a secret organization of conservative scholars bring out the outrageously revolutionary nature of the King’s various reform measures, and the king’s adamant will to bring about a desirable future. The dynamism of the conspiratorial actions and the suspense of the detective genre add popular charm and marketability to this work involving serious reinterpretation of Korean history and its indigenous traditions of democracy.

The opposing faction are not presented as pure villains but as a group with its own democratic philosophy based on the principle of checking the king’s power through the council of ministers. This faction fears that giving the powerful and dangerous tool of writing to the people, the king may be gambling with the welfare of the people, when the scholar officials can best represent the interests of the people. The drama’s sophisticated perception of history as a dialectical movement of opposing forces rather than a fight between good and evil is another of its charm and its secret for securing maximal contact surface with the audience, both global and domestic. In its exploration of the relationship between language, writing, discourse and power posited by Foucault, it shows the extent to which the sugar coat of a popular genre can be used for the dissemination of culturally significant contents. It also is an example of happy hybridization of traditional material and global culture, and of the past and the present.

Fraying the Fringes of Bare Life : Vegetal Agency in Han Kang's *The Vegetarian*

Haerin Shin / Vanderbilt University

What does it take to be vegetarian in a society that subsists on domesticated subjects of prey? What does it entail for one to digress from accepted standards of wellbeing, knowing that the gesture would be seen merely as a misguided aberrance to be remedied instead of an alternative recourse, if not a willful act of defiance? Challenging socio-cultural conditions of normativity with allusions to such inquiries, yet strategically circumventing their enunciation by relegating the subject of speech to a vegetative state of narrative agency, Han Kang's novel *The Vegetarian* (2007) traces the crude seams of political agency down to its most threadbare form: control over one's own manner of life. The story revolves around a woman named Young-hye, who wakes up one day to realize that she can no longer stand the sight of meat. While Han's lyrical prose bathes Young-hye's excruciating journey toward individuation in a surreal hue, the visceral urgency of her drive has invited readings that attribute its violent ramifications to culture-specific traditions of misogyny and patriarchy in the Korean context. Resisting such synecdochical interpretations, this paper calls attention to the subversive potential of the vegetarian motif as a biopolitical register. Young-hye's vegetarianism starts out more as a bodily reaction than a conscious decision, and is therefore her way of being rather than her belief in how she or others must live. The primal physicality of Young-hye's position proves far more disruptive than any explicit statement of intentional defiance. From docile wife to obedient daughter, loyal sibling, and functional human being, she not only sheds but irrevocably destroys her claim to all such labels as she moves further toward a vegetal existence, destabilizing the power dynamics of control that maps her on to the normative social fabric. Abandoned by all save for her sister to wither away in a mental institution, Young-hye appears to embody what Giorgio Agamben calls "bare life"; wretched existence, deprived of political agency or even the right to be recognized as such. However, I claim that her disenfranchised presence also merits affirmation as a disruptive force that frays the parameters of the system she fails out of, for the bareness of Young-hye's vegetal life is what remains at the core of her self-elected mode of being as a result of agencial pruning.

SESSION 2016-17

Fandom Studies

Audience Involvement Between Audience and Media Personae of Korean Fashion as Process of Identity Development Among Indonesian Youth

Desideria Lumongga Dwihadiah Leksmono / Universitas Pelita Harapan

This paper wants to discuss the relations that long have been known between media personae as public figures who appear frequently in the mass media with their audience. Media personae are those who become popular with the help of mass media. Media personae influence the loyal audience or fans in a particular way since fans usually like to imitate their idols. Korean actors and actresses are also media personae and the way they dress have inspired their audience especially young audience around the world.

Indonesian young audience has been the loyal audience or fans of Hallyu for quite a long time, and the loyalty produces a strong bond between audience to their media personae. Even though the bond does not necessarily mutual but it is considered as a real relation for the fans. The process of bonding itself has to go through some processes which called Audience Involvement, the processes start with transportation, parasocial interaction (PSI), identification and worship.

And since young people are still in the process of building their identities, more or less the process will be affected by their involvement as audiences toward media personae.

The research will be conducted in mix methodology, which will be started with a qualitative approach to finding the aspects of each process of Audience Involvement (AI) as well as the aspects in Identity Development (ID) processes. After that researcher will try to find relations between AI and ID.

K-pop and “Asia Capability” in Australia

Sarah Keith / Macquarie University

K-pop, above other Asian popular cultural industries, provides a readily accessible cultural milieu for audiences all over the world. This has particular resonance for Australia, which while geographically a part of the Asia-Pacific region, is culturally aligned with Western, European, and Anglophone influences. This is reflected in Australia’s media landscape, which has been noted for its lack of diversity (Ang et al., 2008) as well as other areas such as second language education (Ozolins, 1993) and arts and culture (Bennett and Carter, 2001). Simultaneously, “Asianisation” — that is, developing the nation’s capacity to engage with Asia, through fostering cultural understanding and language learning — has been an ongoing “dilemma” (Fitzgerald, 1997) for decades. In 2015, the Diversity Council of Australia released a report on Australia’s “Asia Capability” (“A-Cap”) emphasising the region’s economic importance. The capabilities assessed included Asian cultural knowledge, cultural experience, and language proficiency.

The increasing availability of media such as K-pop online challenges the Western-dominated status quo of the Australian cultural landscape. Rather than being restricted to a limited number of content channels, audiences are able to engage with broader cultural spheres. This is of value for the quarter of Australia’s population who were born overseas, however a key feature of Hallyu and K-pop is its appeal toward, and consumption by, non-Korean audiences; it therefore holds potential as a tool for broadening cultural understanding.

This research investigates the synchronicity between these two situations, namely, Australia’s need to deepen its cultural knowledge and experience with Asia, and the latent Australian audience for K-pop. It furthermore draws on the A-Cap framework and participant interviews with K-pop consumers to investigate Hallyu as a means for equipping Australians with Asian cultural proficiency.

The Influences of K-pop fandom on Substantiality of K-pop: The case study of Philippine K-pop Convention, Inc.

Jung Eun Song / SSK Glocal Culture and Regional Development Research Institution, University of Seoul

The Korean Wave could be rapidly spread by the participation of the Korean Wave fans in the world, and Internet and social network services (SNS) contributed to distributing the Korean Wave contents and encouraging the content receivers. K-pop leads to the Korean Wave and enhances the familiarity and favorability on Korea and Korean culture. Local recipients of K-pop develop fandom to build cultural relationship with Korea. This research aims to discuss the influences of the Korean Wave fanclub culture with the perspective of sustainability of the Korean Wave based on the case of the Philippine Kpop Convention, Inc. To do so, this research conducts a face to face interview to the four administrators of fan clubs and focus group discussion(FGD) to the four of not fan club members. Also, this research observes the fan activities on the PKCI's Facebook page. The PKCI is an umbrella organization among the diverse K-pop fan clubs and has contributed on the diversification and cooperation of local K-pop fandom. The case study of the PKCI suggests the ways of developing the Korean Wave and the importance of fan club participation on the future of K-pop.

Key words: Fandom, Korean Wave, K-pop, Cultural exchange, Localization

SESSION 2016-18

Round Table:

Food & National Identity

Food and National Identity in Comparative Perspective

Ayumi Takenaka / Aston University Birmingham, UK

Food is an important marker of national culture and plays an important role in defining or creating a sense of nationhood. Food binds nation, because it connects individuals to a place, history, and tradition; it can also serve to cultivate a regional or local identity. As a tool of soft power, a growing number of states today also use or promote food for diplomacy and nation-branding.

How is food used and promoted (or what kinds of food are used and promoted) by governments and other actors in cultivating a national identity? How is national cuisine created and by whom? How do individuals relate to nationhood through food, or how are individuals' identities manifested or expressed through everyday culinary practices? And how effectively or ineffectively does food play a role in cementing or branding a nation?

In this panel, we explore these (and related) questions by drawing on various case studies from Korea and other countries or regions around the world. By comparing different cases, we aim to examine the relationship between food and nationhood broadly.

Special Session

*Winners of the 4th World Student
Article Contest*

Finding Home in the “K” of K-Pop:

Perceived Space and Affective Home Building of Expat K-Pop Fans in South Korea

Cody Black, Duke University

A Portrait of an Expat as an English Teacher

Early in my fieldwork, a mutual Korean friend introduced me to Mark. Mark is a Vietnamese-American from Los Angeles who had moved to Seoul nearly a year prior after finishing his masters in Linguistics with a TSEOL certificate at a school within the California State University system. Like the majority of expats from English-native countries in Korea, Mark was an English teacher, and as such occupied an ambiguous position in the power-structure of Korean society.

Despite the official efforts on promoting English language education in Korea since the “English frenzy” (*yeongeo yeolpung*) movement in the 1990s, which sought to promise Korean youth a means of “social and economic development to all those who learn it” (Pennycook 2007:100), English teachers—as gatekeepers of a necessary human capital for modern Koreans (Park 2011)—are largely considered “temporary, low-status, unskilled, and lacking opportunities for advancement” within an increasingly neoliberalized Korea (Kim 2012:311). Holding a master’s degree, however, Mark worked in a more desirable academic environment compared to the variable and undesirable environments often experienced by other teachers. As a result, the positive working conditions, highly livable wage, and the applicability of his university degree selection to his current job demands largely provides Mark with an idealized level of social security for someone living in the social margins.

Unlike many English teachers whom are self-admittedly in Korea only temporarily, Mark adamantly proclaims his desire to stay in Korea permanently on a regular basis. Mark has actively attempted to abate the aura of occupying this particular social positionality. Mark’s strive for social permanency within Korea is underscored by his high level of activeness within the larger Seoul community. Mark volunteers actively in an orphanage, enrolled in a Korean language academy, joined a Korean Presbyterian church, and is applying for his PhD at one of the SKY universities.

Underlying the drive Mark possesses towards Korean permanency, Mark often hints at his continual experience of negative stigmatizations traditionally associated with his social-identifiers: be it the aforementioned ambiguous status of the teacher, the demonization of Americans due to their militarized proliferation throughout Korea (Moon 1997), or falling outside the ethnic homogeneity of the prototypical ethno-nationalist Korea for not possessing “Korean blood” (Shin et. Al. 1999). Nonetheless, Mark often appears stubbornly unfettered by these markers, and demonstrates a full embracement and social understanding of this generalized cultural attitude towards the precariousness often stigmatized towards the foreign teachers, and attempts to put it behind him in his aforementioned pursuit of making Korea home.

I specifically introduce this inherent drive towards Korea possessed by Mark as these prompts are preceded for him, and so many other similar expats, but an undying fandom of Korean media. Certainly many English teaching expats arrive in Korea to pay down student

loans, quell their desire for adventure, or due to their inability to find work elsewhere. However, I am using this presentation to highlight informants whose familiarity with and fandom of popular media, specifically music, produced by entertainment companies headquartered in South Korea prompted an active decision to move to Korea.

These expats largely hoped a potential benefit of living in Korea would be to lessen the spatial gap between their location and the country of origin of brand, thus hoping to become more “culturally proximate” to the medium (Straubhaar 1991) as opposed to remaining a distant fan. Despite consuming K-Pop on an instantaneous basis through various forms of media technologies in their home country, their perceived spatial distance between the alleged “Korea” of K-Pop and their home country seemingly proved problematic of experiencing “real” K-Pop. Once in Korea, these expats suggested satisfaction with their increased fan-relation within the K-Popery that sonically and visually defined the spaces of Seoul through which they frolicked. My informants attended the increasingly-difficult-to-enter live recordings music shows, stood outside entertainment headquarters in the Cheongdam-dong neighborhood of Seoul, and reveled in these familiar sounds in cafes, shops, and other areas with publicly mediated aural intrusion.

Despite these seemingly utopic conditions of fan consumption, these expats, like Mark, simultaneously expressed ambiguous, if not disparaging, remarks regarding the social hardships involved with living in Korea. While many attempted to integrate themselves further in Korean society, these individuals still tended to exist within the secluded margins of everyday life in Korea. Consistently reminded of their outsider, if not homeless, these expats often performed acts that affectively aligns them with their conception of their “real” home: be it eating at Western restaurants, going to Western pubs and clubs, or socializing primarily with other expats. However, despite such disparate sentiments and acts of reclaiming home, these expats continued to maintain their high level of consumer attachment to K-Media, if not expressed an even greater level of consumption that in prior times. For mediation allowed the “Korea” for which they longed and now felt connected, even if their everyday, non-mediated experience was a radical departure from that perception.

Revisiting the “K” in K-Pop

Mark had become familiar with the genre during his graduate studies after a Korean-American colleague introduced him to the genre. As a student, K-Pop grew to become not only the dominant music genre to which Mark listened to, but it significantly shaped his perception,

desires, and social construction of Korea. To Mark, K-Pop was not just the music from Korea, but the music of Korea. It was a critical trope in defining Korean cultural sensibilities from abroad, and to Mark this lens was attractively decorated in catchy melodies, highly choreographed dances, and manufactured idols. As this distant genre had become part of his routine acts in everyday life, the logical step in defining his fandom was to reside in the country of origin of this genre. Acting upon this would not only allow him to develop a stronger sense of identity with the object of fandom (Sandvoss 2005) become culturally intimate with others in the geographic home bounds whom also shared this common social trait which is otherwise a source of social embarrassment to Mark in America (Herzfeld 2005).

Not surprisingly, K-Pop has invariably been tied to the geopolitical constructed South Korea by its global consumer base. On a superficial level, the transliteration of “K” in these instances neatly and coherently associates the geopolitical locale of Korea to the relative medium: the production facilities of the media are primarily Seoul, the performers are primarily of Korean descent—or at the very least sing in the Korean language—and live performances appear on television channels run by Korean broadcasting corporation. This occurs in spite of the common knowledge that the actual level of “Koreanness” is not fully pure as the hybrid components of the actual content that underscore a singular notion of Korea, such as hiring American and European producers and choreographers (Oh and Park 2012). Nonetheless, Korea remains the primary country of origin of brand of this particular product, even with consumer knowledge of this hybrid construction process (Phau and Prendergast 2000).

Any form of K-Media thus becomes the vehicle for being representative of “Korea” to whomever mediatedly consumes the media. A prevalent danger inherent in the reception of country of origin of brand for an identifiably “foreign” product amongst a global consumer base is the act of deciphering consumer attitudes towards a country’s brand image in a country which little possess little pre-established affective slants. While the consumer electronics corporations Samsung and LG, and automotive manufacturers such as Hyundai, have become associated as quality brand names globally, the actual effective level of soft power effects (Nye 2004) of other consumer products that are produced in Korea have been in a relatively nubile state until recent years. As such, the “Korea” that precedes K-Media remains an open symbolic quality in which direct experience with the product is the primary factor in influencing perceptions of a country, therein defining brand.

The translocal signifying process of “Korea” through these mediums, however, has proven to be a highly contested endeavour. That is, the actual connection to Korea on a cultural level varies depending on the level of which that perceived culturalness of K-Media fits in with the already established perception of Koreanness by the consumer. As perhaps the most notable discussant on this topic, the sociologist John Lie (2012) notes there is a lack between the content of K-Pop and what he defines as the traditional idea of Koreanness. On this, Lie argues:

“the very idea of Korea — and components of Korean culture — was almost always in flux, with radically distinct and contradictory notions at play at any given point in time. Not surprisingly, ‘Korean culture’ remains something of the proverbial floating and empty signifier of contemporary cultural studies. [...] In this sense, the K in K-pop is merely a brand, part of Brand Korea that has been the export-oriented South Korean government since the 1960s. The Korean Wave in general and K-pop is particular is naked commercialism, albeit with the grateful garb of cultural respectability that comes from prestigious, luxury goods. It would be

too much, however, to regard this as having anything to do with traditional Confucian, Korean culture” (361-62).

I do not refute the degree that elements of K-Pop and its associative mediums lack with those traditionally associated with Confucian Korea. Yet there exists an inherent danger in both comparing and attempting to define the bounds of a geopolitically constructed nation-state relative to the object onto which the label of that country is attached. While Lie is careful to note the status of the empty signifier that contemporarily inscribes Korean culture, reducing Korea to the geopolitical referent suffix of these mediums is an act of continued essentializing a very specific form of Korea. In other words, defining Korea as a singular vernacular suggests there is indeed a singular value of Korea that necessarily overscores the overall interpretive experience of the historical, political, cultural, geographical, and, for that matter, traditional Korea.

Despite this problematic, using a singular cultural value to define an essentialized form of an otherwise complex matrix that is the nation-state remains an active act in both public and academic discourse even today. The historian James Clifford (1988) suggests, if not laments, the inherently “the idea of culture carries with it an expectation of roots, of a stable, territorialized existence” (338). To express a sense territoriality is to express a sense of stability or staticness in an increasingly deterritorialized world where such concepts are continually contested. Yet to assume an essential principle of staticness is to ignore that concepts of a nation or culture is very much a notion that is influx and subject to social contestation. Even on the official level, the nation-state is continually subject to its geographical and social bounds being mediatedly imagined by various forms of capitalism and consumption (Anderson 1991) or inventing superficially old traditions in modern times (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983).

In the case of the “K” in K-Pop, conflating the subjectless symbol that is its suffix with the status of accurately representing or misrepresenting Korea produces a stark, if not overtly narrow, scope of meaning and interpretive precedence. Marring “K” with the concept of Korea forces it to become dependent on individually preconceived notions of Korea based on the flux of various social components based on one’s personal direct or mediated experience with “Korea.” If the reception of K-Pop falls out of line with one’s particular notion of Korea, then conflict arises with the applicability of Koreanness onto the given K-centric medium is put up for argument. For Lie, K-Pop does not fulfill his experiential understanding of Korea as a static ideal heavily defined by certain notions of Confucianism. Thus, the actual applicability and relationality of Korea with the medium is thus put up to question.

Lie, however, recognizes the power of his interpretive stance on this matter. Within this recognition, he proposes that what contemporary “Korea,” or more specifically Korean culture, signals is indeed a floating or an empty signifier. Floating signifiers, as coined by the anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss (1987), are symbols in their purest form that contain zero symbolic value and are “liable to take on any symbolic content whatever” (64). In this instance, any given interpretation of “Korea” is likely to differ, as this symbol possesses no direct or commonly agreed upon, referential base—at least within the scope of the Saussurian tradition of semiotics. However, the mistake in this is that “Korea” becomes prioritized over the even more ambiguous marker of “K.” Implying that the “K” is something inherently representative of Korea limits what could be a broad scope of cultural tangibilities and interpretations to concentrate on aspects directly related to and influenced by the broad definition of the Korean nation-state.

Within this process of semiotic narrowing, the “K” loses its ambiguousness due to the

primacy of the nation-state as the primary classifier of culture and genre within the global flow of objects and symbols. As this truly floating symbol is constrained within this scope, interpretive ideals of space and place become challenged due to the classificatory restraints related to this symbol. In other words, the multiplicity of affective or sensory interpretive measures which one may receive or imply onto the emptiness of “K” becomes skewed in favour of constantly, and as I would argue improperly, relating this symbol on a geopolitical scale that is already contested in its public definition.

Branding “K”/Branding Korea

The problem with “K” extends beyond merely the interpretive prowess of Korea as a nation-state. Rather, translocating “Korea” as the definitive source of the “K” suffix inherently imbues this referent with physical and spatial properties at the primary level of interpretation, despite being an even emptier signifier than “Korea” would be within this web of reception.

Predicating the importance of the county of origin or brand creates potential for conflict between actual and mediated reception of the object.

Indeed, utilizing K-Pop as a brand identifier for this genre of music is a strategic, result of the disbursement of the genre to its global consumer base. Certainly the “K” is in many cases an organically applied term, resulting in the creation of K-Pop as an organizational tool to separate and classify the music apart from the sounds heard in elsewhere in the everyday life one’s home for those who reside outside the nation-state of Korea. However, the suffix of “K” has been an integral part in the ongoing attempts of the state and other major Korean corporations in their attempts to brand and influence the global perception of Korea in the light of a progressively modern and global nation-state (see Lie 2012, Nelson 2000) through a hybrid product constructed of varying elements associated with contemporary modernity, if they are closely copied or adopted from the more predominant American and Japanese cultural industries (Shim 2006, Shin 2009).

Branding Korea as a modern, hyperprogressive society with the “K” suffix, among other symbols, relies heavily on creating a positive affective stance within the empty signifiers as opposed to anything inherent within the country of origin itself. On this, the anthropologist Constatine Nakassis (2013) concisely suggests when:

“nations compete to attract global brands and thereby build up their own nation brand, this is because this neoliberal collusion operates on an ideology in which commodities are reckoned not by their production origins but by the floating brand identities that imbue them with sign value” (119).

Ultimately the idealized affective stance which is hoped to be imposed by the floating or empty signifiers of “K” is reliant on, or rather they are resultant of, a separation of the geopolitical origin of Korea from the product being circulated itself. In a similar discussion on the branding of Japanese cultural products with the affective notions of “coolness,” the anthropologist Anne Allison (2009) remarks “The ability to generate affection in consumers is what distinguishes a brand – that exists more in people’s minds – from a product – that resides more as a material thing” (94). In a similar respect, nothing inherent in Korea signifies modern but rather modernity is an affective ideal onto which Korean political strategy strives to achieve. Modernity or progressiveness is a stance that consumers must apply to the floating signifier of the “K” suffix.

The actual success of the branding efforts of modernity or progressiveness endowed relative to the branding of “K” in K-Pop is not of primary concern here. Such affective blocks of hope may very well be, and likely are, translated within the global circulation of the medium. However, instead of being solely an ideal to which identity aims to strive, the generic conventions of outside countries—K-Pop represents the music of Korea, J-Pop for Japan—still endow these tropes as actualities onto geopolitical Korea as the source of these ideals by people outside the geopolitical locale of Korea. This may indeed be the desired result of such branding efforts. However, the dichotomy between actual and real, here and there, present and future, and experienced and desired to a degree renders havoc onto the experiential processes for those under the influence of the brand who attempt to close the gaps between these chasms by focusing on achieving one side of the dichotomy, leaving them constantly seeking the ideals of the brand of “K” when their conception “K” is not found where it was once thought to exist.

Finding Home, or Reminiscing of In-N-Out and Carolina Barbecue

Several months into my fieldwork, I unexpectedly encountered Mark in Itaewon, the increasingly gentrified foreigner district in Seoul that perimeters the US Army Garrison Yongsan. Early in our brief conversation, Mark noted he had just finished eating hamburgers at a restaurant that specializes in West Coast fast food-style burgers, a style of hamburgers pioneered and popularized by the California-based restaurant chain In-N-Out. Yet tinged with a verbal sense of hopelessness, Mark intensely lamented these particular burgers tasted nothing like the burgers did back home. Eventually noting he was on a quest to find the perfect burger in Korea to get a taste of home back, he quizzed my knowledge of any potential locations for him to try. I confessed that I rarely ate American food in Korea due to its high cost relative to my comparatively low stipend. As such, I had little knowledge of the international food scene in Korea. Yet having been craving Eastern Carolina barbecue from having lived in North Carolina in the summers prior to my present stay in Korea, I appended a request to Mark that if he ever found a remotely decent barbecue places to let me know. His eyes grew wide, and he dragged me to what was supposedly the only Southern barbecue place worth trying in Korea.

On the walk to the barbecue restaurant, Mark had stayed true to his gregarious and conversive self, performing his usual task of filling me in on the latest gossip in the world of K-Pop. Discussing K-Pop became a regular occurrence in the conversations I had with Mark, which ranged from superficial discussions on which idols were dating whom to more philosophical quandaries concerning the various intersections between K-Pop consumption with the rapidly changing structure of Korean youth and society. After a decent walk, we arrived to the barbecue place closed for the night.

While Mark had actively attempted to make Korea his new home, this encounter exemplified Mark’s sense of place lacks certain sensorial triggers in Korea that allow for Mark to feel a sense of security typically associated with home. As such, Mark sought out more readily tangible cues, in this case In-N-Out style burgers, which allow him to perform tasks of the everyday as he would before his physical displacement in Korea. In performing this process of seeking out elements that remind him of his past home, Mark attempts to construct a space that allows the experience of affectively building what the anthropologist Ghassan Hage (1997) calls “at home.” Hage specifically defines this state as the following:

“I am considering the home as an affective construct. An affective edifice constructed out of affective building blocks (blocks of homely feeling). I would like to suggest that for it

to come into being, to be successfully erected as it were, this homely affective structure has to be built with affective blocks that provide either in themselves or in combination with others four key feelings: security, familiarity, community and a sense of possibility or hope” (1997:2).

The most evident affective block for building sensations of home in Mark’s quest for the idealistic In-N-Out burger is familiarity: he was familiar with In-N-Out relative to other foods in Korea, thus being in its sensorial presence allowed him to build home relative to other foods. Yet merely coalescing performative acts of consumption as unquestionably predicated on and resultant of the essentialized notions of geographic locationality through the sole lens of the nation-state—or, linking In-N-Out to the American West Coast—would deny any consideration to the experiential affective blocks in building home that underscores the process suggested by Gage. Rather, placing self-identity in the bounds of a nation in itself is contingent on compounding conditions of self to be relational to the perceived though of the interpreted essential properties of that nation-state. On this, the psychologist Michael Billig (1995) remarks

“national identity also involves being situated physically, legally, socially, as well as emotionally,” and within this matrix it is only when “people believe that they have national identities, will such homelands, and the world of national homelands, be reproduced” (1995:8).

Despite consideration of In-N-Out’s status as a pure symbol of West-Coast Americanism, the sociologists Peggy Levitt and Glick Schiller (2004) note that presence within a given social field does not predicate a predestined performance of identity in relation to that field, for one has “the potential to act or identity at a particular time because they live within the social field, but not all choose to do so,” but this ultimately differs from “ways of belonging” which are the “practices that signal or enact an identity which demonstrates a conscious connection to a particular group”(1010). As such, strictly implying that eating In-N-Out produces sensations of being at home in America ignored considerations to array interrelations within the matrix of experiential and perceptions of self as a West Coast native, In-N-Out as West Coast, and West Coast as home.

I am not suggesting that building home cannot be founded upon a macronational level. Nation-states provides a relative static entity locked away in the past that allows for the convenient placing of self and identity when such conditions are severely displaced in a global context. However, the affective blocks onto which transnational subject latch onto in actively building home has potential to transcend any essentialist properties conjured upon these bordered constructs. In her analysis on the complications of space in the transnational practice of religion as an alternative site onto which one can construct identity, the sociologist Peggy Levitt (2003) suggests:

“Transnational migrants also use religion to delineate an alternative cartography of belonging. Religious icons and sacred shrines, rather than national flags, mark out these spaces. The imagined moral and physical geographies that result may fall within national boundaries, transcend but coexist with them, or create new, alternative spaces that, for some individuals, have greater salience and inspire stronger loyalties than politically or nationally-defined spaces” (861).

Particularly important in Levitt’s analysis is the salience of moral destinations as a primary mode

of belonging as opposed to the traditionally held notions pure geopolitical space. Exemplifying this further in her research on the construction of returning home for subjects in exile, the anthropologist Liisa Malkki (1992) similarly observes the idea of returning to the homeland is “not so much a [return to a] territorial or topographic entity as [it is] a moral destination” (37). In both these cases, various semiotic elements that construct the perception of one’s surroundings in everyday life produce arrays that host various imagined conceptions of home, or provide the sensorial aesthetic of belonging at home within displacement. As voluntary expats whose displacement allows them experience a “generalized condition of homelessness” (Said 1979:18), the anthropologists Akhil Gupta and James Ferguson (1992) observe that as “actual places and localities become ever more blurred and indeterminate, *ideas* of culturally and ethnically distinct places become perhaps even more salient” (10, emphasis in original). To this list, I might add the qualifier of emotionally distinct places, as without such attachments these ideas would have no investment in being formulated. Building home thus not becomes predicated on any discrete geography, but is rather reliant on building affective relations to symbols which represent, if only selectively, imagined notions of security, stability, or hope of a place external to what is otherwise experiences as part of the immediate constructs of everyday life.

As a moral destination to which one returns, home building largely tends to be structured on deliberate acts of nostalgia. In its most basic premise, nostalgia is an active imagined longing for the homeland now gone by those who experience displacement to some degree. However, as Malkki (1992) suggested, homeland is not necessarily predicated on reclaiming the actual homeland once experienced. Home is often imagined and contextual based on the degrees of perceived separation. Indeed, the literature scholar Svetlana Boym (2001) specifically notes that nostalgia is a “longing for a home that no longer exists or has never existed. Nostalgia is a sentiment of loss and displacement, but is also a romance with one’s own fantasy” (3). Actively nostalgizing the memory of home more rather becomes as much a means of affectively triggering core features of self-identity as it is a critique on the social forces which initially prompted this sense of disconnect. According to the cultural scholar Fiona Allon (2000), affectively longing for or remembering home is not necessarily an act that allows one to dwell in a state of the static past, but rather nostalgia becomes:

“a vector of movement, a way of moving forward, into the future-past. The retrieval of the past... also enable[s] a critique of the very forces which have produced the conditions of loss in the first place. Nostalgia has the potential to be reclaimed as a positive site of un-forgetting, and of negotiating the future ahead” (284).

In the case of Mark, by actively nostalgizing for the perfect In-N-Out style burger, is not so much the case of actually finding this idealized burger, despite the idealness of this matter. Rather, nostalgizing serves as a mechanism for living within and coping upon the increasingly negative perception he possesses towards Korea that has resulted from the newly gained perceptions of his directly perceived experience of his surrounds caused naturally by the time he has to this point spent in Korea. While the actual hope of finding the perfect In-N-Out burger in Korea is to a degree futile—even Mark tends to point to his ultimate expectation is only to settle as oppose to achieve—this imagined process of reclaiming a potentially tangible aspect of home provides him with direct sensorial arousal within his process of building home with affective blocks. The actual means of remembering could have been any relevant task, as “home” itself is as much, if not more so, an imagined artifact as it is an actual place. But importantly, within this process of “returning” home, Mark is actively reflecting upon his current displacement in order to negotiate a secure sense of the future through building home.

Going Home in an Instant

Although consuming In-N-Out was transparently identified as a medium for building home under the scope of nostalgia, Mark had simultaneously shown an underlying increased propensity towards the everyday consumption of the visual and sonic modalities of K-Pop. Music has traditionally been considered an eminent means for remembering the homeland or the past by displaced individuals. Borrowing from Julia Kristeva's (1984) concept of the semiotic, Hage (1997) too notes that music and song are particularly poignant mediums from which home is remembered and affectively built:

"Song and music, in particular, with their sub-symbolic meaningful qualities, are often most appropriate in facilitating the voyage to this imaginary space of feelings. It is in this sense that they operate as intimations of the imagined homely nation left behind" (7).

However, despite his increased consumption habits of K-Pop, Mark is not actively stating that he is returning to the home nor the imagined nation left behind in regards to K-Pop in the same manner he states with consuming In-N-Out. As Mark had associated the "K" in K-Pop with the nation-state of Korea, this music had been pointing away from home since his original encounter with the music in Los Angeles. Despite any actively pronounced link between In-N-Out and K-Pop in triggering home, my conversations with Mark nonetheless suggest that he consumes K-Pop through technological means *more* habitually in Korea than he had at home. Should the assumed physical distancelessness between Mark's current location in Korea and the perceived country of brand of origin of K-Pop as Korea, then his consumption habits should then ideally decreased, or rather not increase to the degree in a matter with In-N-Out-style burger consumption. Under this condition, I suggest that despite this conditional marking of an object as "home," consuming K-Pop represents a nostalgic act of building home as a critique of presently felt displacement on terms equal to how other more "home"-based consumptions can perform.

The root problem in this complex is the convergence between the essentialism of distance and the classificatory processes of labelling foreign objects. To dismiss further essentialism though in the term "foreign," I am using this term in the manner that the object of consumption differs in some aesthetic or social manner from the objects one is normally exposed in the performance of their everyday life, even in a general postmodern condition of globalization. However, because the dominant global ordering of the nation-state relies on an implied static division of space, implicitly applying this label of perceived physical distance is among the prominent, if not *the* dominant, acts in the classification of foreign objects. As this classification is implied, an object does not possess this inherent monologically classification property. The anthropologists Charles L. Briggs and Richard Bauman (1992) note that the classification of objects under the frame of genre is an intertextual means for symbolic categorization, as opposed to something inherently monologic or statically. Even if a given object lacks a clear origin due to a lack of prior reception, Briggs and Bauman note genres are still given the opportunity to be "associated with distinct groups as defined by gender, age, social class, occupation, and the like. Invoking a genre thus creates indexical connections that extend far beyond the present setting of production or reception, thereby linking a particular act to other times, places, and persons" (147-48). In the case of foreign samples that may fall under the benign classificatory spectrum of "world music" (see Feld 2000) and foreign languages, the primacy of fixed physical distance not surprisingly favors the "places" qualifier. This process was also shown in the prior discussion of the use of K-Pop—and pop music more broadly, for that matter—in Korea.

Genre classification of foreign objects becomes problematic when the symbolic quality of the implied staticness of the nation-state label overshadows or denies any additional intertextual quality that may be received through increased interpretative acts with the object. If the once “foreign” quality of the object becomes slowly abated due to increased consumption and familiarity, the persistent etic quality that is implicit in the nation-state qualifier continues to push this genre classification as superficially foreign. In the scope of this paper, implying Korea as the symbolic qualifier for “K” maintains the aura of foreignness in spatial terms, despite the increasing everyday familiarity that many fans gain through intensive consumption of the object. The persistency of spatial foreignness that results from the classificatory acts of an object creates intensified desire for those who identify as fans of that object. Within the psychoanalytic processes of fandom, the sociologist Cornel Sandvoss (2005) suggests that intensive identification with the object of fandom becomes:

“part of the fan’s (sense of) self. For the object of fandom, as an external object to be experienced as part of the fan’s fabric of self, fans need to build an intense identification with their object of fandom” (Sandvoss 2005:101). Even if the everyday intensive consumption of the object of fandom becomes by any other measure an act of the ordinary everyday, the persistent externalness prompts fans to become as close to that object as possible. Within the means of physical spatiality, this easily translates to acts of travelling to that country of brand of origin. The sustaining difference in the perceived here-there prompts certain consumers to adhere to the performative act the sociologists Dierdre Boden and David Molotch (1994) call “compulsion to proximity,” or the desire to more physically connect with the desire mediated object on a tangibly affective basis that goes beyond perceived consumption based solely on sign and sounds within a space removed. The sociologist John Urry (2011) supports this notion by arguing “Places need to be seen ‘for oneself’ and experienced directly,” which results in increased media tourism to visit these places consumed through media (Couldry 2005, Hirata 2008, Moon 2009).

The compulsion for proximity seemingly at odds with the sense of distancelessness that the cultural theorist Raymond Williams (1989) calls “mobile privatization.” Fueled by his observations of social effects that resulted from the mass ownership of television, Williams observed that within the security of their own homes, people could perceivably travel to “places that previous generations could never imagine visiting” (171). This state of affairs is the result of the increasing demands for increased profits resulted in the increased acceleration and flexibility of global, which then preceded the numerous advancements of communicative and mediative technologies. The geographer David Harvey (1989) noted this general condition has resulted in what he coins as “time-space compression,” where the speed of techno-mediated exchange results in a skewed, or shrinking, sense of space. Aided by tangential consumer effects prominently exemplified in the rise of mass technology ownership, Harvey notes specifically “Mass television ownership coupled with satellite communication makes it possible to experience a rush of images from different spaces almost simultaneously, collapsing the world’s spaces into a series of images on a television screen” (1989:293).

However, such physical compulsions towards and desires of travelling that are at odds with the armchair viewer implied partially in Williams’ terms is dissolved in part with the continued rapid advancements of television technology, and the more contemporary increase of highly mobile technologies as smartphones and notebook computers, since Williams’ writing. These media forms not only prompt a desire for physical mobility, but imply that travel outside the static idea of home is an inevitable act as well. Building upon William’s coined terms, the media scholar Lynn Spigel (2001) inverts the permanency of home towards one of a mobile

entity. Calling this phenomenon “privatized mobility,” Spigel suggests that the mobile potentiality of media technologies allows one to experience “the home as a vehicular form, a mode of transport in and of itself that allowed people to take private life outdoors” (2001: 392). Important within the context of “privatized mobility” is its dependency on technological mediation within instances of physical travel outside the house. One indeed goes out into the world, but their perception of space is continually mediated through using mobile technologies. Without the affective sense of security provided by consuming media through media technologies, for the highly personal use of tools creates in effect sensations of being at home in both the case of Williams and Spigel, then the affective stance towards the actual experience of the direct world around them potentially differs.

The complications of “privatized mobility” is clearly exemplified in the case of my informants, who maintain differing receptions of “Korea” based on the level of mediation.

Without mediation in everyday life Korea, my informants often demonstrated an ambiguous, if not increasingly negative, perception to the everyday struggles of Korean society. However, through the mediation of K-Pop, this perception remains towards the positive. Because of the pervasiveness of this mediation—be it through the sheer mobility of the smartphone or the numerous mediated aspects of everyday Korean urban space—this affectively positive state perhaps remains dominant. This mediated facet of everyday life coincides closely with the social effects instantaneous mediation and everyday perception of space observed by the cultural theorist Paul Virilio’s (1984). Building upon the phenomenology of perception in the frame of the lifeworld pioneered by the phenomenologist Edmund Husserl (1970), the philosopher Ian James (2006) translates and summarizes the cultural theorist Paul Virilio’s (1984) analysis of instantaneous media perception as such:

“Virilio is suggesting that the way in which we perceive the world as mediated through television or other forms of more or less instantaneous transmission involves the introduction of ruptures, which interrupt the synthesis of the sensible and the intelligible from which [...] the present moment of immediate experience is produced. Via the instantaneous transmission of modern communications we can perceive something as immediate in a manner which bypasses the way in which the situated physical body engages with its surroundings. Something can be perceived as near when it is distant; its appearance in space is not subject to the temporal delay of physical movement in space”

(James 2006:324).

As a result of the previous domination of physical nation-state essentialism of Korea upon the genre of K-Pop, the mediation of K-Pop in everyday spaces gives the illusion of an affectively positive conception of “Korea” which overlaps the everyday experience of “Korea.” Yet these similarly triggered perceptions of different lifeworlds of Korea cannot possibly coexist, or in theory should not be able to, at the same phenomenological level. Under Virilio’s analysis of society, the mediated aspects of “Korea” through the generic classification of K-Pop must then represent a Korea that is at a distance, broadly defined, yet is continually perceived as instance through the mediation—and increasing mediation in the case of my informants—of K-Pop through ubiquitous mediums of technology.

The instantaneous mediation of K-Pop should, theoretically, bring “Korea” into the everyday lives of consumers. But in the scope of this paper, this is clearly not the case because the prominence of locationality in genre prompts a continued valuation of perceived

distance between global consumers and the country of origin of brand of K-Pop. As such, collapsing this sense of distance by physically travelling to this assumed country of origin is seemingly vital for a truly convincing, spatially-uninhibiting connection to K-Pop for many of these expats. However, at the moment in which this perceived geopolitical spatial proximity is supposed to be achieved—i.e., coming to and living in Korea—my informants demonstrate that this spatial convergence is not fully satisfied, which results in the shown increased affinity to K-Pop in the process of nostalgizing despite being in the supposed homeland of K-Pop. Desire is still present; and this desire of K-Pop is still at a perceived distance.

I suggest valuing the essentialized geopolitical construct of Korea as the home origin denies the active recognition of homing this affective block in K-Pop. Since K-Pop is perceived as the music of Korea to Mark, a sense of distance that is not equivalent to his geopolitical conception of returning home as Mark currently finds himself in Korea. This geopolitical classification of K-Pop as something inherently Korean renders mute the fact that through intensive consumption, Mark is demonstrating the sense of immediacy and desire for K-Pop is the perceived simultaneously through mediation as markers of both “home” and in Korea. As this positive desire for K-Pop is not necessarily found in the increasingly negative perception of everyday life in the geopolitical locale of Korea, then K-Pop is then to a degree falsely mediated and received as something purely or inherently Korean. The “K” in K-Pop thus triggers an alternative site of desire, one not defined spatially by political boundaries, and thus is fully intertwined with the affective process of home building to mitigate the experience discontent with the displaced present.

The Perpetual Drive to Conclusion

Within the complex of building home and the state of intensifying consumption of K-Pop, I suggested that K-Pop is not inherently representative of the geopolitical entity of Korea. Recalling Virilio again, the immediate perceptible qualities of an object through electronic mediation gives the appearance of nearness, when in fact the object is perpetually at a distance. In a similar manner, building the affective quality of home is very much a process of mediating the imagined or desired place that is not physically here into everyday life. As a perpetual state of longing, it remains always that: in the distance. Overlaying these affective qualities onto the act of consuming K-Pop perpetually puts it at a distance. As demonstrated by my informants, this exists regardless whether one is geopolitically located, as this quality is ultimately an irrelevant property often misconstrued onto an object due to projects of genre classification.

The “K” in K-Pop, and K-Media at large, represents itself as a drive towards an empty referent by whomever is in the realm of its consumption. In the scope of this paper, the specific desire my informants had associated to its emptiness was something specifically related to the affective conception of home. Unfortunately, the lack entrenched in this affective desire that is placed onto this object produces a condition that cannot possibly be achieved, leaving the consumer in a perpetual state of desiring. Relatedly, the psychoanalyst Slavoj Žižek (1997) argues the “*raison d'être*” for any type of desire “is not to realize its goal, to find full satisfaction, but to reproduce itself as desire” (39, emphasis in original), thus continually producing drive to achieve the object that is desired. In a sense, this is the act of nostalgizing, even though it looks back to “home,” is a process of continually seeking this desire though performing tangible acts that simulate these necessary affective blocks that

suggests a process of achieving this drive. In the case of my expat informants, the “K” in K-Pop is a marker of the continual process of building home in the continual displacement the modern subject experiences. “K” attached to its respective media represents a tangible act and process in which desire of security and home could potentially, but never actually, be achieved.

In the perpetual sense of displacement experienced by my informants, their turning to K-Pop is one of the few seemingly affectively tangible sources towards their drive to desire to which they can actively attend. The hyperreality involved in this instantaneous and everyday mediation of this media through technological means allows one to perceive they are closing in on this desire. While the media scholar Nick Couldry (2005) argues that “One of the primary myths of the contemporary world is that ‘the media’ are our central access-point to whatever we might want to call social ‘reality’” (73), the affects allowed by the gatekeeping of media technologies seem to call one into the social reality they desire, or prompting the intensified drive to achieve that desired reality. As a result, this sense of home building through nostalgia is sought to be experienced with mediation alone. For even in Korea, the geopolitical producer of the media of K-Pop, these forms of desiring are still mediated through everyday technology usage. These effects are the same one would experience in any other geopolitical locale.

I suggest the “K” in K-Pop is not something inherently Korean in any inherent, historical, or physical sense, as it was never coined in Korea to be labeled in such a matter at its onset. Rather, it represents the desire, even for the state of Korea itself, which is unfortunately conflated with the country of brand of origin: a reality that is not perceived until this perceived spatial possibility is collapsed and viewed as a failed act. And to some degree, not even lack is fully realized, or if it is, it is denied.

Acknowledgement

Research was supported by a fellowship from the Graduate School of Korean Studies in the Academy of Korean Studies.

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How Does Korean Musical Theatre Perform the Nation and Its History on Global Stages in the Time of Korean Wave?

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Under the moniker of *Hallyu* (Korean Wave), South Korean cultural productions such as K-pop music, film, and television dramas (K-dramas) have gained both domestic and international academic interest in such various disciplines as Korean studies, film studies, cultural studies, and media studies. Despite the burgeoning scholarly debates over the Korean Wave and its global effect on artistic and cultural production, the study of Korean musical theatre, both in Korean and non-Korean academia, is rarely a part of the conversation—in spite of the Korean musical's growing visibility on global stages. In this research paper, I examine the status of contemporary Korean musical theatre in the time of Korean Wave by looking at the trajectory of how the Korean musical has evolved and become a participant of cultural export in the beginning of the twenty-first century alongside the development of the Korean Wave. Although the Korean musical has not directly been a part of the Korean Wave as much as K-pop and K-drama, this study examines some of the possible links between the Korean popular culture boom and Korean musical theatre, which contribute to broadening the horizon of *Hallyu* discourse as well as diversifying its sphere of study.

While looking at facets that have accelerated the growth of the Korean musical industry on the global stage, I critically examine some of the limits, dilemmas, and challenges that the industry faces. I also contextualize the Korean musical in both national-transnational and local-global frameworks by considering the question of how Korean musical theatre has constructed and represented its national and cultural identity (its “Korean-ness”) based on its local, historical, and sociopolitical milieu. By examining *Hero: The Musical*, a Korean original musical, I will examine how the musical attempts to appeal to a global audience not fixated on Korean nationalism and portray the Korean independence movement with a global, revisionist and more contemporary perspective. By looking at New York critics' responses to *Hero*, this paper also questions what happens to Korean performance and Korea's identity when it travels to other countries.

Despite relatively little published work on contemporary Korean musical theatre outside of the realm of non-Korean academia, scholars such as Hyunjung Lee, Sue-Ellen Case, Jiyun (Kayla) Yuh, and David Savran have been publishing their English-language academic work on Korean musical theatre and performance since the turn of the twenty-first century. Amongst recent articles published in Korean academia, the critical analyses from Choi Sang-ug, Choi Won-gun, and Kim Byung-jin of the current Korean musical industry were most relevant and provided valuable resource and knowledge to my research. By looking at the trajectory of the study of the Korean musical as well as engaging in a conversation with other scholars, I hope that I can also consolidate the current, relatively dispersed state of the field to examine the current status of Korean musical theatre scholarship and its connection to the discourse of Korean Wave.

Marking a New Stage in the Globalization of Korean Musicals: Potentials and Paradoxes

In 2013, Patrick Healy, a theatre critic for the *New York Times*, wrote three articles about the Korean musical industry. By observing and interviewing Korean musical producers, actors, and consumers as well as New York producers, he gave a report on the ongoing boom of the Korean musical industry, particularly regarding its relationship with K-pop, Korean producers' insatiable aspiration for Broadway musicals, and New York producers' interest in collaborating with Korean producers, all of which marks a new stage in the globalization of Korean musicals. In one of three articles—each of them respectively focuses on a different topic of the Korean musical industry I mentioned above—Healy points to how the Korean musical industry begins to capitalize on the popularity of K-pop stars:

A few Korean musical producers are trying to ride the Korean Wave by putting K-pop stars into Broadway musicals and staging tours of the show in Japan; a K-pop-laden “Jack the Ripper” was a popular export to Tokyo last year. The ultimate goal is to bring these tours to China, once its enormous market opens up further to outside theatrical productions. But for now, most theater activity is centered in Seoul, a city of about 10 million people. Producers focus on rotating big-name singers into musicals

to help them have longer runs.¹

Now, three years after Healy's report, as the *Hallyu* continues to prove its expanding impact on a global scale, many producers have jumped on the Korean Wave bandwagon. Producers have certainly been able to capitalize on K-pop stars' appeal, bringing in not only the local audience but also international tourists from other Asian countries. Not surprisingly, these days, casting K-pop celebrities who have so-called "ticket power" has become the first and foremost factor in gaining commercial success of the show. Moreover, swimming with *Hallyu* tide, the Korean musical industry wants to have an opportunity for the expansion of Korean musicals onto world stage, especially East Asia. Nonetheless, there is an obvious downside in K-pop's dominance on the musical stage. K-pop stars' lack of experience and training for musical stage easily ends up damaging the quality of the production, whereas the high salary of K-pop stars raises the production cost. Won-Gun Choi and Byung-Jin Yim argue that the excessive dependence on K-pop stars' appeal will hinder the Korean musical industry from growing further and being competent on the global stage in the long run.²

Another aspect that marks the globalization of Korean musicals is the larger trend in the Korean musical industry to move toward overseas markets. Based on producers' own interest and business strategies, Korea continues to build international connections, especially with Japan and China, to compensate for the saturated domestic market.³ Many producers also hire American and European artists for the development of new musicals for Korean audiences. Moreover, the producers have begun to invest their money and participate in the process of creating new American Broadway musicals as a main producer or a coproducer in collaboration with American artists and producers. The *New York Times* interview with Sin Chun-Soo, president of OD Musical Company, reveals his ambition to become an active participant in the global musical industry. He states his case: "Do I care about losing money on Broadway? Not really. What matters is that American producers notice us, see our market, and understand what Asia can become. Broadway is the place of origin for musicals; once it's on Broadway, it's likely to spread around the world. So we have to become players there."⁴ For Shin and many other Korean producers, the active involvement and commitment in importing, producing, and/or coproducing American Broadway musicals is a long-term investment based on a reasonable prospect of success, which will return them greater economic and cultural benefits. The recent successes of *Dreamgirls*, *Kinky Boots*, and *Jekyll and Hyde* prove this point.

This is a major change, considering that, in the past, the Korean musical industry had to mostly rely on imported foreign content, paying for copyrights and copying the musical conventions and vernaculars prescribed by American producers and directors. In the past, the Broadway musical had long been associated with a trope that signifies "the ultimate, superior 'Other,'" as Hyungjun Lee argues⁵. Recently, however, this is beginning to change. The Korean musical industry that used to look up to Broadway is trying to become an "equal player" in the global market. On the one hand, New York producers welcome the change because it benefits them in many ways. The popularity of Broadway musicals in Korea continues to provide a lucrative market for New York producers, and the producers are also beginning to take advantage of Seoul as a cost-saving tryout region, as well as a stepping stone to expand to China. On the other hand, Korea's active commitment to the global market could also be seen as a kind of "identity crisis" of the American musical.⁶ David Savran argues, "The increasing economic clout of transnational entertainment conglomerates and the development of Broadway musical-like products in many parts of the world have meant that the most U.S. American form of theatre is becoming increasingly stateless."⁷

¹ Patrick Healy, "Heartthrobs Rule the Korean Stage," *New York Times*, December 26, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/29/theater/k-pop-stars-selling-stage-musicals-in-korea.html?_r=0.

² Won-Gun Choi and Byung-Jin Yim, "A study on the Industrial History and Development of the Musical Theatre in Korea," *The Journal of Business History*, 30 no.3 (2015): 35-56.

³ Ji Hyon (Kayla) Yuh, "Modern Musicals in Asia," *Routledge Handbook of Asian Theatre*, edited by Siyuan Liu (Routledge: New York, 2016), 543.

⁴ Patrick Healy, "Korean Cash Takes Broadway Bows," *New York Times*, December 31, 2013, <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/01/theater/korean-cash-takes-broadway-bows.html>.

⁵ Hyungjung Lee, *Performing the Nation in Global Korea: Transnational Theatre* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 7.

⁶ David Savran, "Trafficking in Transnational Brands: The New "Broadway-Style" Musical," *Theatre Survey*, 55 no. 3 (2014): 319.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 318.

Despite all the potentials and possibilities, the Korean Wave musical industry faces some inherent paradoxes. In the Korean musical industry, Broadway means a lot—maybe too much. Even if Korea acquires visible status as an investor, creator, and producer on the global stage, it continues to rely on the Broadway musical industry in terms of content, brand, marketing strategy, and business model. In that sense, what Korean musical theatre has achieved as a game player on the global market is half-agency and half-power. Among these paradoxes, what I continually witness is the marginalization of homegrown Korean original musicals. The Korean musical industry has not committed itself enough to creating a new Korean original musical, or at least not nearly as much as it does for Broadway musicals. This might be because producers in Korea think that having a credit for creating a Broadway musical will earn their companies more glory than staging a new Korean musical. Nor are K-pop celebrities, who are in constant need to sell their appeal to global fans, likely participating in small-budget original Korean musicals. In short, with too much effort being spent on globalizing Korean musical theatre, the Korean musical industry is too narrowly investing its energy and entrepreneurship solely on Broadway musicals that feature K-pop stars. This reliance on K-pop stars on the Broadway musical stage will not enable the Korean musical industry to grow and mature in a sustainable way. Have there not been any Korean original musicals that tried to move beyond and/or decenter the Western hegemony of Broadway while appealing to the global musical market? What kind of subject, content, or aesthetic would be effective and attractive in promoting and communicating Korean-ness on the global stage?

Whereas Broadway musicals grew to meet the demands of their popularity, the development of original Korean musicals today has been achieved by Korean artists', producers', and investors' long-cherished desire to compete against Broadway musicals as well as the nation's aspiration for globalizing Korean culture. Original Korean musicals emerged in the 1990s, and this corresponded with the sociopolitical and cultural shifts of that time. In 1993, a government-sponsored program of economic and cultural globalization and its rhetoric of *segzehwa* (globalization) highlighted the importance of Korean traditions and culture as well as national identity with the ideas of globalizing in a Korean way. At that time, cultural producers, who were strongly influenced by nationalistic goals and aspirations, imagined grand-scale Korean original musicals that moved beyond the national borders to reach international audiences and consumers. Thus, since the 1990s, and long before the Korean musical industry was influenced by today's *Hallyu*-driven cultural phenomenon, Korean theatre artists and producers attempted to establish Korean musical theatre, its national identity, and Koreanness as a world-class culture comparable to the U.S. Broadway musical. Ushered in by *Hallyu* and the circulation of Korean cultural products in the global context, Korean musicals since 2000 has experienced compressed, rapid growth demonstrated by an increase in the number of original Korean musicals, performers, producers, and musical training schools.⁸ Since 2012, original Korean musicals have not only achieved commercial success drawing in both domestic and international audience but also shown the possibility of moving toward overseas market.⁹ Musicals like *Finding Mr. Kim*, *Jump*, *Musical Winter Sonata*, *Musical Laundry*, and *Hero* have not only achieved commercial success in Korea but have gone transnational within mostly Asian countries.

Recasting Korea's Modern History in a Glocal Way and Asian Regional Encounters *Hero the Musical*

Yoon Ho Jin is considered one of Korea's representative contemporary musical directors and producers. He founded Arts Communication International (Acom International) in 1993 as Korea's first professional corporate producer of musicals, and he produced two of Korea's most widely known musicals, *The Last Empress* and *Hero*, both of which deal with Korean national history and memory charged with uniquely Korean nationalistic sentiment. *The Last Empress*, an epic musical set in 1895, tells the story of the planned murder of Queen Min by Japanese assassins. *Hero* tells the story of Korean independence activist Ahn Jung-Guen's assassination of Ito Hirobumi. From the beginning of the production process, both musicals were created and promoted as national cultural products under the demands of globalization. In a bid for global recognition, *The Last Empress* was staged in New York (1997), and it later also traveled to Los Angeles (1998; 2003), London (2002), and Toronto (2004). *Hero* (2009), a sequel piece to *The Last Empress* targets not only local audiences but also global ones, traveling to New York (2011) and Harbin (2015). Yoon's theatrical dramaturgies for adopting this national history into a musical piece—including the musical's plot, structure, characterization, and theme—reflect his ambition to create the musical as a piece of national pride on the global stage. One the one hand, the rationale and motivation behind the production of *Hero* is similar to that of *The Last Empress* in terms of using historical events and figures that exude nationalist sentiment. On the other hand, as Lee argues, *Hero* is

⁸ Lee, 69.

⁹ Kim Sang-ug, "A Study on Overseas Expansion Supporting Strategies of Korean Creative Musical: Focusing on Asia," *Journal of Korea Culture Industry*, 16 no.1 (2016), 2.

different from *The Last Empress* in that the musical is “located at the crossroads of nationalistic sentiments and newly emerging trends that reflect regional Asian conversations about cultural transaction and development.”¹⁰

Hero the Musical dramatizes Korean independence activist Ahn Jung-Geun’s assassination of Ito Hirobumi, the first Japanese resident-general of Korea and the first prime minister of Japan. This musical retells Korea’s national struggle against the Japanese annexation of Korea while critiquing Japanese colonialism and imperialism. Dealing with the Korea’s historical event, *Hero* wrestles with two challenges. First, it is not easy to adapt this significant and symbolic event in Korean colonial history into a musical due to its heavy subject matter. It could easily turn into agitprop or a history lesson being overly charged with nationalism and patriotism. Second, it is more difficult to appeal to an international audience and have universal appeal with a story about Korean national history because the story and characters are rooted in a specific time and place. To adapt the history into a theatrical and dramatic genre, Yoon not only adds some fictional characters and plots but also fleshes out and recreates the two historical figures of Ahn and Ito with a sort of revisionist view. Yoon explained how he attempted to cater to international audience, especially audience in East Asia region: “The musical targets the international audience, especially the Chinese and Japanese. So we will describe every character from the perspective of each nationality. That is why the musical has diverse characters, such as the Chinese woman Ling Ling, a fictional figure, and Japanese detective Wada, to show various spectrums.”¹¹ In this way, by attempting to widen awareness of Japanese colonialism and imperialism in other countries of the Asia region, the musical aspires to portray Korea’s modern history and its colonial memory as the shared past of East Asia.

In *Hero*, to appeal to a global audience (particularly to Japanese and Chinese audiences), the musical represents Korea’s modern history (including its colonial memory and identity that we share as Koreans—its Koreanness) in a glocalized way to some extent through the director’s choice and dramaturgy of the fictionalization and characterization of historical figures. Jean Graham-Jones points out that current theatre practices in many cases rely on the interactive and interpenetrative relation between the global and the local because indigenous theatre productions and international theatre festivals, in many cases, rely on foreign spectators and international media to disseminate their local plays in a globalized world.¹² In this sense, she suggests that the most appropriate term to refer to the nature of performance in our contemporary world is “glocalized.”¹³ Yoon’s choice of characters reflects the ideas and application of glocal or glocalization, a neologism coined by conflating oppositional words—global-local / globalization-localization.

The musical invests much effort in balancing two characters, Ahn and Ito by equally displaying their conflicting ideologies in the context of Asia at the turn of the twentieth century. The most interesting quality of the play as a glocalized text is that the musical endows Ito with more well-rounded, sympathetic, and even humane attributes, seeming to be almost equivalent to Ahn’s, unlike other cultural narratives produced in Korea where Ito has mostly been depicted as an imperialistic villain. In a 2011 interview with *Chosun Ilbo*, Yoon said, “*Hero* sketches Ito as a heroic figure as equally as Ahn. I wanted to illuminate why both national figures could not help killing each other trapped in the frame of the turbulent age. I hope the audience will think about how Japan and Korea could have coexisted peacefully in the past, can achieve peaceful coexistence for now and the future after seeing this show.”¹⁴ Soon after the interview was published, his remarks on Ito and Ahn ignited a heated controversy among the public in Korea. Regardless of having seen the musical or not, some people criticized Yoon’s characterization of Ito and his justification of creating Ito as another hero. Some of them aroused suspicion that he might politically align with a pro-Japanese group. To respond to these criticisms and suspicions, Yoon ended up posting a vindication of the director’s intention, denying the rumors on the website of

¹⁰ Lee, 67.

¹¹ Chung Ah-young, “Musical *Hero* Heightens Expectation,” September 1, 2009, http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/art/2010/10/145_51077.html

¹² Jean Graham-Jones, “Editorial Comment: Theorizing Globalization Through Theatre,” *Theatre Journal* 57 no.3 (2005): viii-xvi.

¹³ Glocalization is a neologism coined by conflating those two oppositional and contradictory words. Globalization, originally coined by Robertson, rejects the idea of locality as a form of opposition or resistance to global trends. Glocalization is modeled on the Japanese term *dochakuka*, originally derived from *dochaku*, meaning the agricultural principle of adapting farming techniques to local conditions. The word also became a Japanese business strategy in the 1980s when the Japanese adopted the principle of “global localization” through which a business invests abroad and, to some extent, adapts to the local conditions in order to maximize the local demand for its products or services.

¹⁴ Kim Kyung-Eun, “Ahn Jung-Geun Goes to Broadway,” *Chosun.com*, August 24, 2011, http://news.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2011/08/24/2011082402706.html. The article is written in Korean.

Acom International: “I just wanted to sketch Ahn as a universally acceptable figure not just as a national hero, to make that characterization valid and persuasive, I also needed to describe Ito as well-rounded character not as flat villain.” Indeed, the musical, with its theatrical characterizations and aesthetics endowed to him, represents Ito as a Japanese hero—a counterpart to the Korean hero, Ahn. Why and how does the musical do this, and what is the effect of the depiction?

Yoon is aware that Ahn is a national hero in South Korea, seen as an independence activist, but he also remains a controversial figure for Korean and Japanese relations. Thus, the musical represents Ahn as a philosopher who strives for peace in East Asia rather than fixating on him just as a national patriot. Yoon says, “Ahn is a hero to us, but he could be seen as a terrorist to foreigners. However, he was the person who came up with the Peace of East Asia philosophy, which has a link with the current United Nations’ peacekeeping work. We will show that Ahn is not just a patriotic activist, but a philosopher concerned about peace in Asia.”¹⁵ For dramatic balance between Ahn and Ito, the musical also portrays Ito not just as an imperialistic colonizer but also as a person who believes in the Great East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere that champions modernization, civilization, and westernization while incorporating these ideas into governing Korea.

Along with glocalizing Korea’s history as well as communicating its awareness of Asian regional dynamics, the musical also reflects a revisionist historical view to depict Ito Hirobumi. Recently, some historians with a different perspective have attempted to provide a reexamination of Ito focusing on his philosophical ideas on administering Korea rather than arguing that he spearheaded the Korean annexation with strong imperialist desires. Takii Kazuhiro’s research examines how Ito in Korea was treated as “a master instructor in modernization.”¹⁶ Lee Sung-Hwan focuses on Ito’s philosophy in relation to with his civilization and education policy, with which he set about governing the protectorate of Korea.¹⁷ These revisionist reading of Ito, which diverges from previous understandings of him, is interested in how the idea of governing Korea was incorporated into his convictions toward civilization, modernization, and westernization. Partly concurring with this revisionist understanding of Ito, the musical attempts to shed light on the inner layers of Ito’s thinking and philosophy for the administration of Korea. This understanding of Ito’s approach to governing Korea has a productive meaning for the musical’s dramatic text and characterization (although it is problematic). It is not to gloss over Japan’s atrocities against Korea but to enrich the piece with dramatic subtexts and multiple possible interpretations of the characters. It thematically enables the audience to investigate Ito’s underlying motive for the annexation of Korea in more depth with consideration of his philosophy and convictions. Thus, the musical presents a broader spectrum of representations of Japanese imperialism rather than being fixated on its conventional image of brutality and atrocity.

Even though obvious and clear binary oppositions construct the musical’s plot and structure: Japan versus Korea, colonizer versus colonized, and perpetrator versus, victim, interestingly, however, this good and evil dichotomy becomes unclear and ambivalent when it comes to the representations and characterizations of Ito and Ahn as individuals. The musical represents Ito’s approach to the annexation of Korea as cautious, mindful, and civilized, making it different from other authorities dealing with colonizing Korea. Ito sings to advise that Japan should not ignore Korea: “Despising Chosun for her weakness will lead to calamity/ Chosun has come through great storms / Treat her gently or noses will get bloodied / Chosun is rooted in thousands of years of history / And still you don’t know her / We don’t know Chosun. Chosun is too big to be ignored.”¹⁸ In the song “Going to Russia,” the musical shows a glimpse of Ito’s aspirations for the civilization, modernization, and westernization of East Asia as well as his dream for peace, cultural progress, and co-prosperity in East Asia.¹⁹ This musical also portrays Ito as a well-rounded character, imbuing him with emotional attributes. Although Ito is a villain, he nevertheless has an opportunity to express his solitude as a leader in Japan in the song “The Sun in Twilight” and is nostalgic as an aging man throughout. This number, written as a power ballad with an escalating melody, produces emotional effects and potentially makes the audience feel sympathy toward Ito to some extent. In this way, Ito is portrayed as a relatively more humane colonizer shedding his detestable

¹⁵ Kwon Mee-Yoo, “Yun Takes Musical ‘Hero’ to New York,” *The Korean Times*, August 10, 2011, http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/art/2011/08/135_92515.html.

¹⁶ Takii Kazuhiro, *Ito Hirobumi – Japan’s First Prime Minister and Father of the Meiji Constitution* (New York: Routledge, 2014), 160.

¹⁷ Lee Sung-Hwan, “Ito Hirobumi’s Philosophy of Civilization for The Administration of Korea,” *Journal of Japanese Language and Literature*, 79 no. 2 (2011): 69-90. The article is written in Korean.

¹⁸ English subtitles of *Hero the Musical*, Arts Communication International, unpublished.

¹⁹ Ibid.

attributes.

The musical summons Ito's ghost back to the stage again, even after he is already killed by Ahn, to stage an encounter between the two men. The musical makes the two characters engage in conversation with each other. In this dreamily surreal scene, both characters sing the song "Fate" while standing side by side and looking straight into the audience. This scene and song feature the two figures' similarities and commonalities in that both are heroes who served their countries in their own ways rather than focusing on the aggravated, antagonistic emotions and relationships between the two. The musical shows that they both believe in their visions of prosperity and security in East Asia where China, Korea, and Japan should work in unison to counter and fight off the "White Peril"—European countries engaged in colonialism—and restore peace to East Asia. By providing an opportunity for the two characters to meet and sing together, the musical signifies a potential for achieving mutual understanding and reconciliation between the two countries, as symbolized by the two heroes and based on humanistic sympathy and conversation.

The Challenge of Moving Beyond Korea: New York Critics' Reviews of *Hero* the Musical

When *Hero* traveled to the United States to be shown to New York audiences, Yoon expressed his optimistic anticipation that the musical would be received positively from a global audience. He said, "The audiences will be awed by the spectacle of the Harbin Train station scene where Ahn assassinates Ito Hirobumi, and I am positive that the story will impress international audiences."²⁰ His anticipation was half right and half wrong. Overall, New York theatre critics had similar responses to the production. They were impressed by its theatrical spectacle, but they remained dubious about its narrative. Anonymously, their opinions agree on the musical's lack of universal appeal to a global audience. In his review, Clifford Lee Johnson III says, "*Hero* proves to be a spectacularly produced Broadway-style show with subject matter that remains somewhat provincial."²¹ He goes on to say that the musical does not successfully communicate with the foreign audience: "As often happens in large-scale historical pieces, though, human values are sacrificed for spectacle, with characters reduced to broad types and little time made available for exploring complex ideas. While that's not a problem for 'insider' audiences, such an approach can leave outsiders (like me) feeling detached."²² Similarly, David Finkle remarks, "The anthem-heavy production should appeal to Korean ticket buyers gratified to witness a story they've likely known since childhood as brought resoundingly to the stage. But it could be a very different matter for others to whom the information is new."²³

Several New York critics also criticized the musical for its reliance on the good/bad binary opposition of the two groups—Koreans as a good guys and Japanese as bad guys. As Rachel Saltz for *The New York Times* writes, what is odd about the musical is its "allegiance to two theatrical styles, the commercial musical and agitprop drama, with its impeccably decent good guys and thoroughly evil bad guys. The result is a show more bombastic than rousing."²⁴ She adds, "As a drama, *Hero* has the problems of a patriotic story in which good and evil are too clearly defined (for a South Korean production this show can feel awfully Soviet.)"²⁵ Joe Dziemianowicz states, "Ito was keen on invading Korea, which automatically frames him as unsympathetic . . . An Jung-Guen was executed and died a hero. It is a potentially heavy history lesson—doubly so for anyone who's not fluent in Korea's turbulent past."²⁶

New York critics' reviews have another thing in common. Most of them wrestle to understand this new

²⁰ Kwon.

²¹ Clifford Lee Johnson III. "Hero the Musical," *Backstage*, August 25, 2011, <http://www.backstage.com/review/ny-theater/off-broadway/hero-the-musical/>.

²² Ibid.

²³ David Finkle, "Hero: The Musical," *Theatremania*, August 24, 2011, http://www.theatremania.com/new-york-city-theater/reviews/08-2011/hero-the-musical_40010.html.

²⁴ Rachel Saltz, "Politics, History, and All That Jazz: Good vs. Evil in 34 Songs," *The New York Times*, August 29, 2011, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/31/theater/reviews/hero-a-korean-musical-at-the-koch-theater-review.html>.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Joe Dziemianowicz, "Hero the Musical Review: Hummable Homicide Aims to Stir Seoul," *Daily News*, August 21, 2011, <http://www.nydailynews.com/entertainment/music-arts/hero-musical-review-hummable-homicide-aims-stir-seoul-article-1.951638>.

Korean musical, its subject matter, characters, and aesthetics by reflecting upon and comparing it to other Broadway musicals. Johnson III understands the show's representation of the heroic main character Ahn through comparison with the heroic protagonists of *Jesus Christ Superstar* and *Les Misérables*. Dziemianowicz comments that the antagonistic choreographic representation of the Koreans and the Japanese is "very like [the] Sharks and the Jets from *West Side Story*."²⁷ Thus, these common aspects of the New York critics' reviews reveal that, in order to understand *Hero*'s politics and aesthetics, audiences have to navigate within the limited frame of their own knowledge due to the musical's unfamiliar subject matter and context.

For American audiences, seeing a play such as *Hero*, which is set in Korea in 1909, may be difficult in its focus on the history of a Korean independence activist's assassination of a Japanese authority. The musical as performed in Korean using simplified English supertitles might not have been that captivating. This is especially true when an American audience does not have as much direct experience with the traumatic and humiliating colonial history as would a Korean audience; it can thus be hard to understand the cultural and political climates embedded in the play. Yoon's dramaturgical attempts to re-envision the relationship between Ahn and Ito by minimizing the crude good/bad binary opposition between the two was not communicated effectively to New York audiences, although Korean audiences were sensitive and responded well to it. The New York production of *Hero* and its reception tell us what challenges and limitations almost inevitably confront a play being presented to a global audience. However, despite this inherent difficulty, *Hero*, as a musical that addresses to international audiences a more contemporary understanding of Korea's national history, does not necessarily lose its potential when it goes overseas. We may never know what effect and sociopolitical discourse when this musical would bring when it were to be staged in Japan or China.

Actually, *Hero* has performed the show in Harbin in 2015, and it also is planning its tour in Shanghai in 2016. I believe an additional research that focuses on how the musical has been staged and received by the Chinese audience and critics can be a valuable work to develop this discussion further.

Conclusion: *Hero the Musical* and Its Political Discourse and Efficacy in East Asia

Since *Hero* premiered in 2009, it has drawn constant public attention through its active social media presence, holding a discussion forum and posting news articles concerning Korea's unresolved colonial history and memory. It has been a good strategy for maintaining communication with its audience and potential audience. In addition, the musical's political practice has also promoted engagement in and contributions to Korea's political and social discourse. Since Abe Shinzo became a leader in Japanese government in 2012, Koreans have been disappointed about the growing conservative nationalism of the Japanese government in issues of its colonial and imperial past, such as comfort women and territorial issues of Dokdo. Ahn's assassination of Ito is one of those unresolved and irreconcilable issues between Japan and Korea that creates antagonistic attitudes between the two nations, furthering oppositional opinions in regards to interpretation and memorialization. Specifically, in the case of Ahn, the opinions differ as to whether his deed is considered honorable activism for the independence of Korea or a regretful incident of terrorism.

In 2009, Chung Sung-Hwa, who played Ahn, visited Harbin, China, with the creative team for research and inspiration when the production process had just started. At that time on the site, there was neither an explanation of what happened a century ago nor any small, symbolic monument to memorialize Ahn's deed. Chung says, "The spot where Ahn shot the Japanese high-ranking official who led the Korea-Japan annexation, was marked with a triangle and there was no explanation due to possible diplomatic rows."²⁸ Then five years after, on January 19, 2014, China built and opened to the public a memorial honoring Ahn at Harbin Station in northeast China. The memorial hall features more than ninety exhibits tracing Ahn's life, his patriotic activities, and the historical background of the assassination to his execution.²⁹

The Chinese government's decision to open Ahn's memorial has brought praise from South Korea but criticism from Japan. Thus, this new memorial museum has also brought diplomatic ties between Korea and China but conflict between those two countries and Japan. Sun Yao, vice governor of Heilongjiang in China said, "People have cherished the memory of Ahn for past century. Today we erect a memorial to him and call on

²⁷ Johnson III.

²⁸ Kwon Mee-Yoo, "Chung Portrays Patriot Ahn's Humanity on Stage," *The Korea Times*, October 24, 2010, http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/culture/2014/01/145_78553.html.

²⁹ Sohn Ji-Ae.

peace loving people around the world to unite, resist invasions and oppose war.”³⁰ The South Korean foreign ministry praised the museum, saying it would “set the path for genuine peace and co-operation based on correct historical awareness.”³¹ However, the Japanese government criticized the memorial; Chief Cabinet Secretary and government spokesperson Yoshihide Suga described the opening as “regrettable.” He stated, “The Japanese opinion of Ahn Jung-Geun is that he is a terrorist who was sentenced to death for murdering Ito Hirobumi, our first prime minister.”³²

Engaging with this diplomatic controversy over Ahn’s memorial hall, Yoon conveyed his wish to exhibit recorded video of *Hero* in the memorial hall, and a Chinese representative of this memorial has accepted his ideas. Yoon said that playing this musical on the actual site where the event happened can help visitors of the memorial understand this historical event more engagingly and emotionally, broadening visitors’ understanding it. The creative team has cut down the musical into a 10 minute-video to play in the memorial hall.³³ In this way, the creators of *Hero* attempt to realize its potential more proactively and engagingly by making it a site-specific production, even though it is not a live show but a record of an abbreviated version.

By bringing the issue of Korea’s colonial history and memory to the forefront, *Hero the Musical* offers a chance for the Korean audience to be more consciously aware of its own history and society by revealing to them the still unresolved residues of Japanese colonialism and imperialism. In addition, rather than being fixated on overt nationalism, the musical aspires to communicate Korean history with international audience by representing it as a shared past of Asia, reflecting Asian regional dynamics in the past and present. *Hero* the Korean musical in the time of Korean Wave has the potential to affect the Korean viewers and international audience in a deep, emotional fashion, while resuscitating their critical and historical recognition of Korean history in Asia which they might have been indifferent and apathetic.

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³⁰ Angela Erika Kubo, “China Opens Memorial Honoring Korean Independence Activist,” *The Diplomat*, January 22, 2014, <http://thediplomat.com/2014/01/china-opens-memorial-honoring-korean-independence-activist/>.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Ibid.

³³ Son Hyo-Rim, “Ahn Jung-Geun Memorial exhibits recorded video of *Hero*,” *Donga.com*, February 27, 2014, <http://news.donga.com/3/all/20140227/61234961/1>. The article is written in Korean.

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Mending fences on the 38th Parallel:

Hallyu helps bridge the cultural divide

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Hallyu is often credited with spreading Korean music, dramas, food, and fashion across Asia and the wider world. However, one of its most crucial contributions is often ignored. The increased presence of Hallyu products, media, and ideas above the DMZ has radically affected how ordinary North Korean people view culture, history, governance, and social status. Ultimately, Hallyu helps to form the bedrock for a pan-Korean identity, one that links the North and South through shared experience. This bond has the power to supersede the acrimony of the inter-state relationship.

After over 70 years of separation, North and South Korea have developed wide gaps in culture, language, perception, style, technology, and history. Defectors risk life and limb to leave the repressive North, only to discover that acclimating to life in the South is complicated significantly by these cultural differences. In fact, defectors have higher unemployment and suicide rates when compared to other South Korean citizens.³⁴ They suffer from discrimination, are hampered by linguistic differences, lack technical skills, and struggle to form deep connections with South Koreans. This underlines the fact that a wide gulf has formed between the two nations.

The citizens of East and West Germany had relative freedom to communicate with one another and bond through common radio and television broadcasts.³⁵ On the other hand, the North Korean authorities prevent and restrict communication from flowing across the 38th parallel. Things have recently begun to change, however, thanks to North Korea's marketization. Hallyu media is penetrating and influencing the famously isolated nation. This illicit infusion of music, movies, television programs, and radio broadcasts is forming the foundation of a collective identity, one that will prove indispensable during the process of unification. By creating shared reference points, memories, products, speech, and ideas, Hallyu has the power to kick start the cultural mending process and bridge the cavernous divide separating North and South. The "Han" in Hallyu stands for the power to inspire hope and begin the hard work of Korean reconciliation.

For many years, North Koreans did not fully appreciate how much they were missing due to the authoritarian and isolationist policies of the Kim regime. But through foreign media and marketization, the bulk of the population has crossed an ideological barrier that cannot be uncrossed. The gradual proliferation of outside ideas has resulted in shifts in attitudes towards the regime, scrutiny of the historical underpinnings of regime legitimacy, and a novel characterization of what constitutes success in North Korea. Most importantly,

³⁴ "Defector among us: what does she look like?" *Korea Joongang Daily*. Web. 19 October, 2010. <<http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/Article.aspx?aid=2927327>>.

³⁵ Kim Gay Young. "West German radio gave Easterners window to world during Cold War." *Daily NK*. Web. December 21, 2015. <<http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?catId=nk00100&num=13649>>.

Hallyu creates a way for North and South Koreans to generate affection and empathy for one another. To map these transformations, we need to see what sorts of content and ideas are reaching the population. Next, we need to ask how these ideas are being absorbed and interpreted.

The shield: Why the regime uses an information blockade

Kim Il Sung began using indoctrination as a tool of control and influence as early as the Korean War. Ideological education was instituted to ensure that the entire population toed the party line. Revolutionary discipline was used to punish those who failed to conform. To express ideas that countered the wisdom, generosity, or legitimacy of Kim Il Sung was considered criminal intent.³⁶ The North Korean regime employs a multi-faceted approach to blocking and filtering out any information “that might call its portrayal of material circumstances into question.”³⁷ The Chosun Worker’s Party exercises strict control through an informational blockade carried out by the Ministry of People’s Security, customs officials, and the State Security Department. Furthermore, the Party exercises a monopoly on arts and information disseminated through the Department of Arts and Culture and the Department of Propaganda.³⁸

For a long time, the information blockade made critical comparison near impossible for ordinary residents. Because of the thoroughness of censorship and propaganda, people had few opportunities to draw on alternate resources to evaluate the authorities. But the regime’s ability to maintain control is limited by its resources. After the Soviet Union collapsed, North Korea lost a major source of financial backing.

When aid from the Soviets dried up, the North Korean economy was doomed. The North’s agricultural sector was devastated. A massive famine followed in short order.³⁹ Initially, the Kim Il Sung government enacted a “Let’s Eat Two meals a Day” campaign, and then the Public Distribution System (PDS) collapsed, meaning that citizens outside of elite circles and “essential” industries were left to their own devices. A series of catastrophic floods with an estimated damage toll of \$15 billion displaced over 5 million people. The famine followed in due course, killing hundreds of thousands. This period is known in North Korea as *The Arduous March*. It changed people’s perceptions dramatically. The parent-like image of the leadership began to wither away.

The flood: How Hallyu broke through

³⁶ Smith, Hazel. “North Korea: Markets and Military Rule.” Print. 2015.

³⁷ Haggard, Stephan, and Marcus Noland. *Witness to Transformation: Refugee Insights into North Korea*. Washington, DC: Peterson Institute For International Economics, 2011. Print.

³⁸ Park, Kyung-Ae, and Scott Snyder. *North Korea in Transition: Politics, Economy, and Society*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2013. Print.

³⁹ Noland, Marcus. “Famine in North Korea: Causes and Cures.” *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 49.4 (2001): 741-67. Web. <<http://www.iie.com/publications/wp/99-2.pdf>>.

After this catastrophe, households, government agencies, military units, and even the National Library were forced to resort to market based schemes to stay afloat.⁴⁰ For lack of food from the regime, the people began to engage in trade by meeting up at unsanctioned markets called *jangmadang*. Low level cadres and officials turned to rent seeking in order to make a living. This meant that residents could get away with committing offenses such as smuggling and trading as long as they were able to bribe their way out. Andrei Lankov writes that “the seemingly unstoppable growth of private entrepreneurship creates an environment where uncensored and unauthorized information about the outside world spreads with great ease.”⁴¹

The country’s economic transformation gave Hallyu the opportunity to spread. According to a 2010 survey of defectors, 70.9% had engaged in private trading. Nearly half of the respondents earned their entire income through the market, while 2/3 received over half.⁴² According to the Ministry of Unification, a full 85% of defectors reported that they had watched South Korean soap operas while in the North.⁴³ According to a survey of defectors, the percentage of North Koreans who have watched or listened to foreign media has climbed from 30% to 55% since the famine era, while the portion of respondents who did not have access to foreign media declined from 65% to 50%.⁴⁴

At first, consuming Hallyu was a secretive and private affair. Getting caught could mean spending six months to a year in a labor camp. Crackdowns happened cyclically. They were frequent and thorough. Though the element of risk remains, things have calmed down in recent years. This is because of an unexpected development. It turns out that some of Hallyu’s most enthusiastic consumers are cadres. “The authorities growing willingness to secretly allow or be involved in the process is the main driver for the expansion of Korean Wave media inside North Korea. Cadres participate directly and indirectly in this process by taking bribes or selling discs loaded with contraband media and taking in huge profits.”⁴⁵ This has increased the availability of foreign media and promoted a more permissive attitude towards it.

A 2010 survey by Intermedia for the U.S. Department of State indicated that fewer North Koreans are willing to report on each other for consuming the contraband material.⁴⁶ For those who are caught, many are able to bribe the arresting agent from the Ministry of People’s Safety (MPS). For example, one man paid three bundles of ten cigarette packs and was left alone. As a result of these trends, Hallyu has spread from the cities to rural areas. Additionally, people have started watching with family members and neighbors. These developments underline how power structures are morphing in order to accommodate Hallyu’s presence.

⁴⁰ ^Haggard, Stephan, and Marcus Noland.

⁴¹ Park, Kyung-Ae, and Scott Snyder. *North Korea in Transition: Politics, Economy, and Society*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2013. Print.

⁴² ^Haggard, Stephan, and Marcus Noland.

⁴³ Choe, Hyeon-ok. “Research on the Viewing of South Korean Soap operas by North Korean Residents: focusing on the period after the late 1990s.” M.S. Thesis, University of North Korean Studies (2011), 23.

⁴⁴ ^Haggard, Stephan, and Marcus Noland.

⁴⁵ Lee Sang Yong. “Hallyu’s hooks deep into North Korean society.” Daily NK. 24 April, 2016. <<http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?num=13873&cataId=nk01500>>.

⁴⁶ “North Koreans Gaining More Access to Foreign Media, Says Report.” *North Korea Tech*. 12 May 2012. Web. 19 Dec. 2015. <<http://www.northkoreatech.org/2012/05/13/north-koreans-gaining-more-access-to-foreign-media-says-report/>>.

Empathy: How Hallyu creates a cross-border identity

A 2011 study of North Korean refugees in South Korea revealed that 38.8% had watched South Korean dramas at some point and that 15.2% watched South Korean broadcasts on a regular basis.⁴⁷ A 2010 study by the US Broadcasting Board of Governors found that 74% of North Koreans have access to a TV and 46% can access a DVD player.⁴⁸ When it comes to Hallyu programs, North Koreans prefer realistic content that portrays the daily life of Southerners. This contrasts with the over-the-top political content from North Korean media. Northerners enjoy variety programs featuring their favorite comedians and pop stars. One South Korean celebrity, Yoo Jae Seok, has gained quite a bit of fame over the DMZ. For this reason, he is known as the “Emcee of the Peninsula” (*Kungmin MC*).

North Koreans have begun to imitate the speech patterns, style, and behaviors that they see and hear about on South Korean programs. Some wealthy “Pyonghattanites” pay U.S. \$20 per lesson for their children to learn the dance moves of South Korean singers such as Girls Generation (*Sonyo Sidae*).⁴⁹ In North Hamgyong Province, people pay six times the cost of a normal haircut to look like the fashionable South Korean celebrities they see in dramas.⁵⁰

South Korean shows such as “Misaeng” and “Three Meals a Day” reveal the everyday life of middle class employees and the food culture of the South. Some cadres even ask their Chinese connections to provide them with ingredients so that they can recreate the delicious concoctions they see on TV.⁵¹ In Ryanggang Province, people have begun to copy another South Korean culinary tradition: *pojangmacha*. These colorful tents give diners a cozy place to consume street food at night. After seeing the *pojangmacha* in dramas, people in Ryanggang have begun gathering near food stalls at night to recreate the atmosphere.

One program - called “Grandpa Over Flowers” - features celebrity seniors trotting around the globe and exploring other cultures. Most North Koreans don’t have the freedom to travel internationally, so this program serves as something of a vicarious vacation. “Grandpa Over Flowers” is important because it simultaneously highlights the liberties of South Korea and stimulates North Korean curiosity about the wider world.

Other cultural aspects have also been influenced by the Hallyu programs. On the linguistic level, children have begun using less formal speech to refer to their parents. Instead of saying *Abeoji* (father), many have taken to saying *Abba* (Dad or Daddy). Although it is still taboo to talk about watching dramas in public, their influence is seeping into daily life. The word “no doubt” (당연하지) did not exist before people were introduced to it through foreign media. Using such catchphrases is now a subtle way to signal that one watches.

In terms of gender roles, Hallyu programs present men and women as social equals,

⁴⁷ Chu-chol Lee. “Current State of North Korean residents’ Exposure to South Korean Broadcasting.” Paper presented at the Korean Logistics Forum, August 8, 2011.

⁴⁸ “The Plot to Free North Korea with Smuggled Episodes of ‘Friends’.” Wired.com. Conde Nast Digital. Web. 19 Dec. 2015. <<http://www.wired.com/2015/03/north-korea/>>.

⁴⁹ Park, Kyung-Ae, and Scott Snyder. *North Korea in Transition: Politics, Economy, and Society*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2013. Print.

⁵⁰ ^Lee Sang Yong.

⁵¹ “Hallyu Programs Gain Popularity in NK as Looking Glasses into SK.” - *Daily NK*. Web. 19 Dec. 2015. <<http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?num=13454&catald=nk01500>>.

something that contrasts with the patriarchal media conventions of the North. One woman from North Pyongan Province said that this exposure has had a meaningful influence on her family life. It has caused her to reconsider what she once considered to be the “natural” order – female subservience. She added that her husband recently started helping out with the household chores. It is thus clear that Hallyu programs not only provoke critical introspection and social critique, they also provide a shared platform for North and South Koreans to relate to one another and create social meaning.

Epiphany: How Hallyu reveals the truth about South Korea

North Koreans have been taught through propaganda that South Korea is a dangerous and unequal society, filled with homelessness, prostitution, and murder.⁵² Of his own experience, one defector said, “We’re constantly told that South Chosun [South Korea] is a rotting and sick capitalist society, when in fact, the opposite is true.”⁵³ Because North Korea touts itself as the alternative to the ‘immoral, capitalist puppet state’ known as South Korea, diverging narratives challenge the fundamental political legitimacy of the regime.

North Koreans have seen a different side of South Korea through smuggled media and pirate radio broadcasts. It is difficult for many to truly comprehend the wealth and advancement of South Korean society. Possessing a car or a giant refrigerator is a status symbol afforded to very few in North Korea. It comes as quite a shock therefore, that this is the norm in South Korea. One defector said he only began to understand the wealth of South Korea when a friend suggested that they take a bus to travel for just a few short blocks. Before leaving the North, he had used public transport only a handful of times in his entire life.⁵⁴

North Koreans have reason to be suspicious when it comes to media. North Korean film conventions have trained them to watch with a discerning eye. In propaganda films made by the state, North Korea is presented as a modern, beautiful nation. It’s no surprise then that North Koreans do not simply trust all the images they see in foreign media. When watching South Korean soap operas, it’s hard for them to believe that normal people live in such opulence.

The overall perception of South Korea has changed significantly. A middle aged woman remarked that, “Perhaps children in primary schools still believe that South Koreans are poor. But everybody else knows that they are rich.”⁵⁵ Contrary to this woman’s suggestion that young children do not understand the discrepancy between the real world and state propaganda, a different source pointed out that, “it is not unusual to hear a story about North Korean children laughing during class when they are told about ‘ragged and hungry

⁵² Lee, Woo-young. “The Process of Social Change in North Korea.” *Understanding North Korea: Indigenous Perspectives*. Place of Publication Not Identified: Lexington, 2015. Print.

⁵³ “Pirate Radio Changed My World.” *Daily NK*. Web. 29 May. 2015. <<http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=nk00100&num=13228>>.

⁵⁴ Interview with the author. Seoul, South Korea. April 15, 2015.

⁵⁵ Lankov, Andrei. *The Real North Korea: Life and Politics in the Failed Stalinist Utopia*. Print.

South Korean children.”⁵⁶ Some school children have taken this a step further by turning a discerning eye towards their own government.

Suspicion: How Hallyu stimulates new views on the Kim regime

It's a scene that does not appear subversive until you zoom in closer: Carefree elementary, middle, and high school students singing a playful tune while hanging out with friends or heading to school in Pyongan Province. Only the content of the song is a satirical send-up of the Kim Dynasty. And the tune is based on a song originating from South Korea. North Koreans first heard the “Three Bears” song in an immensely popular South Korean drama called “Full House” in 2004. North Koreans then changed the lyrics to poke fun at the Kim regime, singing: “*Three bears in the house run the whole show: grandpa bear (Kim Il Sung), papa bear (Kim Jong Il), and baby bear (Kim Jong Un). Grandpa bear is fat, papa bear is also fat, and baby bear is foolish.*”⁵⁷ Representatives of the Kim Il Sung Socialist League have responded by screening children's song books and punishing those caught singing the tune with self-criticism sessions, but they can't seem to dent the staying power of this catchy little rhyme.

These students from the Pyongan Provinces are not alone. In the chaos of the Arduous March, the education system became largely defunct. Only 10% of children attended middle school during that period.⁵⁸ Thus, it became difficult to indoctrinate the children through ideological training. Instead, this cohort was exposed to increasing streams of foreign information, which poured in from the public and economic spaces that opened up as the government struggled to regain its footing. As a result, according to a former teacher, students in the present do not pay attention to *juche* ideals and are bored by discussion of socialist concepts.⁵⁹

Another example reveals how Hallyu stimulates new views on the regime. A former military official was responsible for tracking down and arresting consumers of foreign media. However, he changed his opinion of the regime after watching a South Korean documentary about authoritarian states in the Middle East. “Reading about the crimes happening in these countries, I began to realize that those crimes were happening in my country too... That was the starting point of the logic shifting in my brain. I began to understand the nature of dictatorships.”⁶⁰ With this example as context, it's easy to see just how devastating a sudden infusion of uncensored information could be for the regime.

In surveys, we see a direct connection - “Consumption of foreign media was

⁵⁶ Park, Kyung-Ae, and Scott Snyder. *North Korea in Transition: Politics, Economy, and Society*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2013. Print.

⁵⁷ “SK Children's Song under Fire above Border.” Daily NK. Web. 17 November. 2015. <<http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?num=13579&cataId=nk01500>>.

⁵⁸ Park, Kyung-Ae, and Scott Snyder. *North Korea in Transition: Politics, Economy, and Society*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2013. Print.

⁵⁹ Lee, Woo-young. “The Process of Social Change in North Korea.” *Understanding North Korea: Indigenous Perspectives*. Place of Publication Not Identified: Lexington, 2015. Print.

⁶⁰ “The Plot to Free North Korea With Smuggled Episodes of ‘Friends’.” Wired.com. Conde Nast Digital. Web. 19 Dec. 2015. <<http://www.wired.com/2015/03/north-korea/>>.

associated with more negative assessments of the regime and its intentions.”⁶¹ Some North Koreans were even motivated to vote with their feet by defecting after learning the truth through foreign media. 71.5% of refugees surveyed said that watching South Korean dramas influenced their decision to leave the country.⁶² Foreign information tends to stimulate doubt about the regime and carry positive messages about South Korea. One specific form of South Korean media is particularly potent when it comes to influencing attitudes in the North.

Healing: How Hallyu radio brings the North and South closer together

Pirate radio broadcasts from South Korea are especially powerful. These broadcasts provide real time news, stories of defectors, weather information, and re-tellings of history that challenge the Kim propaganda. According to a 2004 survey of defectors, 19% got the bulk of their news through pirate radio, 21% knew someone who could jerry rig their radio to tune into the illegal wavelengths, and over 50% knew someone who had been caught and punished for tuning in.⁶³ A 2010 survey by Intermedia revealed that 27% of respondents had listened to foreign radio broadcasts.⁶⁴

North Koreans understand that it's important not to simply trust everything they hear. Developing trust, therefore, is quite difficult. A 2010 Intermedia study asked, “Which source of information do you trust?” 34% of respondents said word of mouth, 9% said South Korean Radio, and 4% said North Korean TV.⁶⁵ What's more, 44% of those who listen to foreign radio share the information they hear with friends and neighbors and 28% shared with immediate family members. Thus, even though the number of radio listeners remains limited, the news and information distributed through the radio travels widely through a ripple effect.

When asked how listening to pirate radio had changed his perspective on the North Korean regime, one defector had the following to say:

*After listening, I came to realize that North Korea is an isolationist country that restricts the free flow of information... I learned not only about politics and South Korea, but also about the true state of North Korea. At first, I didn't trust the broadcasts. I doubted that the North Korean authorities were capable of tricking us to that degree. I gradually came to understand that the regime was tricking us, that the political procedures were nothing but empty and vain ceremonies... I learned about how those who defect to South Korea receive free aid and support.*⁶⁶

⁶¹ ^Haggard, Stephan, and Marcus Noland.

⁶² Park, Kyung-Ae, and Scott Snyder. *North Korea in Transition: Politics, Economy, and Society*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2013. Print.

⁶³ Haggard, Stephan, and Marcus Noland. *Famine in North Korea: Markets, Aid, and Reform*. New York: Columbia UP, 2007. Print.

⁶⁴ "North Koreans Gaining More Access to Foreign Media, Says Report." *North Korea Tech*. 12 May 2012. Web. 19 Dec. 2015. <<http://www.northkoreatech.org/2012/05/13/north-koreans-gaining-more-access-to-foreign-media-says-report/>>.

⁶⁵ Kim, Jane and Nat Kretchun. "A Quiet Opening. North Koreans in a Changing Media Environment." Intermedia. 2012. <http://static2.volkskrant.nl/static/asset/2012/A_Quiet_Opening_FINAL_261.pdf>.

⁶⁶ "Pirate Radio Changed My World." *Daily NK*. Web. 29 May 2015.

This defector indicated that he preferred broadcasts done by defectors because their accents are easier to understand and they know what information is most relevant/important. Because the defectors have experienced their own epiphanies about the truth of the regime, they know better than outsiders how to optimally present and sequence the information. They know what requires background explanation and what does not. This finding is consistent with testimony from East Germans during the Cold War. They felt a sense of belonging and kinship when listening to pirate radio broadcasts from the West, according to Anna Kaminsky, who served as executive director for the Federal Foundation for the Reappraisal of the SED Dictatorship.⁶⁷ Radio broadcasts let the Easterners know that they had not been forgotten or abandoned by the Western brethren.

As the value of foreign media continues to climb, the value of traditional state-run media has taken a nosedive in North Korea. For example, sections of the *Rodong Sinmun* (North Korea's state newspaper) that do not feature the likeness or image of a Kim family member sell for twice the price as those that do. This is because it is considered a political crime to deface or damage any object containing the image of the Suryeong. North Koreans tend to use newspapers for wallpaper and rolling cigarettes. When asked about pages containing a picture of a Kim, one vendor said, "Even if I gave it away for free, no one would take it. A publication that has a picture of any member of the Kim Dynasty is worth less than (expletive)."⁶⁸

Taken together, these two vignettes – the vendor struggling to sell newspapers featuring the image of Kim Jong Un and the eager, nighttime listener of South Korean news radio – form a powerful illustration of the current ideological situation: trust and reliability is now vested in the unofficial and foreign narrative. The efficacy of North Korean propaganda is diminishing and the importance of outside information is rising. This has opened up a space for Hallyu to play a meaningful role.

Metamorphosis: How Hallyu transforms speech and social statuses

Embracing new technology is another sign of the times. Wearing a computer USB on a key chain has become trendy.⁶⁹ The precipitous surge in cell phone subscriptions is also an indicator that conspicuous consumption is growing. According to a Chongjin resident, men without flashy cell phones have difficulty attracting attention from the opposite sex. Cellphones are status symbols in that "only those who regularly eat meat can afford to buy one."⁷⁰ The dating scene has been changed in other ways as well.

<http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=nk00100&num=13228>.

⁶⁷ "West German Radio Gave Easterners Window to World during Cold War." *Daily NK*. Web. 21 Dec. 2015.

<http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?num=13649&cataId=nk00100>.

⁶⁸ "Residents Embrace Rodong Sinmun, but Not for Reading." *Daily NK*. Web. 23 September 2015.

<http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?num=13477&cataId=nk01500>.

⁶⁹ Lankov, Andrei. *The Real North Korea: Life and Politics in the Failed Stalinist Utopia*. Print.

⁷⁰ Kim, Yonho. "Cell Phones in North Korea: Has North Korea Entered the Telecommunications Revolution?" US-Korea Institute at SAIS with Voice of America. Web. 2014. <http://uskoreainstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/Kim-Yonho-Cell-Phones-in-North-Korea.pdf>.

In the past, having defector relatives was viewed as a liability. Being the subject of extra scrutiny and attention from the authorities meant it was extra hard to find a partner. But things have changed significantly. Residents with defector relatives have become the talk of the town.⁷¹ Because of their sheer amount, remittances from South Korea to North Korea (\$10 million annually) have been dubbed the 'Mount Halla Stream.' It's no mystery, then, why a defector relative is as good as a cellphone at signaling financial security in the dating pool. This optimistic appraisal of the South bodes well for the healing process.

Probably the most symbolic and important change with regard to social status is the rise of the *donju* (money masters, nouveau riche). The *donju* are responsible for popularizing the word "boss" (*sajangnim*) in North Korea. They utter the phrase to potential customers and clients as a way to flatter them and start the sales process. The word, which is absent from the Socialist lexicon, was first introduced by Foreign Currency Earning Companies, which are much more capitalist in orientation than their predecessor Trading Companies.

In the 1990s, the word "boss" came to define China-facing tradespeople who were essential for importing goods and seemingly created opportunities out of thin air. The phrase "boss," then, is imbued with a special sort of reverence, one that exists in direct contradiction to communist values. A North Korean from North Pyongan Province said, "I think becoming a 'boss' is the ultimate goal of many North Koreans."⁷² This linguistic change not only helps North Koreans to adjust to Southern language conventions, it also helps them to understand the economic landscape and the corresponding power relationships.

The danger: Why Hallyu poses a challenge to the regime

There are indicators that the regime knows how dangerous it is for residents to consume Hallyu content. For instance, over the past five years, the regime has intensified its radio jamming efforts multiple times.⁷³ The signal blocking generally happens at night, when foreign broadcasters attempt to reach North Korean listeners. Many of the independent radio broadcasters work with limited budgets, and they therefore struggle to expand frequency and signal strength as a countermeasure to the regime's jamming tactics. During the jamming attacks, broadcasts are sometimes fuzzy and incoherent. In addition, authorities have banned the import of portable media players called *Notetels*. These devices are one of the main methods that North Koreans use to watch Hallyu content.⁷⁴ The ban is struggling to take effect however, because "South Korean dramas have put down deep roots here in the North."

An inside source in Pyongyang said that "Kim Jong Il's greatest concern of all was that as the Kaesong Industrial Complex got bigger it would cause a growing number of

⁷¹ "Defector Relatives a Bonus on Dating Scene." *Daily NK*. Web. 13 November 2015.

<<http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=nk01500&num=13572>>.

⁷² "Meet the New Boss - Capitalist Vocab Enters through Market." *Daily NK*. Web. 29 October 2015.

<<http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=nk01500&num=13545>>.

⁷³ "North Korea Steps Up Jamming." Radio Free Asia. 19 December, 2012.

<<http://www.rfa.org/english/news/korea/jamming-12192012154701.html>>.

⁷⁴ Seol Song Ah. "Notetel imports banned to quash Hallyu." *Daily NK*. 28 June, 2016.

<<http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?num=13963&cataId=nk01500>>.

workers to harbor feelings of interest and longing for South Korean society.”⁷⁵ In response to this, North Korean propaganda has changed the tune on South Korea since 2000. The new narrative is that South Korea’s economy is in fact doing okay, but this is the result of imperialist meddling from the United States. South Koreans are thus miserable puppets without cultural identity or pride. The economy will implode when the Americans move on to another country to exploit. The North is thus presented as the ideologically pure Korea.

Essential to this claim is that, Kim Il Sung the, “embodiment of the national struggle for independence of the Korean nation,” because without his “leadership, the North would be living under foreign occupation by the United States.”⁷⁶ However, if Kim Il Sung did not play this role, then his grounds for legitimacy would be open to criticism.

For much of North Korea’s history, it was common knowledge that the South started the ‘Great Fatherland Liberation War’ by invading the North with the United States. June is known as ‘Anti-America Month’ in North Korea. It is celebrated by events and rallies held all over the country at schools and factories. But perceptions have changed to such a degree that, “most people have snubbed such events by saying ‘We started the war.’.... The number of people who have concluded the Korean War was started by us is growing gradually.”⁷⁷

The culmination of these two realizations – that South Korea is economically prosperous and that North Korea started the war – cuts at the heart of neo-juche revivalism. This ideology – which attempts to harken back to the glory days of Socialism – is the government’s “last-gasp effort to define a new legitimacy for the state that has failed miserably in fulfilling its end of the social contract.”⁷⁸ But it is also a prison which will constrain the regime, hinder necessary adaptations, and expose contradictions. Because of this, Victor Cha and Nicholas Anderson have written that “neo-juche revivalism is in many ways the worst possible ideology that the regime could follow in parallel with the society’s marketization.”⁷⁹

The feedback loop: How the regime has adapted to Hallyu

To characterize the ideological shifts as a simple action-reaction interchange between protagonist and antagonist would be to disregard the key dynamic. We are instead witnessing a nationwide, unspoken negotiation. A delicate dance. An incremental merging and unmerging of the state sanctioned ideology and the grassroots-inspired worldview. The dance is interspersed with collision and adjustment. There is a feedback mechanism through which the state has internalized, adapted to, and even benefitted from marketization and the accompanying infusion of foreign media.

⁷⁵ "Kim Issued 'Close Kaesong' Order." *Daily NK*. Web. 29 April 2013.
<http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=nk01500&num=10532>.

⁷⁶ Smith, Hazel. "North Korea: Markets and Military Rule." Print. 2015.

⁷⁷ "Changing Perceptions on the Korean War." *Daily NK*. Web. 1 July 2015.
<<http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=nk01500&num=13314>>.

⁷⁸ Cha, Victor D. *The Impossible State: North Korea past and Future*. New York: Ecco, an Imprint of HarperCollins, 2013. Print.

⁷⁹ Park, Kyung-Ae, and Scott Snyder. *North Korea in Transition: Politics, Economy, and Society*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2013. Print.

Perhaps no single item better illustrates the feedback loop than the Choco Pie, a sweet cake produced in South Korea. The Choco Pie has become emblematic of K-Food, the culinary arm of Hallyu. It should not be surprising, then, that after making its way around the world this little snack made its way to South Korea's closest neighbor. When it got there, it made waves. South Korean managers at the Kaesong Industrial Complex were forbidden from giving wages directly to their North Korean workers. However, they did supply them with hot meals and a monthly stipend.⁸⁰ In addition, certain managers rewarded workers with Choco Pies as a little icing on the cake. In no time at all, the snacks took off like wildfire and the Orion Company was trucking in mass quantities to multiple managers to distribute amongst workers throughout the Kaesong Industrial Complex.

Instead of eating the snacks on the spot, the entrepreneurial workers were taking the KRW 700 (US \$0.59) snacks home and selling them for as much as \$9.50 apiece. The DPRK government caught onto the scheme after not too long. They understood how potentially subversive the little chocolate treats could be. So they banned Choco Pies and began production of a cheap imitation (KRW 200) called "*Chocolate Danseolgi*."

The new snack did not go off without a hitch. Production was halted between October 2014 and March 2015 when Cuban sugar imports ceased. The SOE managers scrambled to find alternative sources in China.⁸¹ After much effort, the production of *Chocolate Danseolgi* cakes began. But their taste has been subject to criticism: "lacking in chocolate flavor," "prone to crumbling," and filled with "overwhelmingly pungent butter."⁸² The Choco Pie story is a microcosm of what is happening all over North Korea - a battle for the very soul of the nation. The regime is struggling to align itself with the ambitions of its people. Their failures result not just from technical and logistical shortcomings, but also from the widening ideological gap. The people have tasted capitalist chocolate, and they like it.

The regime has been far more successful in co-opting marketization than it has been in re-creating it. In order to keep pace with changing times, the Department of Arts and Culture is changing its rigid rules to allow artwork to reflect a more open attitude. This includes novels and movies featuring characters who make practical business decisions, earn foreign currency, discuss foreign culture in positive ways, ponder economic reforms, pursue affluence, and wear Western style tight dresses.⁸³ This flies in the face of traditional content, which prioritizes party fealty, prudishness, conservatism, and revolutionary zeal.

One novelist - Mun Chang Kim - wrote a novel called *Desire* that paved the way for subsequent iconoclastic writers. While these authors do not outright challenge the regime's legitimacy, their works provide an important alternative to the 415 Creating Corps (4.15 *Munhak Changjakddan*) - a state agency that produces revolutionary literature on behalf of the Party. The fact that censors have given alternative literature the green light is a significant change.

Other foreign influences have been popping up in North Korea as well. The surprise appearance of Mickey Mouse and Winnie the Pooh at a concert for Kim Jong Un in 2012

⁸⁰ Cha, Victor D. *The Impossible State: North Korea, past and Future*. New York: Ecco, 2012. Print.

⁸¹ "N. Korea Makes Knockoff Choco Pies." *The Chosun Ilbo*. 10 June, 2015. english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2015/06/10/2015061001760.html

⁸² "North's 'Choco Pie' Knock off Falls Far Short." *Daily NK*. Web. 14 June 2015. <http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?catId=nk01500&num=13338>.

⁸³ Lee, Wooyoung, and Jungmin Seo. "Cultural Pollution from the South?" *North Korea in Transition: Politics, Economy, and Society*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2013. Print.

marked a wild departure from Pyongyang's traditional arts scene.⁸⁴ For years, children have loved the Disney characters and purchased notebooks with their likenesses from China. But this marks the first time the characters were represented at an official state function. This highlights Kim Jong Un's strategy to stimulate loyalty by presenting himself as a stern yet magnanimous leader.

The regime's ongoing attempt to crackdown on foreign influences while simultaneously basking in their reflective glow sends mixed signals. It leaves room for cautious optimism, but also proves that there will be no quick or easy victories. The bottom-up nature of Hallyu's profusion throughout the North reveals that incremental change can have structural consequences. With hard work, the progress made thus far can be prelude of more to come.

In perspective: How Hallyu helps healing

Tensions between North Korea and the world have gotten worse over the past year. Nuclear tests, missile launches, verbal threats, and other provocations have set back negotiations and cooperation at the top diplomatic level. However, another development has been occurring that deserves attention and investment. Hallyu has pried open the door to the imagination of everyday North Koreans, creating an opportunity to develop a shared Korean identity that supersedes the acrimony of the inter-state relationship. By facilitating exchanges, creating shared memories, and spurring cultural diffusion, Hallyu has helped the Koreas advance towards healing and understanding. Though the road ahead is beset by an intimidating array of obstacles, mutual understanding and compassion provide North and South Korea with a fighting chance to continue towards peaceful reconciliation.

⁸⁴ "Mickey Mouse makes North Korean debut at concert for Kim Jong-un." The Guardian. Web. 11 July 2012. <<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jul/08/disney-characters-perform-north-korea>>.

When the Islamic world meets Korean culture: A study of *Hallyu* in Tunisia

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This study examines the spread of *Hallyu* so as to better understand how Korean culture is accepted into other cultural areas. Tunisia, as one nation of the Islamic world, is widely accepted K-pop and Korean drama. By employing qualitative methods especially participant observations and in-depth interviews with Tunisian women, this study portrays three dimensions of Tunisian fans. First, the study finds that Tunisian fans, seeing Korea as an attractive and exotic space, actively take advantage of digital media such as SNS to follow real-time information on Korean popular culture. Second, Tunisians identify with features of Korean culture that are shared with Islamic mind such as family-friendly value and respect for the elders. At last, Tunisians consider Korea as a role model of development where a modern society can be rapidly achieved. Accordingly, the objective of this study is to come up with ways for Korean Wave to open new avenues in the Islamic world as the medium of future public diplomacy.

Keywords: Hallyu; Islam; Tunisia; cultural identity; modernity

Introduction

"I want our nation to be the most beautiful in the world. By this I do not mean the most powerful nation. Because I have felt the pain of being invaded by another nation. ... The only thing I desire in infinite quantity is the power of a noble culture. This is because the power of culture both makes ourselves happy and gives happiness to others."

Journal of Baekbeom: Autobiography of Kim Koo (Kim Koo, 2002, p.431)

As Kim Koo (1876-1949) who was Korean nationalist politician leading independence movement against the Japanese colonization longed to achieve the power of culture. Today, Korean wave (hereafter Hallyu) is likely to empower Korea gratifying nation's pride as well as people on the globe. To be specific, Hallyu is now flourishing beyond Asia, and making inroads to America, Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. While Korea itself surprisingly face the sudden popularity of Korean popular culture in adjacent countries, particularly, in China, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong, Hallyu also flows into the Islamic world where has been hardly discovered in Korean society. This is because cultural awareness toward outside of Korea is narrowed down which causes biased global citizenship among Koreans.

This study examines the spread of Hallyu so as to better understand how Korean culture is accepted into other cultural areas. Tunisia, as one nation of the Islamic world located in north Africa, was frequently reported because of several fatal terrors in 2015 – Bardo National Museum attack in Mar. and the Mediterranean city, Sousse attack in Jun. – as well as the starting point of Arab spring in 2011 – Jasmine revolution. In spite of its bad reputation as fragile state of terror, Tunisia is not exceptional from the influx of Hallyu; it is widely accepted K- pop and Korean

drama which leads to demand for Korean language learning and spontaneous Korean cultural event among Tunisians. Lee Yook, et al. (2014) analyzed the interaction between Hallyu products and the process of ethnic identity development in particular the cultural adaption for Korean transnationals in the U.S. As a result, 2nd generation of Korean Americans who are totally Americanized have the least affiliation with Korean identity even less than non-Korean Americans which means Hallyu more effects on those who already have existing emotional ties with Korean culture. In this sense, the questions about the sudden emergence of popularity on Korean culture in the Islamic world can be raised. Because of geographical distance to the Middle East, psychological and cultural distance to Islamic culture also have been existed. This is why people whose Islamic background has not been expected to enjoy Korean popular culture. It is a fact that Hallyu has reached the Middle East and North Africa while research on Hallyu mainly concentrated on southeast Asia. To be specific, the scholarly research and media coverage on Hallyu are increasing, so far Hallyu in the Islamic world has not been gained attention in response to excessive growing popularity of Korean culture.

In this global context, Hallyu has become a central issue for Korea and beyond in regard of cultural proliferation. To investigate Hallyu phenomenon in Tunisia, this study focuses on its similarities and uniqueness in today's media globalization based on these questions: 1) What Korean cultural factors awaken the Islamic world? 2) How Tunisian fans consume Korean culture as cultural practice? 3) How Hallyu in Tunisia can be applied to mutual relationship between Korea and Tunisia to enhance its cultural understandability?

Hallyu 2.0 era, beyond Asia

Hallyu was first coined by Chinese media to describe the growing popularity of Korean popular culture products among Chinese youth in 1998. After then, the unexpected hype, *Winter Sonata* ignited the subsequent “Yon-sama” phenomenon among Japanese middle-aged female audiences. Regardless of language barrier, cultural proximity is likely to function in neighboring countries for many reasons – familiar theme and content of media products. Sohn (2009) attempted a meta-analysis of 250 Korean research paper regarding Hallyu (Nov., 1998

– Nov., 2008); as a result, researches were focused on short-term and economic benefits originated from Hallyu in the field of management, tourism and traditional media studies. More importantly, most previous studies of Hallyu have only been carried out on the specific geographic locations – East and South Asia – and have not dealt with reciprocal cultural understanding among audiences and their society. Furthermore, it is a fact that there are a very limited number of academic approaches on Hallyu out of Asia excluding several case study of certain region; however, there are researches that studied Hallyu beyond Asia: Europe – France (Hong 2013), South America – Peru and Brazil (Ko, et al 2014), and The Middle East – Iran (Koo 2014), Israeli and Palestine (Otmazgin & Lyan 2013), and Egypt (Noh 2011). Regarding current research on Hallyu, cooperative governmental relationship and economic interest were given priority to the practical influx of culture.

Previous studies attribute the great success of Hallyu in Asia to cultural hybridity which occurs with trans-cultural flows. It mediates tensions between the center and periphery, the global and local, and the West and the East. To be specific, Asian drama boom was started in 2004-2005 and peaked around 2005-2006; for instance, dorama world, UCC website was also created in 2005 (Hong 2013, p.196). Prior to the arrival of Asian drama, French television aired Japanese manga (comic) for decade (1987-1997), whereafter the audiences of Japanese animation are likely to broaden their cultural taste and finally transfer to consumer of Korean

drama (p.231). Hong (2013) classified French fan of Hallyu into three types based on the duration and pattern of consumption of Korean culture: 1) cinephile who regularly watch Korean movie within cinematic field which means maniac for certain movie on the globe; 2) young adult and middle-aged who are omnivore of Asian popular culture especially tend to enjoy Korean popular music, drama and movie. They encountered Korean drama such as *Full House* – the first Korean drama for French fans – and later on *Princess Hours (Gung)*, *The 1st Shop of Coffee Prince*, *My name is Kim Sam-soon* thanks to the increased distribution of the Internet since 2000s; 3) The youngsters from middle, high schooler to college students who took advantage of digital media and experienced the sudden influx of Korean popular culture in late 2000s. They are passionate to learn all about Korea and copy K-pop stars with other fans as a part of adolescent sub-culture.

The studies on Hallyu has been placed based on traditional binary opposition which means the cultural flow between the core and periphery. In this regard, it is disputable to inquire of Hallyu in light of counter-cultural flow. Filipino audiences affirm cultural closeness and share its socio-cultural context toward Korea through Korean soap opera, so-called Koreanovela. They experience contemporary Korean way of life such as community- centric socialization and hierarchical family relationship which are attractive cultural aspect to Filipino fans (Kwon 2007). Hallyu followers in Peru and Brazil are European or indigenous descent whose high level of education status in addition to lower income than average socio-economic status who are able to utilize the mediums of communication such as television set and Internet.

Accordingly, ethnicity and cultural proximity are not associated with Hallyu in Latin America where exists non-Asian descent and distant linguistic background (Ko, et al 2014). Meanwhile, Latin America also experienced the counter-flow of its soap opera – Telenovela. In regard to Hallyu and Telenovela, Kim (2013) compared its similarity and uniqueness. The similarities can be listed as follows: 1) In terms of cultural imperialism, the diffusion of certain media contents brought the Pan-Asian identity and the transnational Hispanic identity over the suppression of Western media such as Hollywood movies and the U.S. drama series; 2) Both contribute to its economic interest in media industries and also enhance the national image in political way; 3) In terms of gender issue, they represent women as a challenger who are strong enough to against the patriarchal society. In addition, both of media products show more moderate with sexuality compared with American soap operas. On the other hand, remarkable difference can be discussed; Hallyu media products has to be translated mostly in English to overcome the language barrier, whereas Telenovela is exported to either Spanish-speaking countries or to countries where Spanish population are resided. In this regard, Hallyu television drama is able to denominated as Koreanovela; however, fans of Korean drama today who enjoying Hallyu 2.0 era heavily depend on the Internet rather than television network even if there is Pan-Arabic channel which aired Korean drama.

Lately, several scholarly researches paid attention to the newest Hallyu in the Middle East – Iran (see, Koo 2014), Israeli and Palestine (see, Lyan & Levkowitz 2015; Otmazgin & Lyan 2013), and Egypt (see, Noh 2011). In regard of these case studies, it suggested the common cultural sectors where Korean culture especially originated from Confucianism meets Islamic culture. Koo (2014) indicated the “Korean-ness” but possibly fitting across the nations. The major reason why Korean drama rapidly gain its growing popularity in Iranian society is that certain themes which is acceptable in Iranian public and its feature of cultural hybridity in the global context. And yet, it has geographical limitation to conduct research on Hallyu in the Islamic world; this is because, monolithic research toward the Middle East possibly homogenized whole Islamic world even though each country has its own history and

cultural identity. It is a fact that there are subtle but significant cultural differences among Islamic countries. Above all, simplifying the Islamic world as one cultural identity does not fully explain how and why Hallyu has emerged in distant nations. In this sense, to investigate detailed current occurrences regarding Hallyu, a case study of certain cultural area is required. In the case of Hallyu in Tunisia requires a multifaceted approach. One previous research on Egyptian Hallyu (Noh 2011) found gendered fandom in which subaltern people – women in the Third World country – has been silenced instead of speaking themselves eventually discover a window to speak out throughout foreign media contents. On the contrary, Tunisian women have relatively more freedom rather than others in the Islamic world. For example, Tunisian women have the constitutional right to education equally; furthermore, Tunisia is the first Arab state to formally abolish polygamy in 1956, and today officially monogamy society.

Overview of Hallyu in Tunisia

To delve into Hallyu in Tunisia, it is important to inquire into the whole circumstance broadly:

- 1) Historical and cultural background and, 2) an ongoing diffusion of Korean culture. 1) Historically, Tunisia has been played key role in establishing a strategic point by its neighboring countries. To be specific, the fact that Tunisian culture is a mixture of diversity is its geopolitical matter which caused an invasion of Roman and Andalusian in the past and experience of French colonial rule based on its indigenous culture, Berber. That is why Tunisian official language is Tunisian Dialect Arabic which makes distinctive language combined with French that is different from original Arabic in the Middle East. In this sense, it is generally said multifaceted Tunisia; it is geographically located in African continent – North Africa, Maghreb¹; it has Islamic mindset since its official religion is Islam; and it highly depends upon Europe governmentally and economically due to its physical short distance and historical occurrence.
- 2) In the late 2007, Tunisian national television network, El Wataniya 1 aired *Sad Love Story* which is the first official Korean drama on Tunisian TV and whereafter on private channel Hannibal TV. With the great success of Korean drama through public broadcasting, *Dae Jang Geum*, *Jumong*, *Emperor of the sea* and *Full House* also rapidly stimulated Hallyu. At that time, the high distribution rate of satellite television sets in Tunisia contributed to spread of Korean drama every household; for example, Korea TV, Arirang TV and KBS world played significant role in conveying Korean media products as Korea-based channel. Currently, there are fourteen Korean dramas which are listed up on MBC 4²; In Tunisia, *Fashion King*, *The Master's Sun* and *That Winter, the Wind Blows* are lately on air. The common universal genre are romance, comedy and drama in which Korean drama independence production prefers to make and favorably penetrates to different cultural fields.

The major limitation of airing Korean drama on Pan-Arab television network is dubbing into Arabic language which is insufficient to convey original meaning and narrative. It is a fact that retaining the original language of drama with subtitles instead of dubbing into local language certainly promotes more foreignness. This is why Tunisian fans are willing to learn about Korean language for better understanding of Korean media products as well as getting involve into Korean community forming close intimacy even though Korean language is not widely spoken but only for ethnic Koreans. Furthermore, Arab television network often edits some part of scenery and hardly airs the latest Korean drama. In Tunisia, there are dozens of K-pop and Korean drama online community on Facebook; in addition, each individual has their own Twitter account. They generally share the up-to-date information from the official website such as allkpop (http://www.allkpop.com/) and retweet each entertainment agencies – JYP, YG and SM – to spread out real-time information about Korean popular culture. In addition to information

that are uploaded, Tunisian fans tend to leave individual's opinion mostly in English like as other fans do. Notwithstanding the advantage of utilizing SNS service, Tunisian fans are likely to create offline association so-called cultural exchange club. Tunisian clubs which were voluntarily

Title	Year (Estimated Members)	Feature	Affiliation
TOKE	2011 (120)	Tunisian Organization of Korean cultural Exchange Arrangement of travel to Korea every summer and winter Promoting cultural exchange program	Individual
ACTC	2012 (100)	Association Culturelle Tuniso-Coreenne Host annual cultural event "Asian Bridge" Practicing Korean fan dance	Individual
TUN-HAN	2014 (60)	Affiliated to computer science department Organizing weekly cultural exchange seminar and annual TUN-HAN day in every Apr.	University

Table 1 Tunisian offline fan community

established to share Korean culture with likeminded members. Since they prefer to conduct face-to-face communication and share all about Korea in common with other fans, most of Tunisian women fans actively engage in their fan community. The main Tunisian fan communities are below; in addition to these three Tunis-based clubs, there are two more regional club in Bizerte – KBFC (Korea's Bizertians Fan Club) – and Sfax – KIFA (Korea Inspiration Fans Sfax).

In this research, ethnographic approach offers a helpful way to gain insights into Tunisian fans: participant observation as a Korean language instructor belonging to embassy of Korea in Tunisia for 6 months (from Sep. 2014 to Feb. 2015) cooperated with TUN-HAN and in-depth interview. The participant observation as one core member of TUN-HAN serves primary opportunity to witness women's active practicing of Korean culture. The majority of this club is female members and most of them presumably belong to the middle-to-upper class since they are fluent or conversant in English as well as French which means well- educated and had an access to Internet. In-depth interview is also conducted to obtain detailed understanding of the way Tunisian young women — within the range of between 10s- 30s — experience Korean popular culture. The interviewees are 10 Tunisian women like as below; half of them had chance to visit Korea on behalf of Tunisia for higher education,

Name (Age)	Occupation (Major)	Feature
Amani (23)	College Student (Computer Science)	Founder of TUN-HAN
Safa (23)	College Student (Economy)	Korean language course attendant
Yosr (22)	College Student (English)	Korean language course attendant
Hanedi (24)	Worker at Club Med in Djerba, Tunisia	Korean language course attendant
Ahlem (20)	Passed BAC in 2016	Korean language course attendant
Intissar (29)	Officer at KOICA in Tunisia since 2012	Visited Korea in 2015 for administrative training at KOICA
Siwar (24)	College Student (Management)	Korean language course attendant Visited Korea in 2016 3 rd winner of Korean language Competition conducted by Korea Embassy in Tunisia
Haifa (23)	College Student (English)	Visited Korea in 2015 Representative of Tunisia in 2015 Quiz on Korea
Ilef (25)	College Student (Design and Architecture)	Visited Korea in 2014 Founder of Bubble Korea
Omayma (25)	Graduate Student (Computer Science)	Grantee of Korean government scholarship for foreigner in 2015 A soon-to-be master student at Chung-Ang Univ.

Table 2 Tunisian Interviewees

governmental training and participating *Quiz on Korea*. Each interview was conducted for more than one hour in person after weekly seminar of TUN-HAN, in Feb. to Apr., 2015.

CONGRESS SUMMARY

CONGRESS INFORMATION

CONGRESS PROGRAM

ABSTRACTS

Experiencing foreignness through Korean drama

Korean wave has already penetrated Tunisia around 2007 when *Sad Love Story*³ aired on Tunisian national television network, El Wataniya 1. The high distribution rate of television, prior to the emergence of high-tech media, played significant role in claiming Tunisian audiences' attention. The interviewees recurred the moment when they firstly encountered Korean drama through television.

When I was a teenager I felt in love with Kwon Sang -woo who was starred in *Sad Love Story*; for me, he was the ideal man. Not only the main character, but the whole story of that drama really touched me. I wish my parents would live like them even though they were divorced. Anyway, after then, I became more and more interested in Korea. (Haifa)

In 2009, when I found "Korea TV", *Stairway to Heaven* was on air. I knew that male character named Kwon Sang-woo because I already watched *Sad love story*, so I kept watching. Later on I just addicted to that Korea TV showing everything about Korean...like K-pop, Korean food, Korean language named *Let's speak Korean*, and entertainment program named *Star king* and *Highkick*. (Yosr)

I started watching Korean drama even before "Gangnam Style". When Psy made a huge success around the world in the summer of 2012, I wasn't that surprised to seeing that, because I knew that time just has come. (Intissar)

In the beginning of Hallyu, satellite television played important role in traveling Korean drama in Tunisia, particularly the first Korean satellite station, Korea TV. Furthermore, the explosive growth of social media in accord with the increased rate of internet usage lead the shift toward Hallyu 2.0 thereby, K-pop and Korean drama fans are obsessed with social media to participate online community. Meanwhile, Tunisian fans, seeing Korea as an attractive and exotic space, actively take advantage of digital media such as SNS to follow real-time information on Korean popular culture. They search for any information on Korean celebrities and watch original Korean dramas with English subtitle.

Heo-jun on Arirang TV was my first Korean drama. At that time, I found that Korean culture is very different and mysterious. After then, I started watch Korean cultural program more on Arirang TV and KBS world. (Amani)

Korean contents are unique. It is totally different from Arabic and American program. That was something new for me. (Hanedi)

Tunisians who prefer Korean drama over American as well as their indigenous other Islamic countries have become desensitized the uniformity of American media contents and indifferent to Islamic content from Turkey or Egypt which describes a conflict amongst family-in-laws dramatically throughout longer episodes than Korean drama. Tunisian fans are willing to experience brand-new Korean media content which is physically far away from where they live but represents the high level of modernity. They enjoy the foreign difference between Korea and Tunisia from individual perspective. Although the audience recognize fictional feature of drama, it allows Tunisian young women to feel the sense of emancipation and move away from daily routine temporarily getting vicarious satisfaction.

I know drama is not real. As long as I have to choose drama, I would love to watch Korean drama where the most romantic guys are acting. (Safa)

How cute they are! We couldn't imagine having couple items like T-shirt and key holder for couple. When we are dating, we can hold a hand together; but it is not common to share accessories to show that "we are couple". If I ask to do that to my boyfriend, he must be surprised on it and I can imagine his response. Too bad.
(Siwar)

Basically, Korean drama portrays harmonious relationship between the male and female characters showing fairly treated woman by man. Particularly young couple characters in drama, the two are very friendly terms that is sufficient to attract Tunisian women. In addition, women whose charmingly decorated room and up-to-date clothes in her twenties evoke interest in contemporary Korean culture more. That is, imagining another world where is full of fantasy offers the thing that is unavailable to achieve in reality. In this way, Korean drama helps Tunisian audiences to bring about potential emotion and desire that is innate in their mind but hardly realize it. It is related to camerawork in Korean producing system, particularly close-up shot in melodrama, in order to express emotion dramatically (Hong 2013); in doing so, the audiences pay attention to the way of expression of cast's emotion which lead to emphasize their pureness.

I like their natural looking and behavior. But for Westerners, I do not like what they do. Especially sex appealing performance. Within this conservative Islamic culture, K-pop stars don't cross the line. They just look like enjoying their performance on the stage. (Omayma)

For American, they look serious and make themselves very special. But Korean knows how to make fun for others. They always do their best to make other people happy. For Korean singer, they usually perform as a group which means work, sing, and dance together. The viewers never get bored. (Hanedi)

From Korean drama to K-pop, Tunisian emphasized its uniqueness compared with American one. Within Islamic culture, the way of representation especially women are crucial to consume foreign culture; in the case of Hallyu products, Tunisian fans strongly believe that it functions as a filter for western values which moderately represent the performance. In particular, either Korean boy band or girl group as a part of K-pop conducts group performance which reminds the 90s western pop such as Back Street Boys and Spice Girls.

Seoul is a big city, right? And I found from drama that there are a lot of No-rae-bang (karaoke) in Seoul. I want to go there like crazy. (Siwar)

Korea is my dream, my passion and, the place where I want to study. Briefly, it's my craziness and goal of my life! Everything related to Korea makes me happy.
(Haifa)

Tunisian fans are interested in a broad spectrum of all aspects of Korea: Korean people, language, and its traditional and contemporary culture. Like as Egyptian fans utilize Korean familial terms such as "unnie" and "oppa" (Noh 2011), Tunisian also prefer to call Korean language instructor – the ethnographer – "unnie" or "seon-saeng-nim" to build a strong relationship with Korean and ensure its solidarity among the members of Korean cultural community. In response to what they have learnt from Korean drama, they are more than willing to practice Korean intimate terms in person. Likewise, idealistic and romanticized image of Korea, in particular Seoul as a dream city, is embodied to Tunisian. The modern element focused on cityscape of Seoul will be discussed on the following part. Even though Korean culture is foreign, Tunisian fans consider all about Korea as an exotic cultural product in which hardly experienced before. Rather, physical distance arouses their curiosity to unknown field. Such attractiveness of Korean culture has become boosted along with the

arrival of Hallyu 2.0.

After Ben Ali, Internet censorship is over⁴; so we could access to YouTube freely where all Korean dramas were uploaded. (Amani)

The rate of Internet usage in Tunisia was increased since then, basically YouTube functions as the gateway to reach current Korean drama; there are also other sites to access Korean Drama not dubbing into Arabic but with English subtitle: <http://www.jaewinter.com/> and <http://sweetnona83.blogspot.kr/>. Those cover the newest Korean drama; it is sufficient to satisfy Tunisian audiences who are willing to watch Korean drama without dubbing into Arabic. This is because they would like to build a strong relationship with Korean actor/actress through Korean language directly which allows them to experience Koreans' own voice and its original meaning. For Tunisian youngsters whose aspiration to consume Korean culture frequently, don't have any difficulty with English subtitle on YouTube; because they prefer to learn and practice English to communicate broader and gather more information about Korea compared with French unlike their parents' generation who went through French colonial rule.

Identifying with Korean culture based on the Islamic mind

It is a fact that the Islamic world has been excluded in cultural exchange with Korea as well as economic trade, by the same token, media contents producer hardly expected to gain explosive popularity in Islamic community because of Asian region-centric phenomenon during Hallyu 1.0 era. As previously discussed, melodramatic but realistic representation of everyday life based on divergent feeling draws Tunisian audiences' attention after ensuring its acceptability into their socio-cultural setting. To some extent, it is necessary not to undermine the Islamic cultural value; this is because, Tunisian audiences dread to be exposed constantly to the Western contents contained unacceptable element which deviated from religious faith. For instance, showing extra-ordinary sexuality and propagating wrong idea have negative effect on the Islamic society's norms and familial fabric.

I remember that even my father tried to finish his work early and come home to watch that drama, *Emperor of the sea*. When he couldn't come to watch, he called my mother to ask about how things are going on drama. It was very famous like that much in Tunisia at that time. (Hanedi)

I like Korean family culture. I mean, the manner how you treat each other especially respecting the elders. (Ahlem)

Even though there is a chasm between drama and real-life, Korean drama is likely to satisfy major Islamic culture – relation-oriented life style. The narrative of Korean drama considerably associates with Arab ethnicity in which it highly values family, friends in addition to hospitality to foreigners. Koo (2014) found the cultural proximity among Iranian women; Tunisian are also comfortable with Korean media contents which represents the respect to elder and traditional family value since family is the most important unit in the Islamic world. Family-centric lifestyle of both countries significantly influences on the reduction of cultural discount. As Iwabuchi (2002) has observed, Tunisian fans embraced Korean culture as their own story once they felt close to its message in spite of its foreign origin. Furthermore, seeking out the common element caused by the Confucian way of thinking to identify with Korea allows to form cultural intimacy.

My first Korean drama, *My name is Kim Sam-Soon* made me start to watch other

drama. Sam-soon have to struggle to achieve her love which is a little bit late in her age. While I was watching that drama, I could not stop thinking same as her; what if I get in trouble like her, how I am going to overcome that situation. I kept asking myself and finally I encouraged her as if Sam-Soon's close friend. She was strong enough but never hesitate to express her emotion. Most of dramas cover the situation not like reality; but *My name is Kim Sam-Soon* was different. That is way I fell in love with all kinds of Korean melodrama. (Intissar)

A soon-to-be marriage couple and its relationship both families are also troubled and problematic in Tunisian society like as Korea. The parents who forced their child – particular for daughters – to get married in certain age are universally an annoying social custom. Chung (2007) showed that Korean college students identified with the main female character “Sam-Soon” and pleasantly accepted the television drama reality rather than resisted against the patriarchal ideology. Due to familiar narrative which thoroughly describe the reality, Tunisian audiences also appear to share cultural values and beliefs in spite of language barrier. Noh (2011) also indicated cultural proximity between Arabic and Korean culture in the global context specifically in the light of gender. Tunisian young women are in empathy with main female character's sentiment. As Hallyu is feminized, stimulating its audiences' emotion by implementing major traits of Korean drama – romantic, cute, sweet – arouses the sympathy regardless of cultural barrier. In terms of narratives of Korean drama, it portrays both platonic and romantic love relationships between main characters, not merely focusing on sexual love. In doing so, the women's ideal romantic relationship and enthusiasm for pureness are irritated.

In terms of reducing cultural discount, the former Tunisian Ambassador to Korea, Mr. Khammari mentioned: Like Korea, Tunisia has no major natural resources. Also like Korea, Tunisia has chosen to promote its human resources. This great similarity between Tunisia and Korea in education and the promotion of human resources is not the only one. Among other common features between the two countries and two peoples we can mention are the place of family, and respect for elderly people, love and devotion to the homeland and the need to achieve development without depending on others, but relying on one's own abilities. In this sense, Hallyu leads cultural hybridity apart from cultural imperialism based on core-periphery model. The prevalence of Korean drama satisfies Tunisian's desire to attain multi-cultural mind and distance from Americanized culture. Moreover, sharing historical legacy of imperialism one by Japan and the other one by France has positive effect on embracing the Korean culture. Indeed, Hallyu created a sense of affiliation with the Korean culture and allowed inter-cultural communication regardless of its distance.

Negotiating alternative modernity and aspiration for development

Tunisia and Korea experienced colonial rule in common: Korea has suffered from Japanese colonization from 1910 to 1945; and Tunisia achieved freedom from French colonial rule in 1956 which began in 1881. What makes Tunisian colonization different from its neighboring country, Algeria, is that Tunisia was a French protectorate same as Morocco. It allows Tunisia to become heavily dependent on France in manifold socio- cultural factors without violent or harsh resistance which was often found under colonial rule. Furthermore, Tunisia accepted the French policy in cultural assimilation which enable itself to be easily and openly harmonized with other culture. This historical background allows Tunisia to be more inclusive and open-minded than other Islamic countries in acceptance of foreign culture. On the other hands, Tunisian fans are likely to recognize this historical woe as common ground between Korea and Tunisia, thereby feel relieved and close to Korea more than before.

I found we shared a common point that both of us have suffered from the colonization; but the difference between Korea and Tunisia is that Koreans never gave up and struggled a lot until changing your country from poor miserable stance to the world's miracle. That is why I deeply love Korea! (Haifa)

I have read about Korean history concerning about experience with Japan, colonization. We share the same historical pain, because Tunisia also struggled to fight against France. Even though Korea had to face lots of problem in daily life, they overcome the worst situation at the end. (Ahlem)

Officially, Tunisian academics who participated in editing text books and developing scholarly contents heavily influenced by European academic system since they graduated from prestigious universities in Europe and were deeply impressed by the European model which had educational strong points and enviable accomplishments. As a result, they brought westernized contents and viewpoint into their doctrines. The lack of Arabic reference to be used in curriculum has resulted in relying heavily on European literature, books, academic journals, and magazines throughout the whole regular course from primary school to college. Even though Tunisian education system does not offer mandatory courses related to Asia, as far as Tunisian made a chance to learn about Korean pre-modern society in the aftermath of Japanese colonization and Korean War, especially the way of collaborating members of the public and its power to take off for the better future, Korean culture is readily connected to Tunisian society.

I really want to learn from you(Korea) how to develop my country(Tunisia). (Amani)

China is still growing. I think they are not “developed country” yet like Korea. We need a role model to develop our country, Tunisia. (Siwar)

What I found through Korean drama is that the more you work, the more you earn. Unfortunately, that is not possible in Tunisia. Even though Korean life style looks very hectic, I believe that finally brought the miracle of Korean development economically and culturally. I really admire it. That is why I did my best to do my master in Korea. (Omayma)

At the workplace in Tunisia, there are few employees who attend on time. Not defining this habitual tardiness to Tunisian ethnicity; however, it is a fact that Tunisian economic standard has been affected by the citizens’ mindset toward community and nation. Tunisian young generation, in particular, recognize the negative aspect of their way of life and seek to find out the solution near to be developed. In this sense, they reasonably set up Korea as a role model and constantly gain the motive power for economic development through Korean media contents.

For Japanese culture, I think it is a little bit strange for me, something weird. I found too much individualism like America. In Japanese drama, all family members live together, but they don’t talk each other. Eating alone, crying alone, playing around alone...I don’t understand. For Chinese culture, I think they are coping other Asian culture such as drama story and entertainment program. That’s not original. (Safa)

Korean drama accommodates modern elements such as metropolitan atmosphere based on Seoul, modern relationships and romance sustaining its traditional family value. Moreover, Korea functions as a filter for western value and accessible to promising future for not only Asians but also Tunisians. The urban middle-class scenery and Seoul-centric imagery in K-drama indicate that hard working and hectic life style guarantee the reasonable payment to live up to citizens’ expectation. In addition, KOICA (Korea International Cooperation Agency) office in Tunisia which was established in 2008 has been building a reliable relationship in terms of international developmental cooperation so as to generalize the mutual growth.

Before Korean drama arrived in Tunisia, we all thought that Asian who has “Asian eyes – slant eye” were Japanese people because of Japanese animation. And we figured out all Asian men act like a girl. They were too girlish. But once we watched Korean drama, we realized that we misunderstood about Asian men. Korean men were different. They are generous especially to their partners, women! (Haifa)

Anti- American sentiment that originated with media coverage of Islam from the western viewpoint surpasses the antipathy against to sex-appealing contents which is not acceptable in Islamic culture. The Americanization generated by the U.S. media contents significantly contributed to the formation of Western identity which causes the homogenization of other global culture.

America always treats us as terrorists as well as all Muslims are related to radical Islamist. That is not true, but It seems that Korean also consider Tunisia as the most dangerous country like as others because of America. Not like any other people, I believe that Koreans are generous enough and open-minded to understand this unbalanced view to the Islamic world. (Safa)

When I was on the subway in Seoul in Sep. 2015, one old man just pointed out my name with Tunisian flag on my holder. He stared at me for a while and then asked me without hesitation: Tunisia? Are you from Tunisia? are you terrorist? Guess what, I was so surprised. How comes... (Haifa)

While western-centeredness dominates the globe, Tunisia could set apart for Americanized globalization due to Internet censorship; at the same time, the feeling of being victimized against to the U.S. is widespread ever since America burgeoned anti-Islamism which leads to Islamophobia over the world after 9.11. Therefore, it is obvious that cultural awareness of Islam is highly required to be reconsidered to empower Hallyu in the Islamic world.

Conclusion

Since Korea became a member of Development Assistance Committee⁵ (DAC) in 2010, it has transformed from an aid recipient to donor. As a part of development cooperation policies, President Park Geun-hye has visited to East Africa (Ethiopia, Uganda, and Kenya) in May, 2016 suggesting that “Korea Aid” program, which is visualized mobile truck showing health service in regard of mutual development and Korean cultural content including food and popular culture. Prior to making a tour to African countries, Park also has completed her four-nation trip to the Middle East – Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, UAE and Qatar – to promote economic cooperation particularly bilateral business partnership as well as cultural exchange. These commitments are likely to be achieved based on reciprocal understanding on the different culture. In this sense, K-pop and Korean drama in terms of Hallyu has been playing a significant role in attracting others and providing positive images of Korea as this study has shown. However, in spite of governmental effort to build a strong relationship with Africa and the Middle East, a note written in Arabic which was full of grammatical errors to pretend a terrorist group was found at Incheon International Airport in Jan. 2016. This incident indicates that Korean people tend to have distorted perception against Islam, which causes insensitive to three concepts – Islam, Arab and the Middle East. Briefly, Islam concerns about religion articulated by the Qur'an as a bible and Muslim is person who follows the religion of Islam. Arab associates with linguistic, cultural, political, and ethnic matters. The Middle East refers to geographical location surrounding Persian Gulf.

Meanwhile, due to the distribution of television and habitual viewing after family dinner, Korean drama had a chance to be exposed to Tunisian family. Hallyu in Tunisia was an unprecedented phenomenon that proved the possibility of cultural influx into dissimilar cultural fields. The Internet diffusion rate as well as the explosion of social networking service (SNS) and YouTube allowed audience to approach to Korean culture, which leads the emergence of Hallyu 2.0. To be specific, Tunisian national television network and satellite dish (2007-2010) had a decisive effect on the diffusion of Korean drama as the most influential medium of viewing it. Prior to the arrival of Hallyu 2.0, it was Korean drama that played essential role in accepting Korean culture among Tunisians, thereby it provided opportunity to Korean media contents gradually spreading out to Tunisian households. Beginning with family-oriented drama contents, in late 2007, Korean drama appealed young and old alike. Since then a family-centric popularity of Korean drama has experienced transition to young generation who watched drama with their parents whereafter they spontaneously seek out Korean media products and transfer to others. In the process of globalization, media contents travel anywhere on the globe thanks to Internet service and Tunisia was not the exception. The decline of Internet censorship and the subsequent rising rate of Internet usage accelerated the diffusion of Hallyu around K-pop and Korean drama with English subtitles. It is the arrival of brand-new mediascape that convey other culture in the global context. Such exposure to Korean cultural products through diverse mediums enhanced the cultural intimacy between Korea and Tunisia on the basis of Korean value in which Islam gladly embraces.

This study paved the way to investigate the Islamic world beyond geographical limitation in the Middle East and expand the point of view toward North Africa, in particular, Tunisia as a case study. On top of that, the majority of immigrant community in France is consist of people from Maghreb due to the same linguistic background – francophone; therefore, this study contributes to broaden research field providing cultural hybridity. Tunisia has been left behind in inter-cultural field with Korea. Moreover, the media has covered it as the nation where is full of insecurity caused by Islamist and terror. As discussed in this research, without comprehensive understanding of Islam, balanced cultural exchange is not able to be completed among diverse cultural fields. For instance, Tunisia is comparatively open to accept other culture and pleasantly enjoy it their everyday life as well; however, basically it is Islamic society which means requires to respect essential religious factors such as conservative clothing for woman, prohibition against alcohol and fasting during Ramadan. In this sense, Hallyu in Tunisia is considerably encouraging as this research has shown; located in North Africa– Maghreb experiencing foreignness though Korean media contents, people whose Islamic mindset identifying with Korean culture and aspiration for the advanced society negotiating alternative modernity. More importantly, sharing the postcolonial experience has been played significant role in establishing cultural sympathy and it leads eventually to cultivate desire to be developed. Overall, Korean drama carries relation-oriented narrative with universal themes which accommodates to fulfill the gap between the Islamic traditional value and the growing modernity from outside of the Islamic world. Accordingly, this study suggests that several recommendations for further studies and field: media studies on Hallyu beyond Asia and public diplomatic strategy over the Islamic world. In spite of the spread of Hallyu in the Middle East and Africa where has remained as unexpected place, media researches on Hallyu restrictedly focus on Korea's neighboring countries, East and South Asia. To be specific, while Korean drama has ignited Hallyu since 2007 and broaden to Korean popular music, Tunisian interviewees' parents became the 1st generation of Tunisian Hallyu, and yet, this study does not discuss their consumption of Korean drama. A further study with more focus on inter- cultural diffusion throughout generations as well as public diplomacy based on Hallyu in the Islamic world is therefore suggested. Given that Korean government and citizens tend to take the explosive growing popularity of Korean popular culture for granted,

mutual understanding between different cultural fields is required to witness sustainable Hallyu in the future on the globe. Moreover, this study is likely to be considered as a simple case study of Hallyu in Tunisia; instead, it will contribute not only to further exchange with the Islamic world where exists cultural barrier due to Korea's dependence on the West but also to expand Hallyu into the unexplored field in this age of globalization.

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NOTE

- ¹ Maghreb means the west which means sunset in Arabic including Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco.
- ² MBC (the Middle East Broadcasting Center) group is the first private free-to-air satellite broadcasting company in the Arab World where its headquarter is Dubai-based. It has 10 television channels, two radio stations and one specialized documentary production unit covering Arabic-speaking countries.
- ³ Sad Love Story (Seulpeun Yeon-ga: Sŭlp'ŭn Yŏn'ga) aired from Jan. to Mar., 2005 on MBC for 20 episodes. It also aired on the Arabic channel Dubai TV worldwide; therefore, Tunisians were available to watch this drama on TV.
- ⁴ During Ben Ali regime, Tunisia has been suffered from Internet censorship; for example, social networking sites such as Youtube had strict filters. In response to the success of Arab spring – Tunisian revolution in Jan. 2011 – offered greater freedom of expression in Tunisia; Tunisians were eventually available to live out under surveillance.
- ⁵ DAC is a forum of OECD, which is consist of 29 members including EU; it mainly discusses about aid, development and poverty reduction in developing countries as the world's major donor countries.